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What is here submitted is a revised form of the Thesis, 
considerably altered and recast. In its original form the 
Thesis was not found acceptable by the Examiners, but I was 
allowed the opportunity of re-submitting it and various 
suggestions were kindly given to me as to the lines on 
which I might proceed in revising the work. In the present 
Thesis the endeavour has been made as far as possible to 
carry out these suggestions: the result being that the 
sections of the work dealing with the views of the two 
writers, Coleridge and Maurice, have been considerably 
shortened and condensed, while the exposition of the view 
I desire to advocate has been expanded and the arguments 
T have to bring forward in support of that view more fully 
detailed. I have here given a much fuller account of the 
Patristic theory of "Ransom",' and of Anselm's famous 
Refutation of it. I have also brought out more clearly 
the Affinity of the two English theologians with the Pa- 
tristic view, and their distinction from the purely 
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INTRODUCTION.
TIIE PURPOSE of this Thesis is to advocate a return-to a pre- 
Ansclmic conception of Atonement theory, and to make an appeal for 
renewed attention to the Patristic idea of a "Ransom". The Death 
of Christ is a Ransom - a Price - which God has to pay for the
redemption of men. (fee 4JJ|p/9eWt>c A)
I do not profess to put forward any new discovery in this fully 
excavated - even over excavated - field of Atonement controversy, 
every inch of which has been examined a^id re-examined with a 
minuteness which itself speaks for the importance of the subject 
and its vital concern to the human heart; but it is the fact that 
with Anselm there cane a radical change of emphasis which has more 
or less coloured the treatment of the doctrine over since, and has 
- as I have been forced to think - introduced a certain obsession 
or prejudice, a certain biassed point of view that has been too 
readily accepted in dealing with the Atonement. Anselm gave the 
death blow to the theory of a "Ransom to the Devil" which prevailed 
before his time. That theory has never really raised its head again. 
It has in most books on the Atonement been exhumed for a moment 
only to be battered with fresh blows and flung into the grave 
again with renewed contumely. "That hideous theory", Ra,shdall 
calls it,- "the coarse mythology of the Ransom theory". And he 
says, "Never in the whole history of Christian thought has a doct- 
rine been so decidedly destroyed by criticism and more universally 
abandoned".(Ideas and Ideals.158)
I venture to think it is just this universal abandonment of it, 
this utter refusal to look at what it means and to make use of
(ii)
th<« principle underlying it that has introduced into the doctrine 
ar.cl retained in the doctrine a sense of obscurity and mystery 
which need not bo there. As an act of God, and an outcome of 
OoH'n nature and character, the Atonement is naturally mysterious. 
Like nil the greatest things it ultimately - exit in mysteriun. 
Hut apart from the welcome grandeur of this inevitable and awe  
inspiring nystery, one fools - in reading the history of the 
doctrine up to the present tine, in tracing the efforts of the 
Krratost writers to find an explanation of the fact - one cannot 
resist the impression that there is a difficulty which ought to 
yiold, there is a sense of baffled effort, to some extent there is 
the feoling of a koy lost, a missing feUaifcent that, were it found, 
would illumine a dark region.
I am bold enough to suggest that the lost key, the desired 
source of illumination, may be found, - not indeed in a re-habi- 
litation of the "Ransom to the Devil" theory as it stood in the 
ancient writers - this no one would dream of attempting in these 
days - but in a fresh investigation of the essential principle 
of which that despised theory was the mythological embodiment. 
I do claim that the total neglect of that principle has helped 
to make the one supreme question, the main problem of the Atone- 
ment - namely, the actual necessity for Christ's death - more 
obscure and baffling than it ought to be. '
There are four main types of theory regarding the Atonement, 
two of which may be said to, divide the field between them at the 
present d&y.
(I) First there is the "Satisfaction" theory which, since the
(iii)
tltw* *hen it received such notable expression in the magnificent 
*y*trn of AnHoln, has stood^ under a great variety of forms - 
nn tho orthodox, official explanation of Christ's death, right on 
throtuii tho Scholastic and Reformation periods up to the present 
tlw, and nay bo said to express the view held by most of the 
pvnfiK'oliral writers and preachers of the age.
(2) Secondly, there is the Subjective, "Moral Influence" theory, 
fir«t put forward conspicuously by Abelard in the twelfth century 
nnd revived by several thinkers in recent times. It has attracted 
n ru;nber of "nodcrn" minds among theologians, Dean Rashdall being 
llH nont notable present day exponent.
The principal modern explanations of the Atonement will bo found 
to conform to one or other of these two types.
(fl) A third theory, which was adumbrated first prehaps by 
Irenaeus, and which has appeared from time to time not generally 
a.s a sepufrate theory but rather as an element in some form of the 
Satisfaction theory, is seen in the idea of "Recapitulation" or 
"Representation", the idea that Christ in His atoning death is 
acting not as an individual but as the representative or as the 
actual inclusive summing up of humanity. This view has often 
crept in as a sort of explanatory or supplementary element to 
ease the difficulty that was felt to attach to some forms of the 
Satisfaction theory.
Possibly Ritochl, with his thougit of Christ's priestly sacri- 
fice in fulfilment of His Vocation, a sacrifice first for Himself
and then for His brethren, may fit in as a modern representative 
of this "Representation" theory better than of any other. 
(4) The fourth main type of theory is.found in the Patristic
(iv)
conception that Christ's death is a Ransom to the Devil. This is 
the view that I would bring forward for fresh investigation in the 
hApo that it nay be found to yield fruitful results.
My reason for basing this work on ,the views of these two English 
theologians, Coleridge and Maurice, is not by any means that they 
can be claimed as adherents of the ancient Patristic theory. 
Neither of them, I imagine, would be in the least willing to acknow- 
ledge such a claim. I know of no modern adherent of the theory, nor 
indeed of any modern writer whatever who mentions it at all except 
to scout it as a long exploded myth, or at best to regard it as a 
theory that "became involved in conceptions curiously impossible 
for us", as Denney says.(Doet.of Sacrifice. p. 31)
Note:- Denney here, in his remarks on. the Ransom theory 
in the course of his historical Sketch of the 
doctrine, seems fully to recognise the value 
of the principle underlying the Ransom theory, 
but apparently forgets this afterwards or at 
least rails to seek any guidance or help from 
it in his own wrestling with the problem.
But in studying the two English writers mentioned I became more 
and more convinced of the need for calling in the aid of such a 
principle as this theory embodies, as essential to the explanation 
of the Atonement. The profound sense of the reality and power of 
evil which both these writers exhibit in all their teaching on 
Redemption; Coleridge's very strilclng and original view of 
"original sin"; Maurice's emphatic and repeated insistance on the 
great idea that all sacrifice proceeds from God, that the whole 
sacrifice is madeby God and that our sacrifice to Him is but an 
expression of our trust in His sacrifice for us; such things 
among others helped to confirm the view I have long held that the
(v)
ancient explanation of Christ's Atonement as a "Ranson" nust be, 
of all theories,nearest to the truth.
The attempt is sometimes made, in one way or other, to evade or 
pet round about the actual point of the problem in treating of the 
Atonement.
For example, the thought is often suggested that in this whole 
question of Redemption and the Atonement made by Christ, what realjr 
natters and what really is indubitable is the fact of it. Theory 
is irrelevant. No agreement will ever be found as to the meaning 
and explanation of the fact. There are many (with Butler,for 
exanple) who would profess a general scepticism as to the possi- 
bility of reaching any kind of satisfying rationale of the atoning 
act. Facturn est. That is all we can say. It _is a fact. The Cross 
has proved historically to be the "power of God unto salvation", 
the supreme and only real power of spiritual uplift and regene- 
ration; but the explanation of this fact, the true theory of it, 
is for ever beyond our grasp. 
Now this is an idea that must be entirely rejected. We must have
- or at least must never cease striving to have - some satisfac- 
tory thought in our mind as to its meaning if we are to do justice 
to the fact; and it has been very effectually shown, by Denney 
and others in dealing with this view, that a fact in which there 
is no theory is a fact in which we can see no meaning. Theorising 
on the Atonement requires no apology or justification for it is 
inevitable.
Again, there is the view - pretty commonly held - that all 
theories of the Atonement are true so far as they go, but no one
(vi)
of then is adequate, not all of then together are adequate, as a 
full explanation of the fact. Dr.Orr for example gives expression 
to this thou^it; "Gathering together all the various aspects of 
Christ's work which have been brought before us, we see, I think, 
the truth of the renark     that the true or full view of 
Christ's work in redemption is wide enough to include them all - 
takes up the elements of taruth in every one of them".(Christ.View, 
p.365)
This of course is entirely true. "The fact is far greater than 
any theory of the fact; and there are elements of truth in every 
theory ever put forward. But simply to say, as has sometimes been 
said, that there ia truth in all theories - and to leave the matter 
there - to advance this as a plea for exemption from further theo- 
rising, is sinply to say that there is truth in no theory. This 
vague attitude will never be satisfying. There must be one theory 
above all others in which the mind can rest as being the actual 
truth of the matter. Or at least the attempt must be made and be 
continuously pursued to find such a theory.
Finally, there is the view put forward by many - perhaps by 
nost modern writers - that the Death of Christ in relation to the 
Atonometit is not to be regarded as anything more than the natural 
consequence of the Life He lived. It was the inevitable outcome 
of the kind of life Christ gave Himself to and of His fidelity to
the truth. The idea here is that, traditionally, too much has boen 
made of the Death, the Cross, the Blood. It is in the whole
phenomenon of the Christ (it is said), His Incarnation, His Life 
and Work and Teaching - as well as in His Death - that the Atone- 
ment consists.
(vii) 
attitude is quite intelligible. Its appeal to the nodern nind
IK obvious, as helping towards the rationalising of the whole 
question, and as bringing the doctrine of Atonenent nore strictly 
with in the bounds of ethical categories.
Nevertheless, I think this will be found on reflection to be one 
nore attenpt (and there have been far too riany in the history of the 
doctrinej) to evade the real problen and to escape the difficulty. 
It is the Cross itself after all that calls for explanation, and 
there is no getting round it. Corner says that Chris.t "frequent- 
ly at fitting tines describes His suffering and death as a task 
prescribed on Hin by God. His suffering and death are to Hin not 
nerely an occurence or nisfortune so that He cannot avoid death 
without unfaithfulness to Hinself." (Syst.Christ.Doet.III.413) 
That is the very point. The death itself is Christ's great posi- 
tive act. It is not an accident of His calling. I heartily agree 
with Thonasius of the Erlangen School:- "In fact the chief stress 
so rmch lies upon the sacrifice that the death, the blood, can 
alnost be spoken of as the whole through which reconciliation is 
effected".(Pranks,Hist.of Doct.309) The Atoiienent problem is 
the Death of Christ - which has got to be isolated and explained.
The Purpose of this Thesis, as has been said, is to show that tho 
deepest questions in the doctrine receive their best answer in the 
ancient Patristic theory; and I start fron Coleridge and Maurice 
because it secns to ne that both of then in their writings   
sonetines consciously and of act purpose, sonctincs coning on the 
natter as it were by chance   have answered those questions, noro
(viii)
thrm any other theologians of modern tines, in a manner essentially 
Hinilar to the answer supplied by that theory.
I bracket the two thinkers together because the fundamental prin- 
ciples of both in this matter show the same prevailing tendency. 
Moreover, Maurice derives from Coleridge. That large, generous, 
expansive though unsystematised body of theology for which the name 
of F.D.Maurice stands in English thought, and which exercised such 
an immense and beneficent influence on the theologians, poets, 
reformers of the later nineteenth century, is really an outgrowth 
and further development of those extraordinary flashes of insight, 
those original, germinative sparks of thought shot forth by Cole- 
ridge in the period of the Romantic Revival.
I havo to seek an answer to the question - precisely why has 
Christ to suffer? Where lies the necessity? Anselm states the 
question with the utmost clearness and vigour; "Quaeritur enim, 
cur Deus aliter hominem salvare non potuit, aut si potuit, cur hoc 
nodo voluit. Nam et inconveniens videtur esse Deo hominem hoc modo 
salvasse; necrapparet, quid mors ilia valeat ad salvandum hominem. 
Minim enim est, si Deus sic delectatur aut eget sanguine innocen- 
tis, ut non nisi interfecto eo parcere velit aut possit nocenti". 
(Cur Deus Homo.1.10)
Yes. Cur Deus Homo? Why this dreadful descent into the humili- 
ation of death? I shall attempt to find the answer in that very 
fact which Anselm in the sequel Of his work set himself to repudi- 
ate - the power of evil to demand a ransom. "This sacrifice", says 
Sabatier, "Christ Himself voluntarily offered, not to God, Kho had 
no need of it, - not to the devil, who had no rigfct to it - but
IX
to Hi3 brethren whom He wished to deliver, etc. (Theological 
Symposium, p. 218)
"The devil had no right to it." May it not be that the 
devil had power to require it?
I may indicate the Scope of the Thesis as follows;- 
I shall first of all deal with the two writers, Coleridge 
and Maurice, in turn, indicating in each case the various 
points of their actual teaching on the Atonement. I shall 
then endeavour to show the affinity of their leading prin- 
ciples with that theory to which I wish to call fresh atten- 
tion, viz,- the Patristic theory of Ransom. This theory itself 
will then require some description, -and I shall set it forth, 
briefly, as it appears in the pages of Gregory of Kyssa - 
where we have it in its purest form. Kext will follow - 
an account of Anselm's refutation of the theory - my own 
counter criticism of Anselm and of the whole "Satisfaction" 
idea in Atonement doctrine - criticism of the purely sub- 
jective theory of "Moral Influence", showing the defects 
of that theory as an explanation of the Atonement, and 
pointing out how essentially the teaching of Coleridge and 
Maurice is to be distinguished from it. This will be fol-. 
lowed, finally, by a constructive summary of the doctrine.
CHAPTER I. 
COLERIDGE.
Smnuel Taylor Coleridge is the great high priest of our English 
Romantics. He is emotional, imaginative, strange, individual, 
adventurous, - far removed from any classic regulation or order. 
Yet also, very curiously, he is an extraordinarily sane Rational- 
ist and Metaphysician. When dealing with religious or philosophical 
natters his mind, which so habitually wanders and strays in the
*
wild regions of the dream world, has a brilliance almost unique 
in its search for precision of thought and word, and in its sense 
of the importance of absolute correctness of expression.
(I) GENERAL.
The influence of Coleridge on all departments of our life and 
thought has been very great, and it is not surprising that fresh 
attention is being directed to him at the present time. Testi- 
nonies to that influence abound in our literature.
Tulloch says: "That Coleridge's thought was a new power is 
beyond question. The 'Aide to Reflection 1 created a real 
epoch in Christian thought. The fact is that the later 
streams of thought in England are all more or less 
coloured by his influence." "Many of his hints and sugges- 
tions", says James Russell Lowell, are more pregnant than 
whole treatises".
Dr.J.H.Muirhead has borne the following 
significant and weighty testimony ("Contemporary British 
. . philosophy",1923.vgl.I-p.3091; "I 4° not,think that there 
is a point in the idealism of the ^seventies^hich was not 
anticipated ? perhaps even better expressed, than it has 
ever been s^nce, by Coleridge in one place or another of hi£ 
numerous writings. What was leit to the generation I am 
speaking of was to familiarise students of philosophy by 
translation and commentary with the works of Kant and Hegel, 
and by systematic exposition to complete the work which 
Coleridge had planned and had let drop from his hands."
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Such striking witness from that distinguished philosopher, of the 
present day, Dr.Muirhead, is welcome, for it is time that Cole- 
ridge's thou$it wore looked into afresh and the illumination regained 
which it is fitted to cast upon such deop natters as this of the 
Christian Atonement.
Coleridge's most distinctive work in theology and the most 
earnest desire of that severely rational element that lay deep in 
his mind, was to "restore the broken harmony between reason and 
religion". He desired to commend the Christian Religion to think- 
ing men for their wholehearted acceptance, and he set before him 
as his aim to make Christianity a religious philosophy. He is always 
appealing to reason. He takes a broad view of religion, and his* 
constant ambition is to present Christuanity as a living mode of 
thought embracing all the activity of man, a kind of spiritual 
philosophy appealing to reason as well as to conscience and faith.
In the'Aids to Reflection 1 throughout, Coleridge makes this 
rationalising purpose of his clear. Let us take one or two passages;
"The position I have undertaken to defend is that the Christ- 
ian Faith is the perfection of human intelligence. The 
mysteries of Christianity are reason - reason in its highest 
form of self-affirmation." (Preface.xvi.)
"I had the following objects principally in view;- first, 
to exhibit the true and scriptural meaning and intent of 
several articles of faith that are rightly classed among tho 
mysteries and peculiar doctrines of Christianity. Secondly, 
to show the perfect rationality of these doctrines, and 
their freedom from all just objection when examined by their 
proper organ, the reason and conscience of man." (p.114)
"By undeceiving, enlarging and informing the intellect, 
philosophy sought .to elevate and purify the moral character. 
Christianity reverses the order. Her first step was to 
cleanse the heart, but the benefit did not stop there. 
Christianity restores the intellect likewise to its natural 
clearness.......The hopes, the fears, the remembrances, the
anticipations, the inward and outward experience, the be- 
lief and the faith, of a Christian, form of themselves a 
philosophy and a sum of knowledge which a life spent in the 
grove of Academus or the painted Porch could not have attained 
or collected. The result is contained in the fact of a wide 
and still widening Christendom".(p.145-6)
In that extraordinary desire for accuracy and clearness both of 
thought and expression which Coleridge manifests throughout his 
prose works, he more than once in the 'Aids to Reflection 1 gives 
ft concise summary of what he has been teaching up to that point; 
and we mi$it here take one of these bird's-eye views which will set 
before us an outline of his argument:-
"My first attempt was to satisfy you that there is a spiri- 
tual principle in man, and to expose the sophistry of the 
arguments in support of the contrary. Our next step was to 
clear the road of all counterfeits by showing what is not 
the spirit, what is not spiritual religion. And this was 
followed by an attempt to establish a difference in kind 
between religious trtths and the deductions of speculative 
science; yet so as to prove that the former are not only 
equally rational with the latter, but that they alone ap- 
peal to reason in the fulness and living reality of their 
power.......Having then enumerated the articles of the
Christian Faith peculiar to Christianity, I entered on the 
great object of the present work; namely, the removal of 
all valid objections to these articles on the grounds of 
reason and conscience." (p.249)
(2) RELATION TO KANT.
The philosophical reader as he takes up the study of Coleridge's 
theological thought will be forcibly struck at once by the undoubted 
resemblance of its foundation principles to those of the great 
system of Kant.
Coleridge's famous distinction (of which he makes so much) between 
Reason and Understanding; his powerful convictions as to the will, 
its freedom and self-legislative character; his ideas of original 
sin, of soul,of duty; indeed his entire ethical system(so far as 
he has a system): are easily recognisable as almost entirely 
Kantian - in appearance at least. A definite genetic relation is 
certainly suggested, although the appearance of similarity is per- 
haps greater than the reality. There are distinctions that are
4 
fnirly vital and far-reaching.
Coleridge has a truer sense thai! Kant has of the realities of 
nan's moral experience. He is nore truly religious in his trend of 
thought. Kant's real interest all through his work is quite appa- 
rently scientific, and it is really this scientific interest that 
determines the form of Kant's ethical and religious theories. Cole- 
ridge feels nore deeply that life is not altogether amenable to 
scientific treatment. He is rather like Jacobi than Kant in his 
religious sentiments, - pious, lyrical, romantic, experiential, 
rather than strictly scientific or philosophical. Undoubtedly 
Kant's forms of thought are the original sources of Coleridge's 
forms, but Coleridge takes them up into a different order of mind, 
a more human and emotional order of mind, than that which origi- 
nally projected them. In a very interesting passage in the "Bio- 
graphia Literaria" Coleridge himself has referred to this quality 
of his mind in its attitude to truth, and has attributed it liargely 
to his study of the Mystics. The writings of the Mystics "acted 
in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned 
within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed 
to keep alive the heart in the head; gave me an indistinct yet 
stirring and working presentment that all the products of the mere 
reflective faculty partook of death." (p.75). Franks, in comparing 
the theological influence of Coleridge in England with that of 
Schleiermacher in Germany, says that one important difference is 
that in Coleridge the Kantian Criticism is less thoroughly applied 
to doctrine than it is in Schleiermacher, the consequence being 
that whereas the latter presents an anthropological Christianity, 
Coleridge is able to accept the orthodox Christianity of the creeds,
5
Coleridge himself freely acknowledges his indebtedness to Kant, 
and the distinction between Reason and Understanding, which forms 
the subject of considerable discussion in the Aids - and indeed is 
interwoven with his argunent throughout - is definitely based on the 
epoch-making Kantian conception of the "Categories of Understanding" 
and the "Ideas of Reason". But it will be found that Coleridge 
really puts that conception to his own use and in various ways 
alters it to suit the requirements of his own purpose.
He himself looks upon the distinction as being of supreme and 
vital importance:-
"Until you have mastered the fundamental difference in kind 
between the reason and the understanding as faculties of the 
human mind, you cannot escape a thousand difficulties in n 
philosophy. It is preeminently the gradus ad philosophiam. 
(Table-Talk.p.94)
"This view of the Understanding as differing in degreo from 
Instinct and in kind from Reason is an indispensable pre- 
liminary to the removal of the most formidable obstacles 
to an intelligent belief in the peculiar doctrines of the 
Gospel." (Aids.197)
It must be confes.scd that Coleridge's elaborate discussion of this 
question is, from a strictly psychological or ethical point of view, 
confused and not always consistent. The general scheme is obviously 
based on the great Kantian distinction, but Coleridge's nomencla- 
ture crosses Kant's at various points, and does not always mean 
the same thing.
"Reason," he says, "is much nearer to sense than to under- 
standing, for reason is a direct aspect of truth, an inward 
beholding, having a similar relation to the intelligible or 
spiritual as sense has to the material or phenomenal." (182)
"There is an intuition or immediate beholding accompanied 
by a conviction of the necessity and universality of the 
truth so beholden,&c".(184)
"Immediate beholding,". "direct aspect of truth, 11 that is "Reason" 
for Coleridge, and this is his real distinction from Kant.
6
The fact is that Coleridge entirely abandons and demolishes Kant's 
Hccpticism. He knows nothing of the limitation of "reason" to a 
noroly regulative function, nor of the ideas of reason being il- 
lusory. The ideas of reason for Coleridge are facts, not mere ideas, 
They are revelations of reality - they give actual truth.
The distinction, of course, does not hold and has no real signi- 
ficance in modern thought, but it is clear why it is of such vital 
iaportance for Coleridge; what he wants to demonstrate is that 
nan, through his conscience and reason, has access to spiritual 
reality,the spiritual world with its laws and requirements is open 
to him directly, and the human will is free to obey these laws so 
revealed. That is Coleridge's intention all through the discussion. 
It is this "spiritual principle", this direct contact with and 
participation in the ultimate spiritual reality of th e universe 
which is God, that constitutes the essential and distinctive nature 
of man and gives him his dignity. It is here also, in this highest 
aspect of his life, that man goes wrong and sins, here that he 
stands in need of redemption. Here is Coleridge's real interest 
in pursuing so elaborately the distinction of Reason and Understan- 
ding. The Will, directed by reason - that "Reason" which is the 
source of actual truth to man - is for Coleridge the crucial point 
of the whole human situation. Here "the sin and the saving lies".
While Coleridge in his whole treatment of the will or spiritual 
principle in man is directly based on Kant's geoat fact of the Self 
Legislative Will, yet he really differs from Kant.. Kant's "Self. 
Legislative Will" is after all, from the point of view of actual 
reality, a mere abstraction.lt is only a "practical postulate",a
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demand of the moral life. In spite of Kant's various inconsis- 
tencies of statement, this is the real effect of his teaching. 
Coleridge's "will", on the other hand, is in every sense a real 
fact. It is in his view intensely real - a fact by itself in the 
universe. The position of Coleridge here differs also from that 
of Hegel. For Hegel the will of man comes to be identified either 
with the empirical process or with God. For Coleridge it is a
reality in itself, a fact, over against both God and the world, an
decisions
aboriginal independent self, whose acts and agctseion have no other
origin but itself. 
Now this transcendant, spiritual, supernatural character of the
will is, Coleridge confesses, the "groundwork of his whole scheme", 
and he dwells at length upon it in the "Aids to Reflection".
"The will is preeminently the spiritual constituent of our 
being, and the spiritual and supernatural are synonymous"jl 
(p.44)
"Whatever, by whatever means, has its principle in itself, 
so far a-s to originate its actions ? cannot be contemplated 
in any of the forms of space and time; it must be consi- 
dered as spirit or spiritual.(49)
"The moment we a^^umc an origin in nature, a true beginning, 
an actual first, - that moment we rise above nature and are 
compelled toassume a supernatural power.(212) Herein the 
will consists,&c."
He goes on to show that this spirituality of the will, appearing 
as freedom and self-originating power, is a direct experience. 
"As we know what life is by living, so we know what will is by acting 
And if proof of this fceedom be called for, or doubt be cast on the 
experience of it as being an illusion, Coleridge replies that the 
consciousness of freedom to act and to originate my own acts is 
axiomatic in experience and can only be proved in the same way as 
all other self-evident axioms are proved - by the inconceivability 
of the contrary. He is here strictly in line with modern logic.
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There are certain ultinate axiomatic truths which are not suscep- 
table of proof except that it is impossible to conceive the contraj^ 
Coleridge holds the freedom of the will and its origination of its 
own acts to be such a truth.
It may be said that Coleridge's views here as to the wills free- 
don and self-originating power are quite in accordance with the 
conclusions of recent psychology. For example, Dr.Francis Aveling 
in "The Psychological Approach to Reality",1929,p.142, referring 
to "the very considerable series of researches that have been 
carried out during the past twenty years or so upon the human will", 
proceeds;-
"Little by little in these investigations a theoretical 
Psychology of Will, still, it is true, elementary, has been 
built up. In that Psychology, both the telcological and 
the efficient causality of willing (resolving, deciding, 
determining,&c.) must be recognised. The experimental work 
already done leads us to distinguish conation (trying, 
striving, achieving.&c.) from volition proper. And it has 
been found that in truly voluntary acts the striving or 
doing is related to the determination or resolve to do as 
effect to cause."
Now in relation to Coleridge's treatment of "reason" as direct visian 
of reality and of will as self-legislative, it may be added before 
leaving the subject, that this shows a distinct advance upon Kant's 
views: in this sense, that, if the "ideas of reason" are not mere 
postulates but revealed realities, it follows that the catego- 
rical imperative (the law according to which the will acts) issues 
not merely from the depths of our own nature, but from the heart 
of the spiritual universe itself. We are self-legislative, but we 
only .re-enact the law already enacted by God. We recognise rather 
than constitute the law of our own being. The moral law given in 
reason is the echo within our souls of the voice of the Eternal. 
Kant's "self-legislative will" is not, therefore, the whole truth.
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The law according to which our will legislates is God's law - of 
which, (owing to Coleridges view of "reason") we are directly con- 
scious. So that the "postulate of the Practical Reason" is no 
longer a mere postulate - it comes within the sphere of certain 
knowledge. (A f>p e 7? dPa D,
(3) ORIGINAL SIN AND REDEMPTION.
There are three moments or stages in Coleridge's theory of the 
Atonement;-
1st - the free will acting and.legislating according to the 
law given in its own reason.
2nd - "Original Sin" - the evil which acts on and in the 
will.
3rd - the redemption or deliverance of the will.
We have considered above his views on reason and the will, and 
have oeen how they derive their form largely from the Kantian 
system, although in some essential ways they show a radical diver- 
gence from it. We now pass to a consideration of "Original Sin" 
and its remedy in Redemption.
As Coleridge has close affinities with the Greek view that reason 
is contemplation of the Ideas, a faculty independent of sense and 
the sole source of real or higher knowledge, so he is strongly 
reminiscent of the early Greek Christian Fathers in his appreci- 
ation of the tremendous fact of evil, its power and its signifi- 
cance; anj here, I would venture to assert, we find his creden- 
tials as a guide into the mysteries of the Atonement. Neither in 
the actual expreiencc of life nor in the study of Christian
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doctrine can the Atonement be really approached except through 
that dark and dreadful region. Many of the failures to understand 
and to explain the Atonement as well as to experience its power 
are due to this initial failure to look deeply enough into the 
terrible abyss of evil. Coleridge never minimises sin, nor does 
he hesitate for a moment to attribute it to its true cause, or to 
assess the ultimate accountability for it. It is evil, wholly and 
originally evil - and it is mine, wholly and originally mine. That 
is his teaching.
Cole ridge disclaims any attempt to account for the ultimate 
origin of evil in the universe and refuses to discuss the question, 
as being beside his purpose, but in all his teaching on the matter 
there are three things he makes clear; (I) The only real evil is 
an evil will - there is no sin, can be none, except in the will. 
(2) He totally 4he rejects the idea ofi any Divine causality in re- 
lation to evil. (3) He asigns evil, and evil alone, as the neces- 
sitating cause of Christ's death. These are vital principles in 
his theory of Atonement.
Now the meaning Coleridge gives to "Original Sin" is well known;-
"I profess a deep conviction that man was and is a fallen 
creature, not by accidents of bodily conditions or any other 
cause.... ..but as diseased in his will, in that will which
is the true and only strict synonym of the word "I" or the 
intelligent self." (Aids.104)
"With sin originant, not derived from without; - not with 
sin inflicted, which would be a calamity; - not with sin 
imputed, for which let the planter be responsible; - but 
I begin with original sin".(204)
"In this sense of the word "original" it is evident that 
the phrase original sin is a pleonasm, the epithet not 
adding to the thought but only enforcing it. For if it be 
sin it must be original; and a state or act that has not 
its origin in the will, may be a calamity, deformity, 
disease or mischief; but a sin it cannot be." (215)
"A moral evil is an evil originating in a will". (233)
II
The position is quite clear. "Original Sin" is siriply sin that 
originates in the will - that is, all sin, for only sin origina- 
ting in the will is sin at all. All sin is original sin. Cole- 
ridge's conception of evil, therefore, the evil frojn which nan is 
to be redeemed, is that it is the corruption or depravation of the 
will.
His objection to the familiar idea of "Original Sin" is that uni- 
versal sin resulting from man's common nature is not sin. It is 
universal calamity. It is in us hereditary, therefore natural, 
belonging to nature, not to the "spiritual Principle" which is the 
will, and cannot be laid to our door as guilt; although at first
- in dmr first parents - it was "original", that is, willed, and 
therefore sin. Coleridge maintains that this is the true Scrip- 
ture doctrine.(Aids.235) The real difference between Coleridge 
and the familiar idea of "original sin" is that in the case of 
each one of the millions of men the sin is (with Coleridge) ulti- 
mately due to the self-determination of the will - whereas it has 
been perverted into the "monstrous fiction" of hereditary sin"(243)
Now while Coleridge's idea here is thus clear and unambiguous, 
his intention being to regard all sin as arising definitely in an 
act of will, and to deny to anything else the name of sin, it is 
interesting to notice that here again he has a close cesemblance 
to Kant, and moreover that he has really been somewhat deflected 
from this simple thought and led into a position inconsistent with 
it undrjr the influence of Kant. Kant'3 view of original sin is 
found in that extraordinary book, "Religion Within the Limits of 
Mere Reason", a book in Which we really have Kant's theory of the 
Atonement, or rather his conception of the Pall and Restoration 
of man.
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Kant's unconpronising assertion is that the bias to evil is innate 
and universal and yet willed by nan hinself and consequently guilt 
on his part;-
Lnen natur lichen Hang zun Bo sen. und 
verschuldet sein nuss, ihn selbst
"So werden wir diesen ein
da er doch inner selbst
ein radikalcs, angebornes (nichts desto weniger aber uns von
uns selbst zugezogenes) Bose in der nenschlichen Katur
nennen konnen." (Gornan Text.p.32)
A radical evil inborn in nan and yet entailed by nan upon hinself. 
This inborn universal bias to evil is, apparently, the individual's 
own sin, and therefore guilt. And Kant utterly rejects (as Cole- 
ridge does) the thought of inheritance in regard to this, for that 
would do away with our responsibility for it. Kant attributes it 
to an "intelligible act prior to all experience", an act "not in 
tine". "It is our own act, yet it is emphatically declared to pre- 
cede all acts. It is innate in the sense that the will nust be con-
#K*Cfep 
ceived to have given itself this bias before any opportunity *£4$&f
for employing its freedon within experience".(Seth."Kant to Hegel1, 
p.112)
Kant's well known position here offers a very extrene doctrine 
of "Original Sin", and one, I think, far beyond what Coleridge 
intends; yet we find hin - obviously under this influence - 
speaking as follows:-
"Let the evil be supposed such as to inply the impossibility 
of an individual's referring to any particular tine at which 
it night be conceived to have connenccd ? or to any period 
of his existence at which it was not existing. Let it be 
supposed that the subject stands in no relation whatever 
to tine, can neither be called in tine nor out or tine. 
....,.let the reader suppose this, and he will have before 
hin the precise inport of the Scriptural doctrine of Origi- 
nal Sin. 4' (Aids.231-2)
But the truth of Pfleideror's renark is certainly seen here - 
that "Coleridge's idea of 'Original Sin 1 is rather Kantian that; 
Biblical". In speaking of an act of will "not in tine", it seene
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to ne that Coleridge really gives away what he has gained by his 
very simple idea of "Original Sin" - that it is always a sin origi- 
nating in a will. So far as I - as a np>ral individual - an con- 
cerned, how does this sin which is due to "an intelligible act 
prior to all experience", an act "not in time", and which is inborn 
in all men - differ from the familiar Augustinian view of original 
sin and guilt? The problem remains, how a man can be held respon- 
sable for a sin which he did not commit.
Having shown the nature of the evil wbich is the occasion of 
Redemption, Coleridge goes forward to expound his view of that 
great transaction itself, and notwithstanding the diffuseness and 
want of system in his writing, the various points stand out with 
sufficient clearness and the total conception is unmistakably con- 
sistent.
To begin with, He is quite clear regarding his view of what the 
Christian Religion is. "Christianity and Redemption," he says, "are 
synonymous terms." (Aids.253) "The two great moments of the 
Christian Religion are, Original Sin and Redemption, that the 
ground, this the superstructure, of our faith." (250) Among all 
the works of God, the "main design" is the "fore-ordained redemp- 
tion of man." (244) And he makes perfectly clear the fact that 
sin (as he has defined it - "original sin") is alone the necessi- 
tating cause or ground of the redeeming death ofl Christ. He repeats 
this over and over again, and it is important tonotice that Cole- 
ridge 1^ whole treatment of the matter shows that he sees the entire 
cause, the sole necessity which demands that death, in the evil, 
the "original sin".
Next, Coleridge pointedly draws attention to the distinction
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between the Act ofl Redemption itself (which he speaks of as "trans- 
cendent") and the effects of that act as they are realised in the 
experience of men. In doing so he gives a full and careful ana- 
lysis of St.Paul's teaching on the Atonement, and the essential 
features of the Apostle's doctrine have never been explained with 
more power and subtlety. By disentangling the effects or conse- 
quences of Christ^S act as they are felt in the experience of the 
redeemed from the. essential nature of the act itself, as an act 
of God in Christ, he manages most skilfully and successfully to 
refute the whole idea of a satisfaction being made to God in the 
Atonement, that forensic or juridical view which "offends the 
conscience and moral sense".
"Now the article of Redemption may be considered in a two- 
fold relation - in relation to the antecedent, that is the 
Redeemer's act as the efficient cause and condition of 
redemption; and in relation to the conseauent, that is 
the effects in and for the redeemed".(264;
He shows the various metaphors by which StPaul illustrates the 
consequences of the act - sin offerings, reconciliation, satis- 
faction for a debt,&c. -.and proceeds;-
"Certain divines have supposed that the various expressions 
of St.Paul are to be interpreted literally; for example, 
that sin is, or involves, an infinite debt.....a debt 
owing to the vindictive justice of God the Father. 
Likewise that God .the Father by His absolute decree or 
through the necessity of His unchangeably justice had 
determined to exact the full sum; which must therefore be 
paid either by ourselves or by some other on our behalf. 
Are debt, satisfaction, payment in full, creditor's rights 
and the like, noalna propria, by which the very nature of 
redemption and its occasions -are expressed;- or are they, 
with several others, figures of speech for the purpose of 
illustrating the nature and extent of the consequences 
and effects of the redemptive act t and to excite in the 
receivers a due sense of the magnitude and manifold opera- 
tion of the boon and of the love and gratitude due to the 
Redeemer?"(270-1). "It is the effects and consequences 
of Christ's mediation****^ St.Paul is dilating".(73)&mck _ v '
Coleridge complains that theologians have erred in applying to
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the act of redemption itself those metaphors by which St.Paul is 
describing only the effects of that act in the experience of men; 
thus attributing to the Apostle crude theories of the Atonement 
which have appeared in the history of the doctrine, but which 
the moral sense of mankind cannot but reject, and which, as Cole- 
ridge trenchantly insists, St.Paul himself would repudiate. The 
distinction is very important and Coleridge has rendered signal 
service in pointing it out so clearly. All views of the Atone- 
ment naturally seek to base themselves on the New Testament, but 
it has not always beon recognised that what is said about the 
Atonement as it comes into our experience does not necessarily 
apply to the act of Christ itself or to God's actual intention 
in that act.
Now as to this "transcendent" matter itself - the Redemptive 
Act - the essential nature and meaning of the death of Christ - 
Coleridge speaks with reverence, with caution, but at the same 
time with that determination (which is the purpose of his whole 
inquiry) to push rationalising and explanation to the utmost 
reach of possibility; to leave nothing dark that can be made 
light.
"The mysterious act, the operative cause, is transcendent, 
Factum est; and beyond the information contained in the 
enunciation of th e fact, it can be characterised only by 
the nature of the consequences." (263)
"Respecting the
Redemptive Act itself and the Divine Agent, we know from 
revelation that He was made a 'quickening spirit 1 ; and 
that in order to this it was necessary that God should be 
'manifest in the flesh 1 : that the Eternal Word, throu&i 
whom and by whom the world was and is, should be made 
flesh, assume our humanity personally, fulfil all right- 
eousness, and so suffer and so die for us, as in dying 
to conquer death for as many as should receive Him. 
More than this, the mode, the possibility, we are not 
competent to know. It is a mystery by the necessity of
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the subject - which at all events it will be time enough 
for us to seek and expect to understand when we understand 
the mystery of our natural life M (267).
But Coleridge himself does go beyond this mere mystery, 
simple declaration of a factum est; and I find that he ventures 
two statements in regard to the nature of the act.
For one thing, the act of redemption is God's own act, and is 
in the nature of a begetting, and its effect, a new birth in man;-
"Now John the beloved disciple. .... .recording the Re-
deemer's own words, enunciates the fact itself, to the 
full extent in which it is enunciablc to the human mind, 
simply and without any metaphor, by identifying it in kind 
with a fact of hourly occurrence, a fact of every man's 
experience - known to all #et not better understood than 
the fact described lay it. In the redeemed it is a regene- 
ration, a birth, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, 
the germinal principle of a hi^icr and enduring life, of a 
spiritual life" (206).
Secondly, Coleridge makes clear j in conformity with his whole 
teaching on the will or spiritual principle in man, and on ori-£- 
ginal sin, that the redemptive act is an act that takes place in 
or on the human will. Redemption for Coleridge is the redemption 
of the will. Christ acts upon the will by a kind of "inward co- 
agency", compatible with, the existence of a personal free wiil, 
which enables the will to repent.
"Whenever the man is determined (that is l impelled and di- 
rected) to act in harmony of intercommunion, must not 
something be attributed to this all present power of act- 
ing in the will? And by what fitter names can we call 
this than - the Law as empowering; the Word as informing; 
and the Spirit as actuating?..... We may believe in the 
Apostle's assurance that not only doth the Spirit 'help 
our infirmities', that is, act on the will by a predis- 
posing influence from without, as it were, though in a 
spiritual manner and without suspending or destroying its 
freedom; .... .but that in regenerate souls it may act in 
the will; that uniting and becoming one with our will or 
spirit it may 'make intercession for us 1 "(47-8).
"The fact or actual truth haying been assured to us by 
Revelation, it is not impossible, by steadfast medita- 
tion on the idea and supernatural character of a personal
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will, for a nind spiritually disciplined to satisfy itself 
that the rederiptive act supposes (and that our redemption 
is even negatively conceivable only on the supposition of) 
an Agent who can at once act on the will as an exciting 
cause quasi ab extra; and in the will as the condition of 
its po"tentiaT7 and as the ground of its actual, beingV$2t£6)
This is as far as Coleridge goes in this transcendent natter, but 
out of his somewhat sporadic discussion 1 hold that there certainly 
do emerge the elenients of the true explanation of the Atonement.
In Coleridge, then, I find;-
(1) The Necessity for the death of Christ is in the Evil.
(2) The actual Object accomplished by that death is the de- 
liverance of the will.
CHAPTER II 
MMJHICE.
F.D.Maurice id a great human figure. He was a greo,t> Christian, 
and has really been a ^reat force in modern English theology. 
F.e ia a supreme example of the adage pectus tacit theolo^um, and 
.the bitter controversy and persecution which are asuociftted with 
his name arose fro.i the very greatness of the man's hen-rt.
Maurice
w?\3 a theologian by nature and grace, by training md experience. 
An extraordinary intellectual r-ud moral honesty, a pure love 01 
truth, an earnest anr , wholehearted desire to be oi service ;-nd 
hel^ to hij follows - based on an almost unexampled hcUiiility i-nd 
selflessness: that(one would say from a study of his life ;-nti 
writings) is the fundamental thing in Maurice as a man, the foun- 
tr.inhead of all he stands for aa a teacher, and the real jource 
of thr painful o^podition'fro: which he suffered XQ much.
Maurice is an outstanding example of the "broad" or "liberal" 
tendency of thought in English theology, an^. it hu,^ been said oi 
him that he "fashioned God in his own image." It is very largely 
a t- ao charge, for it ia his own great heurt oi love rxa charity, 
m-iking him jec the good ii; all things, carryiB,, him ^o far in 
toleraiice and broadmindedness a^ to ler-d him to say that "all men 
are ri&fet in what they affirm, only wrong in what they deny" - 
that raises him to that conception of the universality oi the.
t
divine love which lies at the ba^is of nil ins teuching. ,'nd 
it is because of tbid living, ^ersonal character 01 his views ;:s 
tho outcome of his own convictions and feelings, that rfaurice's
".
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teaching exercised such a far-reachinj iniluence - and not because 
of any complete and rounded-off system o£ thought, for Le had none.
Now ?Taurice is a direct and confessed dicci^le oi' Coleridge.
Many other influences helped to shape that vast body oi theology,
< 
unsystemat|rfsed, unwieldy, but so expansive, generous and true, which
 
fathers around his name - Erskine in Scotland, for ^xainple, con- 
tributed greatly to the form in which his thoughts are cast - but
the philosophical and ethical presuppositions on which his teach-
T€S"k? 
ing; 3w£s4£ are from Coleridge. On this matter v/e have Maurice's
OWD repeated and enthusiastic testimony ;-
"I had read Coleridge before I came up (to Cambridge) and 
I had received a considerable influence fro i him".... "I de- 
fended Co^ridge's metaphysics against Utilitarian teaching 
....'.'I had no inclination to infidelity, Coleridge had done 
much to preserve me froi that"... ."I was still under the 
influence oi Coleridge's writings, himself I never saw." 
(Life. I. 176-8) 
I'is Dedicatory Letter to Derwent Coleridge prefixed to the "King-
dom of Christ" consists largely of a grateful acknowledgement of
his debt to Coleridge:- - '
"The ''ids to Ilef lection 1 is a book to which I feel myself 
under dee> and solemn oblij abions. I can testil'y that it 
w ,s most helpful in delivering me Irom a number ol ^iiilo- 
sophical phrases ;xd generalisations, most helpful in 
ei>ablin( me to ^erceive th ,t the deepest ^riiiciples oi all 
are those which the peasant is ;,s capable of a^jrehcnaing 
and entering into ;s tho schoolman. ... .The AjOA7er oi per- 
ceiving that by the very law of the reason the laov/leciie 
of Cod must be jrivei, to it; th-'-t the monent it c-tte;;ipts 
to create its "taker ^it denies it^eli; bLe coi'victioi. ;tliat 
the mo.jt opposite kind oi' thing to that wnich Uni t:\-ri.a,- 
ism dreaniK of is necessary if the demands 01 reason ;.ro to 
be satisfied - I rcust acki;ov/lecl[,e that I receiver iro.a him, 
if I rijn not bo be unf.ratful to thelli^heot Tercher, ,Vho 
mirht certainly have chosen another instruiient lor con-nu- 
;4f , nicatinr' His mercies, but uho has been pleased, in very
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many cases as I know, to make use of this one." 
But apart from any spoken acknowledgement, we shall see that the 
influence of Coleridge is very evident in the fundamental elements 
of Maurice's religious philosophy. In his teaching of religion 
hi$ aim, like that of Coleridge, is to "give to man a divine 
philosophy". He wants to rationalise, to explain, to restore the 
harmony between reason and religion,
"I do not believe',1 says Archdeacon Hare, that there is any 
other living man who has done anything at all approaching 
what Mr.Maurice has effected in reconciling the reason 
and conscience of the thoughtful men of our age to the 
faith of our Church',' (Life of Maurice.II. 184)
Now in a great body of theology like that of Maurice, which is 
as sporadic, occasional and unsystematised as that of Coleridge 
himself, it is not easy to lay one's finger on what might be 
called the core or central principle of the teaching. There seem 
to be many centres. Canon Storr says that Maurice's fundamental 
principle is his belief in God's nearness to man - which is con- 
summated in the Incarnation of Christ. The Incarnation is the 
supreme example of the union of God and man, the Divine Logos 
incarnate in Christ is, in some measure, present in all men, and 
thus the Person of Christ is the centre of Maurice's creed. 
Certainly this Platonic conception of participation in the Di- 
vine is a very important element in Maurice's view of the Atone- 
ment. Again, Tulloch makes out two fundamental principles; 
the first - what has ,jtfst been mentioned, the great truth of 
the indwelling Christ, Christ the Head of every man. And the
second - his desire for Unity, and his sense of the oneness 
that really underlies all creeds and faiths.
But perhaps one can scarcely speak of a "fundamental Principle"
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or even two, in such a systen as that of Maurice. As Pfleiderer 
says, "his theology is more complicated than that of any other 
theologian, and is on many points extremely vague.,..His thought 
lacked clearness and steadiness, and his knowledge concentration 
and thoroughness 1.' (Develop.of Theol.373) In this respect Pflei- 
derer draws an interesting parallel between Maurice and the Ger- 
man theologian Dorner. In both he finds the same high moral and 
religious tone, the same want of logical consistency in their 
views.
In coming, therefore, to a consideration of Maurice's actual 
teaching on the Atonement one has to pick one's way through a 
miscellaneous mass; of material, and I find that his ideas may be 
gathered quite as much from his intimate letters as from his more 
formal works. The main sources are - (a) the "Doctrine of Sacri- 
fice',1 (b) the "Theological Essays'; (c) certain important Letters.
JBOINTS IN MAURICE'S ATONEMENT DOCTRINE.
(I) FREE WILL.
Maurice's teaching on the Will, its freedom and responsibility, 
is the same as that of Coleridge, and the first thing he makes 
clear in the Atonement as it applies to man, the first essential 
step towards understanding the doctrine or experiencing the power 
of the Atonement, is found in the will, the self and its sin. The 
sin that calle forth the redeeming act arises out of the will. It 
is my own. It is "original" (in Coleridge's sense). The intense 
conviction of personal responsibility ij as unmistakable in 
Maurice as it is in Coleridge, as it is in Kant's great doctrine 
of the Self-Legislative Will; and it is the first thing to be
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recognised in his doctrine.
"I did this act, I__thou$it this thought. It was a wrong 
act, it was a wrong thought, and it was mine. The world 
about me took no account of it, I can resolve it into no 
habits or motives; or if I can, the analysis does not 
help me in the least. Whatever the habit was, J wore the 
habit, whatever the motive was, I was the mover...Any- 
thing is better than the presenee of this dark self 1.1 
(Essay.j.22)
"That sense of a sin intricatelyj inseparably inter- 
woven with the very fibres of their being, of a sin which 
they cannot get rid of without destroying themselves, 
does haunt those very men who you say take no account 
of it. This is not the idiosyncrasy of a few strange 
temperaments. It is that which besets us all 1.1 (25)
This point need not here be dwelt upon further. Maurice has a
great deal to say on the subject of the will, but for our pre-
/
sent purpose this is all one need refer to - the will as the 
ultimate source of sin, and as in the last resort responsible 
and guilty. His teaching on this matter is entirely in line with 
Coleridge.
(IJ) THE NATURE AND POWER OF EVIL.
Maurice does not give us any more than Coleridge the ultimate 
origin of evil  )  who has done so, or can? - but he has some strong 
things to say on its nature and! its power. On this I shall call 
in evidence mainly three documents; the Third of the "Theological 
Essays"; the XVth Sermon in the "Doctrine of Sacrifice"; and the 
Letter to Hort in the Life.II.I5ff. These are of great importance, 
and one actually wonders if they have beon noticed at all by cer- 
tain writers on the Atonement, for Maurice here as it seems to me
touches the very core of the whole matter and has something to 
say on evil, its reality, its meaning, its power, which mi^it have 
obviated much subtle writing that goes round and round the car- 
dinal points in the doctrine wit tout ever coming to the heart of 
, them.
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There is a light shed here on the meaning of the Atonement which, 
I think, is hardly to be seen anywhere else since the early Patrio- 
tic age.
Letting alone the absolute origin of evil - whence comes the evil 
that is felt in every man's life and which gives rise to the sense 
of sin and responsibility we have just beon considering?
"There is in men a sense of bondage to some power which 
they feel that they should resist and cannot. That feeling 
of the 'ought 1 and 'cannot' is what forces, not upon scho- 
lars, but upon the poorest men. the question of the freedom 
of the will, and bids them seek some solution of it......
You may talk against devilry as you like; you will not get 
rid of it unless you can tell human beings whence comes 
that sense of a tyranny over their very selves which they 
express in a thousand forms of speech, which excites them 
to the greatest, often the most profitless indignation 
against the arrangements of the world, which tempts them 
to people it ahd heaven also with objects of terror and 
despair"(Essays.41-2)
There are set forth various ways of accounting for this evil that 
so seems to enslave us. The flesh, the body itself, say some, is 
inherently evil and must be destroyed. The soul, the spirit, say 
others, is corrupt, or has become corrupt, and must rise and re- 
gain its lost purity. But by what ladder? Ah no, say the mystics, 
the soul must not rise but rather sink. It must die. Till it die 
it will never know what life is. But there is a third, an older 
explanation which may be thought quite obsolete.
"There is no disguising it - the assertion stands broad 
and patent in the four Gospels - the acknowledgement of an 
Evil Spirit is characteristic of Christianity.....When I
speak of the existence and presence of an Evil Spirit as 
being characteristic of the Gospels. I mean this;- that 
in them first the idea of a spirit.directly and absolu- 
tely opposed to the Father or Lights f to the God of abso- 
lute love and goodness, bursts full upon us. There first 
we are taught that it is not merely something in peculiar- 
ly evil men which is contending against the &ood and true; 
no, nor sane thing in all men; that God has an antagonist, 
and that all men, bad and good, have the same......The
vision of a mere destroyer, a subverter of order, who is 
seeking continually to make us disbelieve in the Creator,
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to forsake the order that we are in, takes the place of 
every other. With these discoveries another is always con- 
nected; that this tempter speaks t9 me. to myself, to the 
will; that over that he has established his tyranny; that 
there his chains must be broken; but that all things in 
nature, with the soul and the body, have partaken, and do 
partake, of the slavery to which the man himself has sub- 
mitted.
I simply state these propositions; I am not going to de- 
fend them. If they cannot defend themselves, by the light 
which they throw on the anticipations and difficulties of 
the human spirit, by the hint of deliverance which they 
offer it, by the horrible dreams which they scatter, my 
arguments would be worth nothing.......
What is pravity or depravity - affix to it the epithets 
universal, absolute, or any you please - but an inclina- 
tion to something which is not right, an inclination to 
turn away from that which is right? What is it that ex- 
periences that inclinati9n? What is it that provokes that 
inclination? I believe it is the spirit within me which 
feels the inclination; I believe it is a spi.r i t snoaki ng 
to my spirit who stirs up the inclination. That old way 
"oT stating the case explains the facts, and commends 
itself to my reason. I cannot find any other which does 
not conceal some facts, and does not outrage my reason...
I cannot conceal my conviction, the result of my own 
expericmcc, that your minds will be in a simpler, health- 
ier state, that you will win a victory over some of the 
most plausible conventionalisms of this age, that you 
will grasp the truth you have more firmly, and be readier
when you 
at we have 
(Essays 42ff)
I have quoted these passages at length because we have here one 
of Maurice's most pregnant ideas and one of the most important 
for his conception of the Atonement. And what I have quoted is 
no occasional or momentary outburst on the part of Maurice. He 
dwells on the thought repeatedly. Take the following from the 
"Doctrine of Sacrifice";-
"Whatever our thoughts are about the existence or non- 
existence of an evil will, about the personality or imper- 
sonality of that will, about the influence of timt will 
upon us, we alJ know, as a matter of fact, that whisprrs 
do come to us - certainly brought from no visible lips. - 
which take the form of accusations, cruel and malignant 
accusations, against persons who may or may not have done 
us wrong; who may be our enemies or who may be very dear 
to us.....We say it is within us, and we say ri^itly; 
but yet we know that down in those depths which the 
vulture's eye hath not seen, there is a slanderous voice
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speaking to us - suggesting thoughts which we did not ori- 
ginate, which we shrink from, which being rejected, return 
again.
But the same secret whispers which seek to set a man at 
war with his neighbours strive also to set him at war with 
himself. The discontents, the terrible visions of the past 
and of the future, which eveiy man has been conscience of, 
which seem to many as if they made up the sum of their 
existence - whence do they come? At first we think from 
without. We lay them to any annoying circumstances, to any 
disagreeable fellow-creatures. The same discoveries, which 
we cannot be deceived in. bring them nearer home. They must 
have more to do with us than with anything about us. They 
seem to move from us and yet toward us. There springs up 
in us. we cannot tell from whence, a desire to be freed 
from this vile state of mind, this self-torment.......
There is one more discovery still to be made. Thi^ spirit 
is the slanderer and accuser, not only of our brethren, 
not only of ourselves, but of God. Is it not so? &c." 
(Doct.of Sacrifice.232-4)
Here we have some of the deepest elenents of human experience, 
reminding us of the actual spiritual conflicts of Bunyan and 
other great wrestlers with inward evil. I shall quote a few fur- 
ther sentences on the same theme - from Maurice's famous Letter 
to Hort:-
"You think you do not find a distinct recognition of the 
devil's pereonality in my books. I am sorry if it is so. 
I am afraid I have be«'ii corrupted by speaking to a polite 
congregation!.....1 do not know what he ia by theological
arguments, but I know by what I feel. I am sure there is 
one near me accusing God and my brethren to me. He is not 
myself; I should go mad if I thought he was. He is near my 
neighbours; I am sure he is not identical with m y neigh- 
bours. But oh, most of all I am horrorstruck at the thought 
that we may confound him with God; the perfect darkness 
with the perfect light. I dare not deny that it is an evil 
will that tempts me; else I should begin to think evil is 
in God's creation, and is not the revolt from God, resis- 
tance to iTTm......
When I spoke in the first edition of my 'Kingdom of Christ* 
of satisfaction offered by Christ to the devil. I was quo- 
ting from Bishop Hooper, and I wished to startle the 
admirers of our Reformers jvith the thought how, vast, a dif- ference there must be between a theology which ̂ escribed the 
b e devil as demanding a price of blood, and God as demanding 
it. I did however recognise a deep practical meaning in 
Hooper's statement. It.seems to me lhat in sore conflicts 
with the tempter one may find great comfort in saying, 
'thou hast no claim on me; thou hast been paid full mea- 
sure, pressed down and running over."(Life.II.21-2)
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The fundamental elements of Maurice's doctrine are actually to be 
found in this passage;- the sense of the bondage of our will to 
sin and guilt - the forces of evil which account for that bondage - 
and Christ's great act called forth entirely by the need for de- 
livering us from that bondage.
(Ill) "PLATOKISMl1
The third point in Maurice's doctrine of Atonement is what has been 
called his "platonism", his great thought of the Indwelling Christ 
as the principle of nan's true life, and the principle of unity 
anong all men. Man's participation in the Divine through the 
Christ Who dwells within (akin to the Platonic "metechein" and to . 
Coleridge's "reason") was a central and prevailing idea with Mau- 
rice, it is found throughout his religious works, and holds a 
vital place in his conception of the Atonement.
"Christ is in every man, the source of all the light that 
ever visits him, the root of all the righteous acts he is 
ever able to conceive or do"(Essays.64). 
"We say boldly to the man (like Job) who declares that he 
has a righteousness which no one shall remove from him - 
'that is true. You have such a righteousness. It is deeper 
than all the iniquity that is in you. It lies at the very 
ground of your existence'"(60).
"That righteous King of your heart whom you have felt to 
be so near you, so one with you that you could hardly help 
identifying Him with yourself, even while you confessed 
that you were so evil, He is the Redeemer of man and of you"
(67).
"I hope by God's grace that no fear of offending my best 
friends will keep me from proclaiming that truth of Christ 
as the actual Head of man which I was sent into the world 
to proclaim"£Life.II.I6I).
His most beautiful expression of this truth is in the Letter to 
his mother in the Life,vol.I.I54ff.
"Know ye not that Jesus Christ is in you? 1 This question 
is often put in such a way as to distress poor humble per- 
sons very much. But nothing was further from the Apostle's 
thoughts. To give a proud professor a notion that he had
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attained anything in having the Lord of life near to him, 
to give the desponding spirit a gloomy sense of his distance 
from such a privilege, that was no part of Paul's commis- 
sion or his practise.....The truth is that every man is in 
Christ; the condemnation of every man is that he will not 
own the truth; he will not act as if this were true, he will 
not believe that which is the truth, that, except he were 
joined to Christ, he could not think, breathe, live a single 
hour...o You wish and long to believe yourself in Christ; 
but you are afraid to do so because you think there is 
some experience that you are in Him necessary to warrant 
that belief. You have this warrant for believing yourself 
in Christ, that you cannot do one living act, you cannot 
obey one of God's commandments,you cannot pray, you cannot 
hope, y°u cannot love, if you are not iii Him."
This is a really fine thought which Maurice is very fond of - as 
I have said he repeats it frequently throughout his writings. 
At the sane time it almost amounts in his hands to a sornrwhat 
crude theory of Identification, so that Christ's obedience is 
humanity's obedience, Christ's sacrifice is humanity's sacrifice, 
and so on. I think the oft-quoted summary of his Atonement teach- 
ing which Maurice gives rests on this idea:-
"Supposing all these principles gathered together; sup- 
posing the Father's will to be a will to all good; - 
supposing the Son of God, being one with H^m, and Lord of 
men, to obey and fulfil in our flesh that will by entering 
into the lowest condition into which men had fallen through 
their sin; supposing thjfcMIan to be, for this reason, an 
object of continual complacency to His Father, and that 
complacency to be fully drawn out by the death of the Cross; 
supposing His death to be a sacrifice, the only complete 
sacrifice ever offered, the entire surrender of the whole 
spirit and body to God: is not this, in the highest sense, 
Atonement?"(Es^aya.147)
Yes, it would be an Atonement, but only one side of the Atone- 
ment as taught by Maurice. It would show that pure sacrifice on 
tjio part of man which is the desired response to God's own sac- 
rifice. But the passage is quite incomplete if put forth as a
r
«
summary of Maurice's theory. As has been made apparent, it 
entirely omits certain vital elements.
28
A severe critic of Maurice's idea of Atonement doctrine appeared 
in J.B.Mozley ("Essays Historical and Theological"). He says (272) 
that Maurice "has a bias agninst all existing forns of opinion, all 
doctrines in the way in which they are actually held and received, 
and seens to consider it his special vocation to assail them. But 
allow him to construct the doctrine for himself, to put it in his 
own formula, and it will not be so very unlike the original one". 
When he comes to show how Maurice does this, Mozley quotes the 
"supposing" passage, and comments;- "If this passage means what 
it appears to do,....we must confess we do not see the great dif- 
ference between Mr.Maurice's doctrine and that which he has been 
so strongly impugning.....Mr.Maurice's formula acknowledges the 
vicarious principle as much as the established one does. His 
language is that God, in consequence of His delight in the obedi- 
ent, is reconciled to the disobedient(280)."
But it might fairly be replied to Mozley that the vicarious prin-
k^r 
ciple docsAreally appear in this passage - either in the sense of
Christ suffering the penalty for all men, or of Christ satis- 
fying the law of justice for all men. I think that in fairness to 
Maurice we must sec that what is implied here is his peculiar idea 
of all men being in Christ,- all men actually obeying, suffering, 
pleasing God, in Christ. Maurice certainly has this in mind, and 
quite obviously feels that he is true to his own objection to the 




lie remaining fundamental point in Maurice's Atonement doctrine 
the great principle of Sacrifice. Maurice holds very strong
i emphatic ideas on this matter of Sacrifice. All Sacrifice pro- 
ds ultimately from God Himself and originates with Him. This 
ms the subject of Maurice's book,"The Doctrine of Sacrifice",
may I think be regarded as his chief contribution to the ex-
> 
mation of the Atonement. The great idea is that in the whole
insaction of Redemption it God Who is acting, God is acting in 
rist, all that Christ does God does t It is God Himself Who pro- 
des the Atonement, the Redemption; lie Himself makes the whole 
icrifice. The argument is against the whole idea of Satisfac- 
ion, the idea that Christ in any sense makes a payment to God 
a man's behalf, from below. The whole movement proceeds from 
od and is directed by Him towards man's deliverance. And this, 
,s we shall see, places Maurice in close affinity with the essen- 
,ial principle of the Patristic theory which this Thesis seeks 
io defend.
"The Cross gathered up into a single transcendent act the 
very meaning of all that had been done. God was there seen 
in the mi$it and power of His love, in direct conflict 
with sin, and death, and hell, triumphing over them by 
sacrifice"(D9ct.of Sacrifice.256).
"Those sacrifices, which it wa3 supposed were to bend 
and determine His will, themsilvcs proceed from it"(6$-70)
"It is this idea oj? sacrifice, not as first rising Trom 
man to God ? but as comong down from God upon man - as 
exhibited in His acts, as expressing and accomplishing His 
will - which I have been tracing through the histories of 
sacrifice which the Bible records; and which I have con- 
trasted with the proud sacrifice, whereby man seeks to 
escape from the punishment of the sin which he has com- 
mitted, and to convert God to his own evil mind. All who 
trusted God and gave up themselves, felt that there must 
be an obedience and a sacrifice which was the ground of
theirs; an obedience and a sacrifice which was essenti- 
ally divine, and therefore, essentially human..,.All our 
present life, all our thought* of that which is to be for
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ourselves and the world, are determined by this great prin- 
ciple" (273).
This is his idea of sacrifice. The whole movement is downwards 
from God to nan, it is God Who makes the sacrifice. And as we 
shall see, this is of considerable significance in determining 
Maurice's real place in the history of the doctrine.
In these four points which I have gathered from Maurice's 
works we have the main elements of his teaching on the Atonement, 
and I shall conclude this chapter on Maurice by quoting the fol- 
lowing important passage from the Essay on the Atonement, which 
might I think be regarded as an actual summary of his views on 
the matter.
"The Scripture says. 'Because the children were partakers 
of flesh and blood He also Himself likewise took part of 
the same. 1 'He became subject to death that He might de- 
stroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil. 1 
Here are reasons assigned for the Incarnation and the 
Death of Christ. He shared the sufferings of those whose 
Head He is. He overcame death, their comnon enemy, by sub- 
mitting to it. He delivered them from the power of the 
devil. All orthodox- schools, in formal language - tens of 
thousands of suffering people, in ordinary language - have 
confessed the force or me words. Instead of seeking to 
put Christ at a distance from themselves, by tasking their 
fancy to conceive of sufferings which, at the sane moment, 
are pronounced inconceivable ? they have claimed Him as 
entering into their actual miseries, as sharing their 
griefs. They believed that He endured death because it was 
theirs, and rose to set them free from it, because it was 
an evil accident of their condition, an effect of disor- 
der, not of God's original order. They have believed that 
He rescued them out of the power of an enemy, by yield- 
ing to his power, not that He rescued them out of the" 
power of God by^paying a penalty to Him. Any notion 
whatever which interferes with this faith.....we have a 
right to repudiate as unorthodox, unscriptural, and 
audacious" (Essays, p. I44r-6)
One wonders if writers on the Atonement who are 3tudents of . 
English theology have noticed this paragraph of Maurice? 
Two points are here made very clean-
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First - it is entirely the evil that explains the need for 
Christ's death, not anything in God. The sole meaning and ptfr- 
pose of the death is the deliverance of nan from evil. It is in 
no sense an offering or satisfaction nade to God.
Second - that death delivers nan fron evil, overcones evil, 
by yielding to its power.
And I venture to suggest that this indicates the direction in 
the explanation of the Atonenent will tend to nove in the future.
CHAPTER III.
LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE TWO WRITERS 
SHOWING THEIR AFFINITY WITH THE PATRISTIC THEORY OF RANSOM.
In the foregoing discussion the atten.pt has been nade to 
gather under various points the actual teaching <fcri the doctrine 
of Atonenent to be found in Coleridge and Maurice respectively. 
Now in the present section of the work my purpose is to show 
that in those fundamental ideas which are connon to the two 
writers, there is to be found a clo»e affinity with that ancient 
theory to which this Thesis iy designed to call fresh attention. 
It seens to ne that the leading principles of both Coleridge and 
Maurice really show a closer resemblance to that theory - viz., 
the Patristic theory of Ranson - than to any other theory of the 
Atonenent.
Coleridge and Maurice are both notoriously unsystematic. They 
are "theologians of the heart" - the thinking is pious rather 
than logical - and they are not always consistent in their state- 
ments; but from the details already given, I think the funda- 
mental ideas of both on the Atonement night be summed up as 
follows;-
I. First of all, both Coleridge and Maurice are at one in hol- 
ding that the Christian Religion centres in Redemption, 
"Christianity and Redemption," says Coleridge, "are synonymous 
terns"; and in the whole of his writings on religious topics, 
and equally in the voluminous works of Maurice, we find this 
everywhere assumed and recognised. Redemption - in the essebtial
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and original significance of the word - is for both of then what 
the Atonement means. And this Redemption is entirely God's own 
act. God Himself in Christ is the Redeemer.
2. Both, again, are strong and definite in their teaching on 
the will. While they would alike disclaim any attempt to explain 
the presence of evil in the universe, they are perfectly clear 
as to the origin o£ the evil that affects man and from which 
he requires to be delivered. It is in the will. All sin is "ori- 
ginal" sin for Maurice as well as for Coleridge - that is, sin 
originating in a will. At the same time, both writers have cer- 
tain deep convictions as to the nature of the evil that is in 
the wili and its power over the will. Both hint (Maurice, as we 
have seen, quite openly and emphatically) at an evil principle 
or Spirit acting on and in my will, not at all relieving me from 
the responsibility and guilt of the sin, but iinmensely strength- 
ening the power of the evil will in me. I think both writers
would repudiate the Pelagian position, "I can be good if I will"J/
and would agree with the Augustinian - "I could be good if I 
would, - but I won't". That is the real position. I can't move 
ny will. My will is my own with all its sin and guilt - yet it 
is in bondage. There lies the need for Redemption.
3. Hence, third, both are equally emphatic and unmistakable 
in their assertion that it is this sin, this evil, this evil 
will and that which makes it evil and keeps it evil,- it is this 
and not anything in God's nature or character - that furnishes 
the real necessity for Christ's sufferings and death. Coleridge 
and Maurice are entirely at one and absolutely unequivocal in . 
their teaching on this matter - the great WHY of the Atonement. 
"Cur Deus Homo"? It is the evil and the evil alone - not God
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at all - it is "false and blasphemous" to say that God for any 
reason or necessity in Himself requires it.
There are implications here, of course, that will fall to be 
considered later; but it is evident that there is something in 
the main orthodox line of Atonement doctrine which our two theo- 
logians would both repudiate with scorn.
4. As to the HOW of the Atonement, the actual effect which 
Christ's death exercises upon the evil which has called it forth 
and how that death delivers and redeems the will fron evil - the 
two writers appear somewhat to diverge, This is a natter however 
in which perhaps we recognise oneof the mysteries of the Atone- 
ment and where full explanation is impossible, and certainly 
neither Coleridge nor Maurice has a finished and complete theory 
to offer.
Coleridge is content at one time to say, "factum est" - the 
Redemptive Act is transcendent; the effect of it is a re-birth, 
a re-orientation, so to speak, of the evil will, and he proceeds 
to discuss what we are competent to know of it. At another time 
he hints at a kind of mysterious"co-agency" between the Redeem- 
ing Spirit and the human will.
Maurice - if he were asked precisely how the death of Christ 
acts in delivering from evil, would no doubt answer the question 
by his theory of Identification and the Headship and Indwelling 
of Christ, whereby we perfectly surrender in Christ's perfect 
surrender - it being clearly understood, however, that accor- 
ding to Maurice the whole fact of the surrender and sacrifice 
of Christ has as its object the destruction of evil, not the 
satisfaction of God. It is a satisfaction to God only in the
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sense that it is a natter of supreme satisfaction and "conpla  
cefecy" to God to see His own goodness and holiness reflected in 
humanity as represented by Christ. But as already indicated, 
this does not by any means embrace Maurice's whole thought on 
this matter of the effect of Christ's death on evil, as he &as 
very clearly given expression to the profound idea that Christ's 
suffering and death is essentially a conquering by yielding.
This I think fairly represents the leading thoughts, and the 
general impression gained is that the essence of the Atonement 
is found in the idea of Redemption or Deliverance, rather than 
in that of Satisfaction or Expiation. It is this general ten- 
dency of their teaching that attracted me to these two writers* 
The whole bearing of their thought on the matter is distinct- 
ly in line with the conception that prevailed before Anselm 
launched on the world his idea of satisfaction paid to the 
Divine Honour. Coleridge and Maurice say - with the writers of 
the Patristic age - that the Atonement is essentially and entire- 
ly the deliverance of man, of the human will, and is to be 
explained from that point of. view.
On the one hand, I find in their teaching a wholehearted re- 
pudiation of those theories of Atonement which attribute to it - 
in any semse whatever - an effect upon God, upon God's attitude
to man, or His willingness or power to forgive. While such ideas 
may find expression here and there in these somewhat unmetho- 
dical writings, it is true that the main bearing of their teach- 
ing constitutes an emphatic and deliberate rejection of then.
On the other hand, that teaching certainly goes deeper than
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the purely subjective thought of Moral Suasion as supplying the 
reason and purpose of the act of Atonenent. Neither Coleridge 
nor Maurice can properly be classed under the Subjective or 
"Moral Influence" theory started by Abelard. This will appear 
more fully wh^n I cone later on to offer a criticism of that 
theory as inadequate to explain the meaning of the death of Christ, 
but it may here be said that there are certain vital elements 
in the teaching of both writers on the dictrine - their ideas 
on the human will, on the nature of evil and its power over the 
will, their concentration upon the thought of deliverance, etc.- 
which remove both Coleridge and Maurice from the purely sub- 
jective standpoint in Atonement doctrine. They both hold to an 
objective Atonement. The redemption of the will is something 
other than the persuasion of the will. The death of Christ is 
more than a sppreme revelation - it is a supreme deliverance.
There is thus to be found in these writers, as it seoms to me, 
a strong affinity with the ancient theory of Ransom, the essence 
of which is that the whole necessity for Christ's sacrifice lay 
in the captive state of man's will - this was the one and only 
possible method of deliverance. The picture of the Deity pre- 
sented to us in their general conception of the Atonement is 
not that of a Sovereign God Who simply chooses this terrible 
method of supremely revealing His love and so winning over the 
rebellious will of man; not that of a Feudal Lord demanding 
that a debt of satisfactioa be paid tcJHis wounded honour; not 
that of a mysterious hidden Being whose inner "divine necessities 
or whose justice, holiness or righteous law, demands a sacrifice; 
but rather it is the very picture presented by Jesus Himself;
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that of an all-loving Father striving for the deliverance of His 
chiidern, and striving with the only weapon possible, the Chris- 
tian weapon, the victorious weapon of self-sacrifice - that 
yielding to evil which alone can overcome and destroy it.
Coleridge tells us more than once that his great object in 
discussing Redemption is to clear "this awful mystery from those 
too current misapprehensions of its nature and import" - espe- 
cially those which would set it at variance with the law re- 
vealed in conscience, so the the doctrine is made to "contra- 
dict our moral instincts and intuitions"(Aids.253); and his very 
penetrating analysis of St Paul's doctrine (which 1 have described 
in the section on Coleridge) shows how strongly he repudiated 
all those ideas of satisfactioh, expiation, payment of dect,etc. ; 
which would attribute the necessity of Christ's death to some- 
thing in God's own nature.(Aids.267-271) He makes out that the 
Act of Atonement is transcendent - beyond our comprehension - but 
he always speaks of it - in regard to its object and purpose - 
as the remedy for a diseased and corrupt will, it begets us into 
a new life, "in the redeemed it is a regeneration, a birth..... 
the germinal principle of a higher and^enduring life." (266) 
It "conquers death"(267), it "destroys the objective reality of 
sin"(266).
In Coleridge the entire direction of the Act of Atonement is 
manward - it is man and his necessities, the dire necessities of 
man's diseased and corrupt condition, his captive state - that 
calls it forth; and that is tjie essence of the Patristic idea.
"Christianity and Redemption are synonymous terms", says Cole- 
ridge, and the word Redemption itself is illuminating; the New
Testament says "agorazein","lmtran", "lutrosis", and Ransori is 
"lutron". To redeem, to buy back, to deliver - that is what Christ 
died for, that is what God sent Christ to die for, and for no 
other object.
Turning to Maurice, we find both in the "Theological Essays" 
and in the "Doctrine of Sacrifice" - as well as in the Letters - 
very many sayings on the Spirit of evil, nan's bondage to it, 
and Christ's sacrifice as his deliverance from it, which seen to 
show, by the unmistakable conviction and earnestness with which 
they are uttered, that Maurice in his views did not stop short 
of the full New Testament conception of an Evil Spirit, an ad- 
versary both of God and man, who has man in his thrall, and from 
whflm Christ's death alone can deliver him;- and which read 
exactly like a transcript in modern terms of the Patristic idea 
of a Ransom to the devil. But with a writer like Maurice - so 
all-comprehensive, tolerant and charitable as to feel that "all 
are right in what they affirm, wrong only in what they deny" - 
with such a writer one does not rely on any individual sayings 
or passages, but rather on the general bearing of his teaching, 
which is clear enough.
Maurice has by no means a pure and single theory on the Atone- 
ment. He is even more vague and diffuse than Coleridge. "Our 
unaccountable theologian," Pfleiderer calls him. "Maurice is not 
capable of taking a clear and logically consistent position 1.1 
(Pfleiderer.Develop.of Theol.p.373) But the whole trend of his 
teaching on the Atonement is similar tothat of Cileridge, and 
is in essential affinity with the principles of the Ransom
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theory. The atoning act is the act of God Himself in Christ,
and it is entirely manward in its intention and effect - the 
whole movement is downwards from God to man, not in any sense 
upwards from man to God, as in the Anselmic tradition and all
the various forms in which it has appeared. The entire and neces- 
sity of the death of Christ is found - for Maurice as lor Cole- 
ridge - in the deliverance of man from evil.
In the volume of "Theological Essays" he begins by showing how 
the "Theology of Consciousness" misleads men as to the doctrine 
of Atonement. We have various "consciousnesses" - with regard 
to sin, salvation, grace,etc. - and out of these "conscious- 
nesses" or experiences we proceed to form systems regarding God's 
action which often outrage the moral conscience and reason.
(Maurice has the scpe thou^it here that we find in Coleridge 
when he draws the distinction between the Act of Atonement itself
and the effects of it as felt in the experience of men). "I wish 
to show, 1' says Maurice, " that the orthodox faith as it is ex- 
pressed in the Bible and the Creeds absolutely prevents us from 
acquiescing in some of these explanations of the Atonement which 
both in popular and scholastic teachings have been identified
with it." (Theol.Essays.42) He then proceeds to give his own 
view, in words which I have already quoted in dealing with 
Maurice. The pasnage is on page 146 of the Essays, and is ex- 
ceedingly important. "He overcame death, their comnon enemy, by 
submitting to it. He delivered them from the power of the devil,
......They have believed that He rescued, them out of the power
of an enemy by yielding to that power, not that He rescued them
out of the hand of God by paying a penalty to Him."
The whole passage (as found on p.30 of this Thesis) speaks for
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itself. In essential principle it is the Ransoni theory; and it 
is no isolated utterance but is entirely characteristic of 
Maurice's prevailing conception of the doctrine. The passage 
shows, too, the impossibility of classing Maurice with those 
who hold the purely subjective theory of "Moral Influence',' 
There is an objective act - an opus operatua - in Christ's 
Atonement. It is an objective Atonement, but the work is wrought 
not on God but on evil.
That Maurice's objection to the Satisfaction idea is as em- 
phatic as that of Coleridge could be shown from numerous places 
in his writings, but I select the following as very clearly indi- 
cating his close affinity with the principle of Ransom;^-
"And thus another very unsightly, and to me quite por- 
tentous, imagination of modern divines, is shown to be 
utterly inconsistent with the faith which we and our fore- 
fathers have professed. There is said to have been a war 
in the Divine mind between justice and mercy. We are told 
that a great scheme was necessary to brin^ these qualities 
into reconciliation. When I attribute this doctrine to 
modern divines, I d9 not af.lirm that there may not be very 
frequent traces of it in the argumentative discourses of 
the ancient divines; but I mean that, with the strong 
belief which they had that an Evil Spirit was drawing them 
away both fron mercy and righteousness,- was tempting them 
to DC both unjust and hard-hearted - they had a practical 
witness against any notion of this kind, which we have 
lost or are losing." "As soon as we return to the prac- 
tical faith of the old teachers,.....we shall know that 
there must be an All-Good on the one side, or that we shaU 
be at the mercy of an All-Evil on the other." 
(Theol.Essays.49-50)
"Do you ask how this act effected the purpose of redeem- 
ing any, or how many were included in the benefits of it? 
The question is indeed most difficult, if by redemption
you mean in any sense the deliverance of man out of the
hand of God, the procuring a change in His purpose or will: 
then there is need of every kind of subtle explanation 
to fjhow how the means correspond to the end. But if you 
suppose that it is the, spirit of a man which needs to be
emancipated, a spirit fast bound with the chains of its 
own sins and fears, .then I do not see what proof, save one,, 
can be of any avail., that a certain scheme of edemption ' 
is effectual. Appeal directly to the captive,etc."//i,,
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It nay be added that Maurice's whole doctrine of Sacrifice - 
which is perhaps his chief contribution to Atonement theory - 
constitutes a direct refutation of all juridical or satisfaction 
ideas. It is not God who, in any sense whatever, requires a sa- 
crifice, but the evil in man which requires God to make a sacri- 
fice if nan is to be delivered. All sacrifice proceeds from God. 
The whole movement in the atoning act is downward from God to 
nan.
I would go so far as to say that Maurice's treatment of the 
Atonement all througfa is a passionate .plea for the truth lying . 
in the Patristic theory - God Himself striving , from start to
finish, for the redemption of man from evil.
Both Coleridge and Maurice would claim as theologians to be- 
long to a "broad" or "liberal" school of Theology. They would 
scorn any "narrow" type of belief. In their own century and 
among their contemporaries they would claim to be "modern" 
thinkers, and certainly would refuse to be classed as adherents 
of any ancient theory what ever outside the Scriptures; yet, as 
I have tried to make clear, I find thaty instinctively the whole 
trend of their teaching on redemption moves definitely into tine 
with the Patristic thought of Ransom - the theory of a "Ransom
to the Devil". 
I now proceed to an examination of .that Theory itself.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PATRISTIC THEORY OF ATONEMENT.
I. GENERAL. - It is not ay purpose to deal with the whole 
doctrine of Redemption as we find it in the Patristic theology. 
Redemption through the Incarnation was the main idea, the special 
natter of Christ's atoning death being in the writers of that 
school subordinate to the wider question of the Incarnation, the 
Trinity, the Person of Christ. But so far as they put forward 
any definite explanation of the necessity for the death of Christ 
we find one fact assumed more or less by all the Fathers, both 
Greek and Latin, throughout the age - namely, that of a Ransom 
to the Devil. Details in the statement of this theory vary very 
greatly, but as an explanation of the actual nedd for Christ's 
sufferings and death in order to atonement, this was the pre- 
vailing orthodox view for almost a thousand years till it 
received its famous refutation at the hands of Anselm in the 
eleventh century.
The idea that the death of Christ on the Cross was really a 
ransom or price paid to Satan for the deliverance of man from 
his power was, amid considerable variety of detail, actually the 
dominant theory of the Atonement throughout the Patristic Age, 
It was the official or orthodox explanation (assumed by all the 
main writers) of the difficulty felt as to why Christ should have
to suffer and die at all, a problem with which the Church was 
challenged by the Gnostics and Other heretical teachers. The 
Patristic theologians were really more interested in the wider
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fact of the Incarnation as being God's great nethod of redemp- 
tion. But when they were compelled to define the church's 
position on the definite and very perplexing question - a ques- 
tion still asked by inquiring minds, young and old, and (as many 
would say) never satisfactorily answered - as to the actual ne- 
cessity for an atoning death, the answer that first came to them 
and which continued to be held throughout the whole age, was 
this thought of a ransom that had to be paid. The Devil - the 
evil from which man was to be redeemed - demanded it as the price 
of redemption.
That was the thought, and it 1 was inevitable that it should 
occur for it seemed to be supplied to them directly by Scripture 
when the need arose.
The leading Scripture passage, of course, is Jesus' saying about 
the "Son of Man giving His life a ransom for many." J.K.Mozley 
In his "Doctrine of the Atonement" (p.103) says, for example, 
that when Origen was led to the formulation of his Ransom theory 
it was as an exegete interested in finding an answer to the 
question - to whom was the lutron paid? The saying of Jesus has 
naturally been greatly discussed and a useful account of the 
various interpretations by English and German theologians is 
given by Mozley, pp.45-50.
Other New Testament passages on which the Ransom theory was 
based are such as the following;-
"That through death He might destroy him that had the 
power of death, that is the Deyil"(Heb.2.I4.)
(Next to the "Ransom" saying of Jesus this is perhaps
quoted more often than any other Scripture passage) 
"Now is the judgement of this world, now shall the Prince 
of this world be cast out"(Jo.12.
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"The Prince of this world is ,judged"(Jo.I6.II)
"Who gave Himself a ransom for all to be testified in due 
time"(I.Tim.26)
"Went and preached unto the spirits in prison"(1.Pet.3.19.)
"The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give 
for the life of the world"(Jo.6.5I.)
"I saw Satan like lightening fall from heaven"(Lk.10.18)
"The god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which 
believe not"(2.Cor.4.4.)
"The prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now 
worketh in the children of disobedience"(Eph.2.2.)
"The accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accused 
them before God day and ni$it"(Rev.I2.IO)
Prom such scriptures as these, from the whole New Testament 
teaching about Evil Spirits, and from the thought common in the 
Apostolic Fathers and Apologists of man being enslaved by evil 
demons and the powers of darkness, we come to Irenaeus towards 
the end of the second century, who took up this idea of ransom 
and was the first tomake it, as Rashdall says, "a hard and fast 
theory". The first formulation of the Ransom idea as a definite 
theory may be traced to Icenaeus, although he certainly held it 
along with ideas of Substitution, Expiation, and also his origi- 
nal conception of Recapitulatio - with all of.which it is really
incompatible.
Origen, however, is the first Christian theologian to teach 
clearly that the death of Christ is a ransom paid to the devil 
in exchange for the souls of men, forfeited by sin; that the 
devil overreached himself in the transaction owing to the per- 
fect purity of the soul of Christ, which it was torture for hin 
to try to retain; and that thus - Christ triumphed over the devil. 
Rashdall says that in the whole account of,the matter in Origen, 
whon allowance is made for rhetorical expressions, there-is
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nothing really grotesque or unethical, irreligious or unphiloso- 
phical from the point of view of one who believes in the universe 
as a scene of conflict between good and evil spirits. (Idea of 
Atonement.p.262)
While Rashdall - in the interests of his own purely subjective 
explanation of the Atonement - claims that the general tendency 
of the Church's teaching in the Patristic age even in the West, 
but especially in the greatest Greek Fathers, is that Christ's 
death saves from sin only because it reveals God's love and 
awakens penitence in the sinner, the fact is that these teachers 
were too wise to say that this gives; the whole explanation of 
Christ's death. They felt that there was more in it - a deeper 
necessity for it - than mere revelation; and we find this 
thought of a ransom, a deliverance of man, and not merely a per- 
suasion of man, in them all. From Irenaeus in the second century 
right on to John of Damascus in the eighth (in whom some of the 
crudest elements of the theory appear), it will scarcely be 
denied that the idea of a"Ranson to the Devil" is assumed as the
accepted formula whenever an explanation is to be given of the
i 
actual necessity for an atoning death.
2. GREGORY OF NYSSA. - To get what the theory actually is I 
take, as a representative writer, Gregory of Nyssa (c.335-395),
feflW,
in whose pages we perhaps the clearest and most careful account
fl
of it. 
Gregory's statement of the theory is to be found in his
"Oratio Catechetica Magna", an apologetic or defensive summary__ _ _ -.
of Christian truth. The object^of this really beautiful work is 
to vindicate the Christian scheme of redemption against heresies
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of various kinds. The facts of the Trinity, the Divine Logos, 
the Creation of Man, Free Will, the Origin of Evil, and especi- 
ally the Plan of Redemption through the Incarnation, are all 
elaborately argued and defended, - the Ransom theory coming in 
as one element in the whole scheme. What I am concerned with is 
the section of the work contained in chaps, xv-xxvi, where we 
have the finest and most complete (as well as the most reason- 
able) statement of the theory that has come down to us. Its 
mythological crudities are, to some extent at least, corrected 
and softened in Gregory's exposition by his fine sense of 
literary expression and his instinctively philosophical turn 
of thought.
In his Prologue to the work I have mentioned. Gregory shows 
that, in order to ensure the acceptance of the Faith, a definite 
system of Christian truth is required, but such system must be 
capable of being stated in different ways so as to meet the dif- 
ferent types of heretical opinion; and he clearly indicates what 
opponents he has in view: "No one would try to set Sabellius 
right by the same kind of instructions as would suit the Ano- 
moean. The controversy with the Manichee is profitless against 
the Jew,etc." (473)
After a subtle exposition, in chaps.i-iv, of the doctrine of 
the Trinity against both the Jew and the Greek, there follows, 
up to the xivth chapter, an elaborate argument as to the pur- 
pose, the necessity and the reasonableness of the Incarnation. 
Here we have the creation of man, with the gift of freedom and 
the consequent introduction of evil. It was necessary that man 
should bo created with something of the divine in him and also
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with an innortal nature in order fuully to enjoy God's goodness. 
But the opponent will naturally ask, Where is this divine re- 
semblance, this immortality? Man as we know him is of brief 
existence, subject to passions, full of suffering. This is an- 
swered, of course, by reference to the supreme gift of freedom; 
"He Who made man for the participation of His own peculiar good 
.......would never have deprived him of that most excellent and
precious of all goods; I mean the gift implied in being his 
own master and having a free will."(c.v) How copes it then that 
man, endowed with such excellent qualities, should exchange then 
for the worse? Gregory is very clear and decisive as to how 
the evil in man originates; "The reason is plain. Ko growth of 
evil has its origin in the Divine will. Vice would be blameless 
were it inscribed with the name of God as its maker and father". 
- (There is a plain truth here not always grasped apparently 
by certain schools of later theology) - "Evil is in some way 
engendered from within, springing up in the will at that moment 
when there is a retrocession in the soul from the beautiful"(c.v) 
"It is not possible to form any other notion of the origin of 
vice than as the absence of virtue....We say .that non-entity is
only logically opposed to entity, and in the same way the word 
vice is opposed to the word virtue, not as being any existence 
in itself, but only as becoming thinkable by the absence of the 
better."(c.vi)
Here we have the profound idea that evil in its ultimate ori- 
gin and nature can only be thought of as negative - the "prin- 
ciple of discretion", as Whitehead would say, in a universe of 
which God is the "principle of concretion".
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There is then no Divine causality in relation to evil. It is 
nan's free will that chooses the worse in preference to the better 
But what is the cause of this error of judgement? "All our dis- 
cussion tends to thi^ point". Here we first cone upon Gregory's 
mythological conception of the devil. He is that power or "angel 
of the earth" created to hold together and sway the earthly 
regiohs, (This is a thought that Origen has developed: there are 
certain nations assigned to the away of the devil.fCont.Cela.v) 
This being, says Gregory, cones to every nan - although how one 
created for all good should first cone to fall into this passion 
of envy "it is not part of ny present business to discuss." 
But he says, "when this power has closed his eyes to the good 
and the ungrudging, like one who in the sunshine lets his eye- 
lids drop over his eyes and sees only darkness, in this way that 
being also, by his very unwillingness to see the good, becones 
cognisant of the contrary of goodness. Now this is envy..... 
The bias to vice generated by this envy is the constituted road 
to all those evils which have been since displayed." Actuated 
Vy this original envy, this being "by his crafty skill decieves 
nan and circunvents hin, persuading hin to become his own nur- 
derer by his own hands."(c.vi) This is the beginning of nan's 
captivity to the Devil, His plan is, by ningling evil in nan's 
will, to withdraw nan fron God's fellowship and protection and 
to get hin into his own power.
Gregory then goes on to show how only God Who created nan 
could redcen hin fron this captive state; and in doing so, he 
details his great argunent as to the possibility and reasonable- 
ness of the Incarnation of the Divine Logos into hunan flesh.
The inportant question follows (c.xiv):- "Why did the Deity
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descend to such humiliation? Our faith is staggered to think that 
God, transcending all glory of greatness, wraps Himself up in the 
base covering of humanity."
In chap.xv he proceeds to answer the question) by showing first 
of all how the reason is found in the love of God to nan, which 
is a special characteristic of the Divine nature. The diseased 
called for a healer, the lost for a Saviour. These wants appealed 
to God's love. Then cones the objection, why it was not possible 
for Bin Who created alJ things out of nothing to effect this de- 
liverance of nan by a single connand of His will, without Hin- 
self having to stoop and suffer?
Origen deals with this sane question (Cont.Cels.iv); "Supposing 
it was so (that God should destroy evil in nan's heart at a 
single blow, causing virtue to spring up there), what then? 
How will our assent to the truth be in that case praiseworthy?"
Gregory's answer to this objection - why God did not destroy 
evil and deliver nan by a single fiat of His will - is first of 
all to show that it was not at all derogatory to the excellence 
of the Divine nature to descend into human life, forasnuch as 
the imperfection of that bodily life of nan was not a weakness, 
only vice is a weakness, and God incarnate had no participation 
in vice; therefore the method adopted was morally consonant with 
God's nature. He then goes on to elaborate his idea of a ransom 
being paid in the incarnation and death of Christ, proving not 
only the moral fitness of God's method but the necessity of it.
In entering on this argument Gregory begins by showing that 
all God's attributes - His justice as well as His wisdom and 
power and goodness - must be exhibited in His method of deli-
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man. "As good, then, the Deity entertains pity to fallen 
.ian; as wise, He is not ignorant of the means for his recovery; 
itfiile a Just decision must also form part of that wisdom"(c.xxi).
Thus we come to the kernal of the theory. "What then, under 
these circumstances, is Justice? It is the not exercising any 
arbitrary poAver over him who has us in captivity, nor, by tear- 
ing us away by a violent exercise of force from his hold, thus 
leaving some colour for a Just complaint to him who enslaved man 
through sensual pleasure. For as they who have bartered away 
their freedom for money are the slaves of those who have pur- 
chased them......on the same principle, now that we had volun- 
tarily bartered away our freedom, it was requisite that no 
arbitrary method of recovery, but the one consonant with Justice 
should be devised by Him Who in His goodness had undertaken our 
rescue. Now this method is, in a measure, this; to make over 
to the master of the slave whatever ransom he may agree to ac- 
cept for the person in his possession." (c.xxiii)
In Gregory's view, then, God's method of redemption takes the 
form of a definite transaction with Satan, God actually coming 
to terms with Satan regarding man - a .view akin to the idea of 
the prologue to the Book of Job. It is highly mythological, but 
in Gregory's exposition of it there is beauty in the myth, and 
a fair show both of reason and oft reverence in the details.
He proceeds in cc.xxiii-xx3ff to expound these details of the 
transaction under the following three points;-
(i) \Yhat would Satan be willing to accept as a price for the 
redemption of his slave? It must be something higher and better, 
so that he would gain in the exchange and thus foster his
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culiar passion of pride. The Incarnate Son of God alone, with 
s miraculous powers, could satisfy this condition. "The enemy, 
holding in Him such power, saw also in Him the opportunity for 
Ivance in the exchange upon the value of what he held. For this 
aason he chooses Him as a ransom for those who were shut up in 
fie prison of death."(e.xxiii)
(Here we have the peculiar note of this theory as found in 
rregory - and also prevailingly in Origen himself and other 
writers of the Patristic school - namely, that the ransom or debt 
paid in Christ's death was paid to the Devil. The essence of the 
change introduced by Anselm's criticism of this theory later on
was that it was paid to God t a debt of satisfaction to God's
wounded honour.)
But as the enemy would have, been afraid to look upon uncloud- 
ed Deity, Christ was sent in the lowly form of human flesh yet 
possessing miraculous power, so that Satan could look on Him as 
an object of desire but not of fear. Thus God's attributes of 
goodness wisdom and justice are all manifested in the transac- 
tion. "His choosing to save man is a testimony of His goodness; 
His making the redemption of the captive a matter of exchange 
exllibits His justice; while the invention whereby He enabled 
the eneqy to apprehend that of which he was before incapable^ 
is a manifestation of supreme wisdom."(e.xxiii)
At this point Gregory introduces his famous metaphor of 
fish and the bait which was laid hold of and elaborated by some 
of the later writers. "The Deity was hidden under the veil of our 
nature, that so, as with a ravenous fish, the hook of the Deity 
nic/ht be gulped down along with the bait of the flesh, and thus, ;
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life being introduced into the house of death,etc." (cxxiv)
(ii) Gregory is quite aware that this amounts to a deception 
on God's part in His dealing with Satan. God "got within the lines 
of the enemy" by fraud, veiling what was really divine in human 
form. But he proceeds to excuse this and stoutly maintains the 
justice and wisdom of the whole transaction. It is the essential 
quality of justice to give every one his due, and of wisdom to 
maintain unswervingly the aim of love to man while not departing 
in the least degree from justice. This is what God did. "By the 
reasonable rule of justice, he who first practised deception 
receives in return that very treatment the seeds of which he had 
himself sown by his own free willj he who first deceived man f 
by the bait of densual pleasure is himself deceived by the pre- 
sentment of the human form. But as regards the aim and purpose 
of what took place, a change in the direction of the nobler is 
involved; for whereas he, the enemy, effected his deception for 
the ruin of our nature, He Who is at once the just the good and 
the wise one, used His device - in which there was deception - 
for the salvation of him who had perished." (c.xxvi)
(iii) There is a third point of detail. Gregory even con- 
templates through this transaction (as Origen had done) the re- 
demption of the Devil himself. Not only is benefit conferred on 
the lost one, but also on him who had wrought the ruin. As in 
the refining of gold the worthless material is consumed away in 
the fire, "in the same way when defith and corruption had grown 
into the nature of the author of evil, the approach of th e di- 
vine power/acting like fire and making the unnatural accretion 
to disappear, thus by purgation of the evil becomes a blessing
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to that nature, though the separation is agonising. Therefore 
the adversary himself will not be likely to dispute that what took 
place was both just and salutary, thattsjifi he shall have attained 
to a perception of the boon." (c.xxvi)
Gregory concludes his discussion thus:- "These and the like 
benefits the great mystery of the Incarnation bestows. For in 
those points in which He was mingled with humanity, passing as 
He did through all the accidents proper to human nature, such as 
birth, rearing, growing up and advancing even to the taste of 
death, He accomplished all the results before mentioned, both 
freeing man from evil and healing even the intruducer of evil 
himself. For the chastisement however painful of moral disease, 
is a healing of its weakness." (c.xxvi)
3. DISCUSSION OF THE THEORY. ITS PERMANENT VALUE.
It will be asked, why seek to revive such a theory as this, 
consisting as it does in the conceptions of a mythology long 
since passed away?
The Patristic school of theology had its own great contribu- 
tion to make to Christian doctrine, and its profound ideas on 
the Incarnation for example have their permanent and essential 
place in the history of that doctrine. But this special theory 
put forward by these writers as to the method - this whole idea 
of a ransom paid by God to the Devil as the method of redemption 
would surely, if it could taken seriously, be entirely repugnant 
to modern thought.
Let it be said at once that I reject the whole theory in the
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nythological forn in which it has cone down to us. No one could 
wish to set the hands of the clock so far back. But I retain 
and desire to call fresh attention to the principle that under- 
lies the theory, because I believe it is the neglect of that 
principle and the failure to call in its aid that nakes .that 
which is the crucial problem in the Atonement - the first and 
deepest question that leaps to the nind whenever the fact of 
Atonement is seriously considered either by the eager young 
Christian inquirer or by the ripe theologian - unanswerable. 
That question, of course, is; why Christ, should have to die.
The answer which the Ransom theory long ago gave to the ques- 
tion is one'that has been too much left out of account but one 
that must be reckoned with, for I venture to think it is the 
answer which above all others best satisfies the mind if one 
thinks of and tries to explain the Atonement as an act of God. 
Why should it be necessary for Christ to die? The Ransom theory 
answers - and so far as I know it is the only one which does 
give this plain and simple answer - because evil demanded it, 
sin demanded it, it was the only way in which evil could be 
dealt with and overcome. That is the principle underlying the 
theory, a simple but extremely illuminating principle, the power 
of evil, the actual reality of evil over against God, and its 
power to determine God Himself, in His will to redemption, into 
one particular line of action. Denney says that the final merit 
of Anselm's theory is that it has such a profound sense of the 
seriousness of sin. But it seems to me that this is even more 
true of a theory that makes sin the enslavement of man and the 
powerful enemy of God than of one which regards it as the in- 
fringement of God's Honour; the Ransom theory may limit God's
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power; the Satisfaction theory linits His love.
Denney speaks of certain "divine necessities" which require 
a prppitiation. What are these? It is here that the baffling 
difficulty really lies. According to the general assumption of 
the dominant theory of Atonenent the ultimate necessity for this 
dire and extreme method God had to resort to - the death of 
Christ on the Gross - seems to lie wholly in God Himself - be it 
His honour and dignity, or His holiness, His justice, His 
righteousness and moral government, His infinite but offended 
and wounded love -- somehow the necessity must lie on the side of 
God. May one say - hinc iliac lacrymae? Is it not possible 
that hence may at least partly arise those terrific, endless, 
and always consciously baffled wrestlings on this question 
on the part of some of the greatest theologians of modern times, 
and that a glance at what this old theory means might bring some 
relief?
How to construe the fact that God apparently in some way re- 
quires satisfaction, and also the fact that the death of Christ 
can in some way supply that satisfaction, - is a problem of 
which I frankly confess I have seen no solution that appears to 
please even the propounder of it himself. To say that the real 
reason why Christ had to die is to be found (in any sense 
whatever) in God's need for satisfaction will never satisfy 
either the writer or the reader on the Atonenent.
Hence the failure of what Dr.John Onan calls - "the honest 
blunderings of Dr.Dale, the passionate scholarship of Dr.Denney, 
the super-subtlety of Dr.Forsyth, the refined elusiveness of 
Dr.Moberly" - really to answer the great question about the need
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for an atoning death. What I feel is that we shall never find 
the reason for it in God. And why I turn to the Ransom theory
»t
is that it refers us to evil for the reason. This is nothing 
new or startling, but it is something too^much lost sight of. The
£}
purest essence of that old Patristic idea that evil had power to 
compel this supreme sacrifice on the part of God if Hia will to 
redemption was to be carried out. And the only purpose of any 
.revival of that ancient theory would be to ask for a glance once 
more in that direction to see if some light at least may not 
thereby be shed ipon the darkest point of the problem.
The main Scriptural basis on which the theory rests is, as has 
been indicated, the famous "Ransom" saying of Jesus(Mk.10^45,&c) 
Rashdall in his great book "The Idea of Atonement" gives a very 
interesting and scholarly discussion of this passage. He is hard 
put to it to explain the saying, as it does not easily fit in 
with his own purely subjective theory, and certainly would like 
it to be dropped altogether as not genuine; but he says, "if we 
must say in black and white what the benefit was which Christ 
expected His death to assist in procuring for many, it would 
doubtless be admission to the Kingdom of Heaven." (p.36) 
Rashdall declares that to understand the words of Jesus here as 
meaning that apart from His death there could be no forgiveness, 
would be to make His teaching at this point entirely inconsis- 
tent with what He elsewhere says about the love of God and His 
willingness to forgive the sinner on the one condition of re- 
pentence. But it seems to me that all through this discussion 
Rashdall fails to see that a ransom, a price, a redeeming death 
may be necessary quite irrespectively.of God's willingness to
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forgive. From the point of view which I uphold the ransom paid 
in Christ's death would not be for the purpose of procuring God's 
forgiveness or making Him willing to forgive, but rather for 
that of making nan capable of receiving the forgiveness which 
God is always freely offering. Rashdall rightly says that the 
constant teaching of Jesus is that repentence is the sole con- 
dition of forgiveness, and to say in this one instance that 
deliverance from sin is dependent on His death would be incon- 
sistent with this teaching. But it may be replied that His 
constant teaching of repentance as the.sole condition of for- 
giyeness (and this certainly is His constant teaching) is not 
inconsistent with the idea that His death is necessary aw a ran- 
som. Repentence is the sole condition of God's offer of forgive- 
ness. That is true - but "what if one cannot repent?" Rashdall 
speaks about Christ never attributing an "expiatory" or a "sub- 
stitutionary" value to His death. I agree. But what about a 
redemptive value? Expiation and substitution are both entirely 
incompatible with the idea of "ransom" - but it means redemp- 
tion. There is a great difference. An expiatory or a substitu- 
tionary death would be for the sake of God, God requires it. 
A redemptive death, a death of "ransom", would be entirely for 
the sake of man, the evil in man demands it.
I have no desire to build too much on an isolated saying of 
Jesu^ which may at best be of doubtful authenticity, but I think 
Rashdall makes too much of the irrelevance of this passage to the 
  context and of its incongruence with Jesus' main teaching.
Our Lord is certainly speaking of His death as some kind of ser- 
vice; may He not have had in His mind, after all said and done,
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a service consisting in deliverance - redemption, the highest kind 
of service one could render another?
I find Rashdall insisting over and over again on the fact that 
Christ's teaching on the need for repentence as the only condition 
of forgiveness is clear and indubitable, and therefore He cannot 
mean that His death is necessary to forgiveness. But I feel that 
there is here either something less than ingenuous or some con- 
fusion of thought. We must distinguish between God 1 s willingness 
to forgive and that forgiveness taking effect on man; and while 
Christ's teaching is as clear as day that the forgiveness of God 
is subject to no condition whatever saving only that of repen- 
tence, it seems to me that His references to His death, both in 
the passage under discussion and in others, very naturally bear 
the sense that that death has a profound significance in relation 
to man's forgivableness t to man's will and power to repent; and 
from this point of view I confess I do not see so much diffi- 
culty as Rashdall seems to do as to the appropriateness and 
relevance of the "ransom" saying.
I have stated above my reason for seeking to direct fresh 
attention to the Ransom theory, - namely that it finds the neces- 
sitating cause of Christ's death in the evil, not in God. 
Now this of course raises many questions; what evil then is - 
its nature and origin; whether there is a spirit of evil, an 
evil person or power apart from Man's own evil will; whether we 
are to think of an ultimate dualism in the moral universe or
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rather to trace the final causality of evil to God Hinself. Such 
questions have been debated from the beginning and will no doubt 
continue always to attract the speculative mind. Some of then 
will inevitably claim attention when I come to defend the Ransora 
theory against its only serious rival - namely, that started by 
Abelard; but the value I seo in the theory does not depend on 
the solution of these questions. The Patristic writers unques- 
tionably held the New Testament view that there is an actual 
Spirit of evil - an antagonist, an enemy both of God and man; 
they held this view in a crude and literal form which is quite 
alien to our ways of thinking^ but this does not affect the 
principle of the theory: that there is power in evil to deter- 
mine God's action in redeeming man, and that it is this power of 
evil that calls forth the death of Christ as the only possible 
method of accomplishing that redemption.
This is the one principle that attracts me to that ancient 
theory. I think it is the only theory that seems to embody that 
principle without reserve. The principle is simple, clear and 
satisfying, and (as already pointed out) I find Coleridge and 
Maurice, of all modern theologians who wish to profess a scrip- 
tural and orthodox position in this matter, most essentially in 
line with it, in the main tendency of their teaching. What I 
am opposed to is that strange, unhappy, perplexed reserve in -the 
minds of modern writers on the Atonement - Denney and Forsyth,for 
example - as to the real need for an atoning death; as if God 
required the death for some masterious. reason of His own in or- 
der to forgive sin. I object to this, and I find this absent - 
nay, explicitly repudiated in both Coleridge and Maurice. The
GO
The reason for the? death is found wholly in the evil to be over- 
come by it, the evil from which man is to be delivered.
Coleridge wants to isolate the transcendent Divine act in re- 
demption; ho does not presume to explain it, but he makes perfectr- 
ly clear his desire to free the act from all those wrong ideas 
and motives which theologians have attributed to it, satisfac-
 
tion, debt, expiation, propitiation,etc., as if the object and 
purpose of God's own act in redemption were reflexive ~ turning 
back, so to speak, and affecting God Himself. To Coleridge the 
act Itself is a mystery - factum_es-t - but certainly its plain
and simple object is the redemption of man from evil.
^
Maurice also - amid the multifarious and not always consis- 
tent views of his too hospitable mind - is undoubtedly horrified 
at the idea of any kind of sacrifice which contains the remotest 
hint of being aimed at the satisfaction or propitation of God. 
All sacrifice is on God's part, and its single aim is man's 
redemption from evil.
Meantime I proceed to defend the Ransom theory against that 
great system which gave it its final quietus and has kept it out 
os sight for some eight hundred years - the doctrine of Anseln.
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CHAPTER V 
ANSELM'S REFUTATION OF THE PATRISTIC THEORY.
I. CUR DEUS HOMO?
The magnificent doctrinal structure reared by Anseln in the end 
of the eleventh century fairly caught the imagination and
carried the day. "If any one Christian work outside of the canon
\
of the New Testament may be described as 'epoch-making' it is
the Cur Deus Homo of Anselm"(Mozley.Doct.of Atone.p.125) In its 
essential principle his explanation of the Atonement is the one 
that prevails in the main orthodox line up to the present day.
Now the Ransom theory had been an answer to/the one great crucial 
question why Christ had to suffer and die, and when Anselm came 
upon the scene he took up this question and at least attacked it 
in the most thorough and searching manner;- "The question is 
why God could not have saved man in another «&&&*% way, or if 
He could, why He chose this way, for it not only seems unbefit- 
ting for God to save man in this way, but it is not clear of 
what avail that death is for man. For it is a marvellous thing 
if God is so pleased with, or in such want of, the blood of an 
innocent person, that unless He is put to death, He cannot or 
will not spare the guilty."(Cur Deus Homo.p.61) The real heart 
of the problem could be more completely laid bare. Anselm at 
least appreciates the question, whether or not his own amswer 
is better than the one it supersedes.
The solution hitherto had been found by reference to the Devil. 
Anaelm by his powerful thinking and by the splendid system he
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evolved changed the whole scene, and for the true answer to the 
question made men think not of the Devil at all but of God and 
His "divine necessities". This is the essence of the epoch- 
making change.
It is not necessary to go through the theory of Anselm in de- 
tail. It is expounded in all histories of Dogma and treatises 
on the Atonement, and the broad lines of it are well known. 
Denney calls the Cur Deus Homo "the truest and greatest book on 
the Atonement that has ever been written"(At.and Mod.Mind.116) 
On the other hand Harnack says;- "No theory so bad had ever be- 
fore his day been given out as ecclesiastical"(Hist.of Dogma, 
vi.78.Quoted by Mozley.I26)
Anselm's great idea is that of an infinite satisfaction for 
an infinite debt. God has suffered a loss of honour by man's 
disobedience, and this by an eternal necessity must be followed 
either by the utter punishment of the sin or by the payment to 
God of an equivalent for the loss He has suffered - which is 
far beyond man's power. This payment of an equivalent for the 
IOSF to God's honour he calls satisfaction. Who can render this 
satisfaction to God? None but man ought to do it, none but God 
can do it; therefore the satisfaction is made by the God Man.. 
Moreover, the voluntary sacrifice of Himself by the God Man is 
more than He owed to God. It deserves a recompence or reward, 
and the reward given to Him is God's forgivenness extended to men.
Here are a few salient passages from Cur Deus Homo showing tho 
points of the argument;-
"Everyone who sins ought to render back 
to Go<J.fthe honour he has taken away, and this ie the
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satisfaction which every sinner ought to make to God" (64). 
"If there is nothing greater or better than God, there is nothing 
more righteous than that highest righteousness which preserves 
His honour in the arrangement of things, and that is nothing 
else than God Himself......It is necessary therefore that
either the honour taken away be repaid or punishment follow; 
otherwise either God will be unjust to Himself, or He will be 
powerless to secure cither alternative - a thing it is wicked 
even to imagine"(68-9). "I suppose you will not doubt this 
too, that satisfaction must be made according to the measure 
of sin"(95). "What therefore will you pay to God for your sin? 
.....If I owe to Him myself and all I can give, even when I do
not sin, lest I should sin, I have nothing to render to Him 
in compensation for sin"(97). "But this good (of man) cannot 
be accomplished unless there be someone to pay to God in com- 
pensation for the sin of man something greater than everything 
that exists except God... .cThere is no one therefore who can 
make this satisfaction except God Himself. But no one ought to 
make it except man; otherwise man does not make satisfaction. 
If therefore as is certain it is needful that that heavenly 
state be perfected from among men, and this cannot be unless 
the above mentioned satisfaction be made, which no one can 
make except God, and no one outfit to make except man, it is 
necessary that one who is God-Man should make it"(119-20). 
"Let us now examine, as far as we can, for what great reason 
man's salvation follows from His death... ..You will not think
that He Who freely gives to God so great a gift outfit to be 
without a recompence?.....What then shall be recompenced to
One in need of nothing, to whom there is nothing that can be
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given or forgiven?.......To whom could (the Father) assign the
fruit and recompence of His death more suitably than to those 
for whose salvation (as truthful reasoning has tau$it us) He 
made Himself man, and to whom (as He said) by His death He gave 
an example of dying on behalf of righteousness?"(I70-2)
That is the theory. Mosley says of it (op.cit.I28):- "Nega- 
tively, the outspoken repudiation of any rights of the Devil is 
enough to mark a turning point for Latin thought; positively, 
the necessity fot Christ's death becomes for the first time ab- 
solute - as a satisfaction to God. We cannot but perceive in the 
working out of the theory the influence of contemporary feudal 
ideas as to the relation of king and subject, together with ju- 
ridical conceptions drawn from the customs of Germanic law and 
the penitential system of Latin theology".
2. DISCUSSION OF ANSELM'S IDEA. DENNEY.
This theory essentially prevailed, as already indicated, 
through the Scholastic period, through the great period of the 
Reformation theology, and up to the present hour.
(Rashdall says: "In St.Thomas's treatment of the 
Atonement no new idea emerges." (op.cit.373) 
"There is no new thought in Luther about the deati 
of Christ".(398)
And the whole of this Scholastic, Reformation, Modern-Orthodox 
view may be seen summed up in terms of our present day thinking 
and feeling in a beautiful passage in Denney's "Christian Doct« 
of Reconciliation", pp.234-5, I wish to quote the passage be- 
cause, while it shows the Satisfaction theory at its best, it 
also makes plain its fatal weakness and may serve to lead up to
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what is to be said in answer to Anselm.
Denney says;} "The work of Christ is not designed to im- 
press men simpliciter.....It is designed to produce in then 
through penitence GocT s mind about sin. It cannot do this 
simply as an exhibition of unconditioned love. It can only 
do it as the exhibition or demonstration of a love which 
is itself ethical and looks to ethical issues. But the 
only love of this description is love which owns the reality 
of sin by submitting humbly and without rebellion to the 
divine reaction against it; it is love doing homage to the 
divine ethical necessities which pervade the nature of 
things and the whole order in which men live. These di- 
vine ethical necessities are in the strictest sense objec- 
tive. They are independent of us, and they claim and 
receive homage from Christ in His work of reconcilia-
tion j whether that work does; or does not produce upon men 
the impression which is its due. This is an objective 
Atonement. It is a homage paid by Christ to the moral 
order of the world established and upheld by God; a 
homage essential to the work of reconciliation, for un- 
less men are caught into it, and made participant of it 
somehow, they cannot be reconciled; but a homage at the 
same time which has value in God's sight, and therefore 
constitutes an objective atonement, whether any particu- 
lar person is impressed by it or not. Even if no man 
should ever say, 'Thou, 0 Christ, art all I want; more 
than all in Thee I find*, - God says it. Christ and His 
work have this absolute value for the Father, whatever 
this or that individual may think of them;..... It is 
because divine necessities have had homage done to them 
by Christ, that the way is open for sinners to return to 
God through Him."
If the last sentence means anything it means that God needs to 
be reconciled before He can forgive man, an idea which Denney re- 
peats more than once, but which is not found in the New Testa- 
ment. It lies at the basis of this whole Satisfaction theory.
Now this is a fine passage and very characteristic of the wri- 
ter, but in reading it I am driven more and more to the Ranson 
theory for the fresh air of reality. Here £in Denney) God pays 
homage to His own divine necessities in sending Christ to die. 
God pays homage to Himself, God satisfies Himself - for Denney 
makes quite clear that the whole work of Christ is the work of
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God: it God Himself Hho is acting - reconciling the world unto 
k
Himself - in Christ; all that Christ does He does absolutely ac- 
cording to the Father's will. And here Christ's death, which is 
entirely by God's appointment, somehow satisfies God. Its pur- 
pose is to satisfy God - even if no man is affected by it, 
But is it not the case that that death has some effect on evil, 
apart from any satisfying of God - except of course that God is 
satisfied to see evil overcome? And was it not to attain that 
effect that God sent forth Christ to die? I cannot but feel 
there is a missing element in the whole structure. Denney seems 
to picture a kind if divine complacency within a closed circle 
from which both man, and the evil in man to be overcome, are 
excluded. God is absolutely satisfied with Christ's death, 
whether it takes effect on any individual or not. There must 
then be an artificial extension to man of this absolute value 
which Christ's death has for God. I can only gather from JUiLiU^' 
Denney's words that, on account of the value which He finds in 
Christ's death, God extends His pardoning grace to men. This is 
Anselm to the letter - butsurely it is as alien to our ways of 
thought to day as the ransom to the Devil is. To my mind it is 
much more so, for I certainly feel there must be some actual 
reason compelling God to take such a method of redeeming man, 
some ob.iect to be attained by the drastic expedient of sending 
forth Christ to die, an object that can in no wise be described 
in any terms of satisfaction to God Himself. The simple solu- 
tion is that evil was that cause - the overcoming of evil was 
that object, evil was such that there was no other way of deal- 




What survived of Anselm's theory was not the details of his
argument but his main idea that God requires satisfaction in
tkir 
order to forgive sin, and^this satisfaction is afforded by
Christ's sacrifice. This is the great thought that comes from 
Anselm and prevails throu$iout the history of the doctrine, 
But this is what I maintain requires to be looked into afresh. 
Is it really so? Is the effect of Christ's death- the effect 
it is intended to produce and does produce - an effect upon 
God? The influence of Christ's sacrifice on God may be said 
to be the fundamental principle in Atonement theory from An- 
selm onwards.
Now the obvious weaknesses of this great system have often 
been pointed out. Indeed Socinus long ago exposed one of the 
most glaring faults when he said that the whole idea of satis- 
faction is incompatible with forgiveness. The main faults and 
inconsistencies of the system have been brought out in detail 
by many writers, J.K.Mozley, Denney, Rashdall and others, and 
need not be dwelt on here. It is the main idea of the theory 
that I would seek to answer, that fundamental assumption in 
which the epoch-making change consisted, namely, that God re- 
quires satisfaction, and that Christ's death supplies this sa- 
tisfaction. Anselm shows a strong sense of the necessity for 
satisfaction - a necessity that lies in God Himself. His whole 
aim is to show that there was no other way. If man was to be 
saved there was something in the Divine nature that had to be
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satisfied, and could only be satisfied through the Incarnation 
and Passion of Christ. This is Anselm's case, and this is the 
fundamental error.
There are two questions; First, does God require satisfac- 
tion? Is there some work that must be wrought on God, something 
that must be changed, some impediment that must be removed, be- 
fore God can forgive?   And second, can the death of Chrisf ac- 
complish this object?
I. DOES GOD REQUIRE SATISFACTION?
Anselm answers in the affirmative, and it is this Anselmic 
obsession that makes true of all theories of the Atonement in 
the orthodox line from the Scholastic and Reformation theolo- 
gians up to Qr.Qenney and Dr.Forsyth what Mozley says of Kaftan; 
"It is when Kaftan faces the question of the necessity of the 
death of Christ in the work of salvation that a certain obscu- 
rity clouds his th ought "(Mozley.170). Obscurity will always 
cloud our thought on that one crucial question, and we shall 
make the whole problem more baffling than it need be, if we 
follow Anselm in assuming that the necessity for Christ's death 
must lie in God; that God - somehow -. has to be satisfied, 
reconciled, changed, appeased, made willing to forgive, or 
that a way has to be opened in God's own nature in order that 
His forgiveness may flow out freely to men.
If this is in any sense true, then a dualism in God cannot 
possibly be escaped. Anselm does strive to avoid a crude oppo- 
sition between God and Christ, but in his system, or in any 
system which follows him in assuming the necessity to be in 
God, it is impossible to avoid a dualism, a division, within
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the nature of God. His love is not free to act. There is an op- 
position in God between love and something else. And this other 
thing must be dealt with, satisfied, overcome.
Now if God is looked upon as pure love flowing out in for- 
giveness and that love be then seen to be impeded by some ob- 
stacle" which must be overcome and destroyed in order that the 
forgiving love may be effective and accomplish its object - 
we have a clear and intelligible view of the Atonement; I would 
say, Christ's view and the true view; and we can understand the 
necessity for such a dire expedient as the Cross, which is 
fully and wholly willpd both by the Father and the Son in order 
to accomplish the object and remove the impediment. But if we 
have no such thing, but rather an impediment within the Father 
Himself, there arises a situation - I would call it the "Ansel- 
mic obsession" - the effort to explain which has led Dale, 
McLeod Campbell, Moberly, Denney, Forsyth and many others into 
an ingenuity of argumentation which is little short of tor- 
turing. In the whole argument.there seems to me to be a deli- 
berate (or at lesfct consistent) neglect of that which can alone 
shed light on the problem - the evil in man as the obstacle, 
the power of this evilf to call forth this sacrifice on God's 
part, and the effect of God's sacrifice upon the evil.
An "objective" Atonement is insisted upon, some object aimed 
at and attained in Christ's death. What is that object? The 
Satisfactioi theory says, God is the object. The Ransom theory 
says, Evil is the object. The former will always lead to im- 
penetrable obscurity and the insoluble problem of a dualism in 
God's nature. The latter is atr least plain and intelligible,
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and does supply a satisfactory reason for the divine sacrifice. 
I maintain that the Atonement is truly "objective" although the 
effect of it is not upon God. God did not send forth His Son 
to die in order to satisfy Himself or His own "divine necessi- 
ties"; but to accomplish a very definite and single object - 
the destruction of evil. I wish to retain an objective Atone- 
ment and yet to abandon altogether the idea of satisfying God.
Denney comes perilously near to the unscriptural idea that 
Christ's death reconciles God to man.
"It is natural that St.Paul in the few places in which he 
speaks of reconciliation should make God its author and man 
its object; but it is not less natural nor less legiti- 
mate for the Christian who feels that he owes to Christ 
his experience of God's pardoning love to say that through 
Christ he possesses a reconciled God and Father......
Reduced to its simplest expression, what an objective 
Atonement means is that but for Christ and His passion 
God would not be to us what He is."(Doct.of Recon.238-9)
I cannot agree to this in Denney's sense. He means that God's 
attitude to us - His love to us -- His forgiveness extended 
toward us, is somehow different owing tQ Christ and His passion. 
I say no. Christ's passion does not in any way change God's 
love to us, but it makes that love capable of taking effect 
upon us by reason of what it does with us - with the evil in us, 
not with God. The simplest construction is to asay that Christ's
passion delivers ua, and therefore opens the way for God's 
forgiveness (which suffers no change) to accomplish its object. 
Denney speaks of God "working for th e winning again of the 
offender against love"(237); Yes, but in working for the win- 
ning of the offender, does God have to work only with Himself - 
to work against Himself? Is, it not much simpler and truer to 
understand that God is working and striving and agonising not 
against anything in Himself at all, but against the offence -
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in seeking to win the offender? A glance at the Ransom theory 
would ease the strain of Denney's effort here and in many other 
passages.
Of course I know that God is holy, is "of purer eyes than to 
behold iniquity"; that sin is hateful in God's eyes and pain- 
ful to Him, and that to forgive it must be a costly and tragic 
business. That is true of any pure and loving personality. But 
what is God to do? He wishes man to be saved and His holy purpose 
for man attained. Therefore, for one thing, He cannot punish 
the sinner - which would mean annihilating the race and defeat- 
ing God's purpose - "God repented Him that He had made man." 
I can imagine Him inflicting pain on man to purge out the sin; 
I can imagine Him forgiving the sinner as an earthly father 
would do; I can imagine Him destroying and wiping out the sin 
by an omnipotent act of divine power; all these are possible 
thoughts: the one impossible thought is that He should require 
the death of the Innocent, or that such a death could accomp- 
lish anything so far as God Himself is concerned. But the death 
of the Innocent is there to be explained. This leads to the 
second question.
2. CAN THE DEATH OF CHRIST SATISiT GOD? 
One great weakness of all forms of the Satisfaction theory of
the necessity for Christ's death is that it is quite impossible 
to see how that death can accomplish its object. It cannot 
satisfy God. I have seen no real attempt to answer this dif- 
ficulty. We are told that "some great act is necessary whereby 
the wrong done to the moral order shall be put right" - that
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"the sanctity of the law must be satisfied" - that "the neces-
sary reaction of a holy God must be expressed". Now the question 
is, does the death of Christ - can the death of Christ by any ' 
stretch of imagination be conceived to do any one of these things? 
'Of course this questiui has been put forward over and over again, 
and yet the Satisfaction theory continues to be held. The fact 
is, the sanctity of the law would not be upheld, it would be 
further outraged, by the death of Christ. It is impossible to 
think of any righteous law or good principle whatever being 
satisfied or vindicated by the death of Christ. That death would 
itself be the greatest of all sins and an unthinkable horror 
unless it can be seen to be the last desparate and only possible 
means of attaining an end that must be attained even at the ut- 
most cost - the destruction of evil and the deliverance of nan. 
It is the simple fact that sin is not punished - the law i3 not 
satisfied - God's honour is not vindicated - nor the moral 
government of the universe upheld - nor the judgement of God 
on sin expressed - by the death of the good Christ. But the evil 
is overcome I I really wish to protest that, in spite of the 
"passionate scholarship" and fine writing of Dr.Denney and many 
others, it is nothing short of blasphemy to attribute the death 
of Christ to any divine necessity or any other cause or object 
whatever except the one supreme object of destroying evil - 
which it alone could do. Among all theories of the Atonement, 
the Ransom theory makes this plain. The theory of a Ransom to 
the devil, as it was elaborated by the Patristic writers - even 
in the really fine pages of Gregory of Nyssa - can only be put 
by with a smile in our day. We nave left mythology - and per- 
haps even the personality of the devil-behind "us. But the
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principle remains. And it supplies a key and a light sorely 
needed in modern discussions of Atonement doctrine.
The "obscurity that clouds the thought" of Dr.Denney as to the 
necessity for Christ's death is well illustrated in what he says 
about sacrifice. Denney has some fine things to say about sacri- 
fice, but it seems to me that he betrays considerable uneasi- 
ness in his efforts to explain how Christ's death is a sacri- 
fice or propitiation offered to God. The truth is it is no such 
thing. The whole sacrifice that is offered in the death of 
Christ - as F.D.Maurice has so clearly shown - is on God's part. 
Christ's death is entirely God's sacrifice - God's supreme 
sacrifice of Himself offered to man - to the evil that grips 
man - in order to deliver him from it.
Denney says:-
"The value (of Christ's sacrifice) is that somehow or 
other it neutralises sin as a power estranging man and 
God, and that in virtue of it God and man are reconciled. 
.......All sacrifice was offered to God, and, whatever
its value, it had that value for Him. No man ever thought 
of offering sacrifi ce for the sake of a moral effect it 
was to produce on hii:iself. If we say that the death of 
Christ was an atoning sacrifice, then the atonement must 
be an objective atonement. It is to God it is offered, and 
it is to God it makes a difference.....The most radical
objection, of course, is that Christ is/bod's gift to man, 
and therefore cannot be a sacrifice by or for men to God; 
but in point of fact this objection never had weight. 
The sense that Christ is the Father's gift to the world 
never deterred Christians froni thinking of Him instinc- 
tively as a sacrifice to God for the putting away of sin, 
(Doct.of Recon.30-31)
The whole bearing of what he says on this matter both here and 
in other places is on the thought of the sacrifice being claimed 
by and offered to God. Uhere is a want of recognition of the 
bearing of the sacrifice in the other direction - the sacrifice 
proceeding from God for the deliverance of man.
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It wilJ be noticed that Denney assumes that if the Atonement 
to objective, the object of it must be God Himself. The Atone- 
ment in the Ransom theory is a truly objective Atonement, but the 
object is - the evil in man, not God at all. The whole trans- 
action is aimed at removing evil.
Compare Denney's view, however, with the clear and bold teach- 
ing of Maurice on Sacrifice:-
"In these Sermons I have compared these two sacrifices; 
the sacrifice which manifests the mind of God,- which 
proceeds from God, which accomplishes the purpose of God 
in the redemption and reconciliation of His creatures, 
which enables those crcultures to become like their Father, 
in Heaven by offering up themselves;- and the sacrifices 
which men have dreamed of in one country or another, as 
a means of changing the purposes of God, of converting 
Him to their mind, of procuring deliverance from the 
punishment of evil, while the evil still exists." 
(Doct.of Sacrifice.Introd.xliv-v)
"The propitiation - for I did not object to the word tfhen 
we had found the divine signification of it - was set 
forth by God; it was declared to be......His own deilara-
tion of His own ^yill and purpose to men: His own way of 
reducing their will and purpose into submission to His. 
The Cross gathered up into a single transcendent act the 
very meaning of all that had been and all that was to .be. 
God was there seen in the might and power of His love, 
in direct conflict with Sin and Death and Hell, triumph- 
ing over them by sacrifice".(pp.255-6)
The difference is unmistakable. Denney is striving to show 
how there are divine necessities which demand to be propitiated 
in the sacrifice of Qirist, and that this is the reason for such 
a sacrifice at all; in Maurice there is a totally different 
emphasis: the demand for the sacrifice is on the other side - 
in man, his plight, his sin. And here perhaps appears Maurice's 
chief contribution to a true objective theory of the Atonenent,
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in his emphatic teaching that all sacrifice proceeds from God; 
Christ is entirely God's sacrifice, offered by Him, and in no 
sense a sacrifice offered to God.
The idea of Sacrifice and the idea of Ransom are one and the 
same, when it i s understood that it is God Who makes the sacri- 
fice. When Denney goes on to discuss the Ransom theory - how 
nan is held in bondage by evil and Christ's death delivers him 
from it - one is not surprised to hear him say: "the truth of 
this, in the appeal it makes to our feeling and experience, is 
unquestionable, and it is as easy to apprehend as everything 
involved in the notion of sacrifice is difficult."(31) Denney's 
thought is too much entangled in the "divine necessities". The 
one great divine necessity was to destroy sin and to deliver 
man from its power and corruption, so that man might be recon- 
ciled to God. It was this alone that called forth the one su- 
preme sacrifice.
If Maurice's great idea be true, that the sacrifice in Christ's 
death is wholly on God's part - it is God Who is sacrificing 
Himself - then we have at once the Ransom theory pure and simple. 
What is the purpose of the sacrifice? The deliverance of man, 
nothing else.
One cannot help feeling that this great vital fact of the 
Atonement, the central fact in our Christian faith, should be 
capable of some straightforward, unambiguous explanation that 
will satisfy the mind, and which can be given at once in answer 
to the questionings of inquirers - and it seems to ne we have it 
here. ; .
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Hefore proceeding to defend the theory against its other 
great rival - the purely subjective theory of Abelard - there 
if, one further consideration I should wish to bring forward.
S.T.Coleridge in his discussion of St.Paul's teaching on the 
Atonement very strikingly calls attention to a point of view 
which has largely been ignored in the treatment of the doctrine, 
but which has a profound bearing uixm the matter we have been 
dealing with. That is, that a careful distinction must be drawn 
between the effects of God's redeeming act as these are felt 
in the experience of the redeemed - and that act itself in its 
actual significance for God. This has not always been taken into 
account. In thinking about the fact of the Atonement we are 
often confused between what God is actually doing and what the 
redeemed man feels is happening in his experience. Now by dis- 
entangling the effects or consequences of Christ's act as they 
are experienced by men from the essential nature of the act 
itself, Coleridge (as already pointed out in the section dealing 
with his work) manages most skilfully to refute the whole idea 
of satisfaction being made to God in the Atonement. "It is the 
effect and consequences of Christ's mediatim that St.Paul is 
dilating on."(Aids.p.73)
This is certainly illuminating and may help to explain much. 
As both Denney and Mozley have made clear, it is impossible to 
remove from the texture of the Apostle's th outfit the idea that 
God needs to be reconciled to man, and that there is an enmity 
on God's part as well as on man's before the reconciliation 
takes place. It is true. Paul dwells on the "wrath" of God 
(Rom.1.18.&c.) It must be admitted that expiation, satisfaction,
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substitution, penalty and kindred ideas do appear in the thought 
of the Apostle. They cannot be eliminated from it. Moreover they 
are true to experience, for these words describe exactly what 
the redeemed man feels. God's wrath has been turned away - my 
flcbt has been paid by Christ - He has st6od in my place - ny 
penalty has been borne by Him, He has been punished in my stead. 
That is all true. There cannot be many things ever said about 
the Atonement which are not true to some element of redeemed 
experience. Hut the question is - can we describe the act of 
Atonement itself and God's intention in that act in these or 
such like terms? The distinction is obvious, and I think Cole- 
ridge has rendered a useful service in pointing it out so 
emphatically. There must be some real necessity for Christ's 
death that God Himself feels, and it is this we desire to get 
at in theorising on the doctrine. As I have attempted to make 
clear , that necessity can only lie in the evil, in the need 
to overcome it and deliver man from it.
In the old Cathedral in the city of Ghent there is a very 
interesting monument. It is an ancient baptismal font in the 
form of a laage globe cut out of stone and resting on a pedes- 
tal. Round the circumference or equator of the globe, entirely 
encircling it, there is carved a huge serpent whose head .and 
tail meet at the point where the spectator stands. The scaly 
body of the serpent bulges out prominently from, the surface of 
the stone, and the obvious intention of the sculptor - which 
his skill has been very successful in realising - is to show 
how the entire globe is dominated by the serpent. Now above, 
on the very top of the globe, tiiere stands a small cross. It
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leans over somewhat to one side, as if battered and almost over- 
thrown by some tempest or other force, tact it still stands, 
barely holding its ground, on the top of the globe and above 
the serpent.
The meaning is clear and very true. The Cross is still on the 
top, the Cross wins, but it only wins and no more. It is all it 
can do to hold its ground, but it does hold on and on ever above, 
The serpent has terrific power, but at the last of it the Cross 
wins.
Now this power of evil, this huge dominating serpent, which 
somehow has power to drive and compel both God and man, and 
which seems almost to conquer, is what I maintain has not been 
allowed for sufficiently in the explanations given of the need 
for an atoning suffering and death in order to the forgiveness 
of sin and the redemption of mankind. I would attribute actual 
power to this evil, power against God as well as against man, 
and there I would find the- necessity for Christ's sufferings.
In "The Christian Experience of Forgiveness", Dr.Mackintosh, 
dealing with th e matter from the definite point of view of 
human experience, speaks of the Atonement made by Christ as the 
cost of forgiveness to God. His leading thought is the divine 
cost, the price God had to pay.
"The Christian message of forgiveness declares that the 
Father puts us right with Himself, at an inward cost of 
which Calvary is the measure"(p.GO) 
"In forgiving sin God takes account of moral realities.
He would not be more divine if He dealt with sin as a 
trifle, merely letting the sinner oft; He would cease to 
be God fi (I58). 
"At Gethsenane and Calvary......faith discerns such an
exhibition of divine reconciling passion t such a tragic 
tension in which God^spares Himself, nothing, as makes the 
heart faint within us and stops every mouth before God." 
(190)
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And Dr.Mackintosh speaks of sin as - "that awful power 
with which God Himself grapples in strife and pain"r~
That is exactly my point. Have the theologians fully evalu- 
ated what this implies?
But now, while God must take account of moral realities, why 
should He have to suffer? Why should there be a cost to God, a 
price God has to pay? This thought requires to be followed out 
into all that it invoices. Forgiveness of a brother means much 
cost to us, but why should it do so in the case of God? We are 
confessedly involved in a struggle with sin and selfishness, 
they have power over us - but is it so with God? If it is, we 
must think what it means.
Maurice in his "Religions of the World", speaking of the 
religion of the Goths, shadows forth the true explanation of 
the "cost" to God in the Atonement;-
"Every Northern Saga is full of profoundest interest and 
instruction. A nighty power of death and of darkness 
struggling to draw all creatures into itself; mightier 
powers of good struggling against it; consuming fires that 
are to destroy what is corrupt; life coming out of death, 
second birth, resurrection - these are the ideas by which
thev were haunted and possessed."(Relig.of the World.122) * ̂ Atonement, L & '
The Christ ianYmeans for God this great battle. It is a titanic 
conflict, the evil is real, and the weapon with which God fights 
it is - suffering. Christ's death is God's dreadful battle with 
evil; it does not merely (lshow God's attitude to sin - it is 
God's actual life and death struggle against sinl
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CHAPTER VII 
CRITICISM OF THE. SUBJECTIVE THEORY OP "MORAL INFLUENCE".
I. ABELARD'S VIEW.
If the essential principle of the Ransom theory is to be main- 
tained as the truest explanation - the nearest rationale - of 
the act of Atonement, it will have to be made good against a 
much more serious rival than any form of the Satisfaction theory 
can present; namely, the purely subjective or "Moral Influence" 
theory.
This has been advanced from time to time by outstanding thinkers
as a relief to the intolerable burden of the prevailing doctrine, 
but it has never succeeded in capturing the centre of the feild, 
which has all along been held by the Anselmic tradition.
I am not concerned with Abelard's teaching; I mention his 
name in connection with the theory of Moral Influence because 
he was the first to put definitely forward this simple and at- 
tractive thought in explanation of the Atonement,- that it was 
the pure act of the Divine love, a supreme sacrifice on God's 
part with the single purpose of appealing to men and winning 
then from sin. That is an intelligible position and perfectly 
clear, but it has never won general acceptance because instinct- 
ively the Christian consciousness seemed to detect a weakness 
in it. The explanation it offers has never appeared to be quite 
adequate to the case. It is inadequate to the Scripture pre- 
sentation of the fact of the Atonement, and to that fact as itr 
appears in the experience of the redeemed.
It should be noted here that this "Moral Influence" theory
of the Atonement explains the death of Christ solely as a re- 
velation -- an exhibition or manifestation of God's love, a 
method freely chosen by God of so showing His love to man as to 
persuade man's will. That and nothing more. The theory as a dis- 
tinct theory by itself, must be pinned down to this single 
thought. Certaifa writers, like Rashdall, for example, - the 
great modern exponent of Abelard's idea - would somewhat demur 
to this, but it must be insisted upon. If there is more in 
Christ's death than a mere exhibition or revelation - if there 
is some profound necessity which makes this the only possible $
i
method of accomplishing the object of man's redemption - if for 
any reason God is forced to adopt this method - then some other 
theory becomes involved, and the purely subjective, Mooal 
Influence explanation falls to the ground. (I would say that if 
this particular method of redemption - sending Christ to the 
Cross - is necessitated, and no other would avail, then you 
havo at once the Ransom theory in principle. God had to pay 
this price. It appears to me that Rashdall's Abelardian view 
hardly seems to appreciate this.)
It is in his Commentary on the Romans that Abelard develops .  
his theory. Christ died, neither because a ransom, had to be 
paid to the Devil, nor because the blood of an innocent victim 
was required to appease the wrath of an angry God, but that a
supreme exhibition of love might kindle a corresponding love 
in the hearts of men and win them to the true freedom of the 
sons of God. There are undoubtedly other points of view to be 
found in Abelard, as has been clearly shown by Dorner(iv.I9), 
Denney(Reconcil.80-81), Mozley( 132.Note), and others.; but his
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real interest, so far as the explanation of Christ's death is 
concerned, is here. The great object is to persuade, to win, by 
the revelation of love, and the most valuable service Abelard 
has rendered is in his emphatic insistence on the fact of love 
as the supreme motive of God in the Atonement.
2. RASHDALL.
Rashdall is the leading modern English theologian who has adop- 
ted this purely subjective view as his own, and in "The Idea of 
Atonement in Modern Theology" thiSB whole position is elaborately 
argued out. Rashdall says that in Abelard both the Ransom theory 
and every kind of substitutionary or expiatory Atonement is ex- 
plicitly denied, and. the efficiency of Christ's death is quite 
simply and definitely explained by its subjective influence on 
the mind if the sinner. In "Ideas and Ideals" Rashdall says: 
"Abelard provided the medieval world with a theory to which no 
objection can bar taken on moral grounds ..... the view which
sinply treats the death of Christ as a peculiarly characteristic 
and conspicuous exhibition of that self-sacrificing love which 
was the inspiring motive of all Christ's work for man and which 
makes it the great revelation of God, moving the world to an-, 
swering love and gratitude...... The Abelardian teaching is
wholly in accordance with Christ's teaching inasmuch as it re- 
presents Christ's life and death, the revelatiai of God, as the
strongest influence which there is in the world for bringing 
about that repentance and amendment upon which, as He Himself 
taught, acceptance with God really depends"(159.IG2).
In defending his subjective theory Rashdall - naturally - 
has considerable difficulty with some of the words of Jesus,
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and gives his own account of'Jesus' teaching. I have already re- 
ferred to his treatment of the "Ransom" passage, but he has the 
same difficulty with the sayings of Jesus found in the narratives 
of the Lord's Supper (Mat.26.26-29) (Mk. 14,22-25)(Lk.22-rI5-22) 
The accounts we have of our Lord's words on that aceasion are 
"not consistent with each other." They cannot be taken literally 
for "in points of detail the contradict one another." "Only one 
of the versions contains any reference to the forgiveness of 
sins, and the words which contain this reference are precisely 
the words which may most confidently be set aside"(Idea of THEOL? 
p.38). In regard to the expressions,"my blood", "covenant",etc., 
in the narratives, Rashdall is constantly found saying,"if the 
words be genuine", "if He actually used the words," etc., which 
shows the tendency of his mind on the matter, and his dislike 
of admitting any objective element whatever in the Atonement as 
Jesus spoke of it. He is very eager to grasp at the possible 
non-genuineness of any words or ideas which will not fit into 
his theory.
I confess to having very little patience with this kind of 
thing. When we have four accounts - three in the Synoptics 
and one in the Apostle - all very much alike and presenting one 
plain thought to the ordinary mind, surely that thought can 
hardly be dismissed in this off-hand manner; and to understand
the words, "Take, eat; this my body" as meaning no more than 
this; "As I give you this bread, so I devote myself wholly to
you (jbo you rather than for you).I desire to identify myself 
with you in the closest possible manner; take this ay a fare- '   
well Fjfpression of our spiritual union" - is surely a remark- 
able J£ur jle ipjrcjet. (Idea of Theol.p.42).
In regard to the general teaching of Jesus on forgiveness, 
Rashdall insists that with Jesus the sole condition of forgive- 
ness is the state of the heart, moral righteousness, love to God 
and one's neighbour. It is entirely a "judgement according to 
works "(p.23). Side by side with this there is teaching equally 
explicit and equally simple about the possibility and need for 
repentance, and the certainty of forgiveness upon repentance. 
These are the sole conditions according to Jesus. The need for 
repentance is the very essence of the appeal that Jesus made 
from the very outset.of His ministry.(23) "Forgiveness is a ne- 
cessary corollary of His fundamental'1 doctrine of God's love to 
His children"([25). The parables of the Prodigal Son and the 
Pharisee and Publican mean that God forgives the truly repent- 
ant without any other condition than that of true repentance.
All this is clear and simple and it is perfectly true so far 
as it goes. Where it fails is in that it does not go deeply 
enough into the repentant state and what brings it about. Repen- 
tance is necessary of course because forgiveness cannot take 
place in men's hearts without repentance. That is trye doctrine. 
Men cannot be forgiven without repentance. But J go further and 
say that men cannot repent without deliverance. That is where 
Atonement by the death of Christ appears. Rashdall's idea of 
what Christ taught and meant leaves no jblace for the Cross and 
offers no explanation of it. The Cross is irrelevant. Yet the 
Cross is the standing fact that requires explanation. Jesus 
taught all that simple and precious truth which Rashdall has ex-
*
pounded - but why did He die? 
As regards the teaching of the Apostle, Rashdall admits that
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St.Paul certainly does attribute to the death of Christ an 
actual objective efficacy, though by far the greater part of 
what He says may be explained and justified by the subjective 
effect which the love of God revealed by Christ produces on the 
soul of the believer. This side of the matter - the appeal made 
by the amazing love of God in the death of Christ to human love 
and gratitude - is the side of the atonement doctrine increa- 
singly insisted on in the later epistles.
In discussing this matter Rashdall shows appreciation of the 
point so well brou$it out by Coleridge - the importance of dis- 
tinguishing between the essential nature of the atoning act and 
the effects of that act in man's experience; and J agree entire- 
ly with what he here says about the teaching of the Apostle. 
But I would add that Christ's death was not a method chosen by 
God merely to show His love and so win men to repentance, but 
rather a method imposed upon God by the nature of the evil of 
which men had to repent. Such a dreadful and desparate expedi- 
ent as appears in the Cross must have had some deeper meaning, 
some more dire necessity, than merely the desire to show, to 
reveal, to exhibit. That is what I contend for; and if it be so 
then you have an objective element, and you pass beyond the 
Moral Influence theory.
There is a fine passage in Rashdall 1 s book which I would like 
to quote, as it shows clearly that in his own thought on the 
matter he cannot entirely rest in the purely subjective view;
"The only way in which the existence of so much evil 
of all kinds.....can be reconciled with the goodness of
God is (as it seems to me) to suppose that the evil is in 
some way a means to the utmost attainable good......But
if our moral consciousness reveals <t9 us any objective 
truth, evil remains evil still, and if evil it must be
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evi.l_for God as well as for nan. And therefore if God loves 
mankind He must needs sorrow over human sin and human pain. 
We may reverently say that if God is good, if He is loving, 
if He looks on men as His children, in a word, if He is 
like Christ - He must in some sense suffer in or with His 
creatures......A God Who contemplates such a world as ours
without suffering would not be a loving God, neither 
would He be in the least like Christ......No kind of death
could have revealed the love of God so impressively as a 
death of suffering voluntarily submitted to for love of 
the brethren. The Atonement id the central truth of 
Christianity in so far as it proclaims and brings home 
to the heart of man, the supreme Christian truth that God 
is lovej and that love is the most precious thing in 
human life." (Idea of Atone.pp.452-454)
Now I cannot fathom how one can speak in this Avay and yet not 
see that there is some deeper meaning and necessity in Christ's 
death than merely to reveal God's love. The whole bearing of 
this passage is to bring out the terrible and tragic power of 
evil, a power to cause suffering both to God and man. 
(a) It certainly shows that evil is something other than "a 
means to the utmost attainable good", (b) It shows also that 
evil caused the death of Christ - called it forth. God was com- 
pelled to do thia if man was to be saved, (c) It shows that, if 
that death of Christ saves man from evil, it does so by some- 
thing else, something more, thati merely appealing to his heart. 
It does reveal God's love and thus appeal to man's heart, to his 
gratitude, his love, - all theories admit this - but that re- 
velation is not the whole meaning of the death. That is to say, 
the case is not that God chose this method of supremely re- 
vealing His love and so winning man over: the case is that God 
had to adopt this method as the only one that would deal with
evil and deliver nan from ,it. What I contend for is that in . 
Christ's death there is sonic objective effect wrought other 
than simple revelation for the purpose of persuasion.
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- 3. VIEWS OF COLERIDGE AND MAURICE ESSENTIALLY DISTINCT 
Mtt)M THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY.
Abelard's idea is in an eminent degree simple,- reasonable and 
intelligible, and therein has considerable advantage over some 
other views; but it is inadequate to the facts, an d the teach- 
ing of both our two theologians, Coleridge and Maurice, is to be 
essentially distinguished from it. It is impossible to place 
that teaching under any purely subjective explanation of the 
Atonement.
It may be said at once that the leading point of difference 
is to be found in their doctrine of the Will. With Coleridge 
and Maurice the will is not free to repent. It is not able to 
repent. The will is "diseased" and requires a "cure", it is 
"captive" and requires "deliverance". The subjective theory 
"assumes - it must assume - that persuasion alone, powerful 
persuasion, is all that is necessary. If persuasion is powerful 
enough the will will yield. Therefore the account which this 
theory gives of the necessity for Christ's death is that it is 
the last, uttermost form of appeal that God could bring to bear, 
that is, the perfect revelation of His love and will to forgive.
*
The Ransom theory goes deeper, and the teaching of both Cole- 
ridge and Maurice agrees with it. More than appeal or per- 
suasion ia involved. §ome actual work is wrought on the will, 
something is done with the corrupt, diseased, captive state 
of the will - a remedy, a deliverance is provided whereby the 
will is enabled to repent and yield. You do not only appeal to 
a diseased person - you cure him; or to a captive - you loose 
his chain.
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In God's great act of love in the Cross of Christ there is
surely appeal and persuaeion of the highest kind, there is a 
call and a summons and all we can think of hope and promise and 
inspiration; but underneath all that there is first of all de- 
liverance, redemption. This is so familiar and so entirely sc ip- 
tural as to seem obvious, yet it is necessary to point it out 
for there is a truth here which the purely subjective theory 
misses, and which both Coleridge and Maurice dwell upon through- 
out their whole teaching on the matter.
Coleridge's very characteristic doctrine of "Original Sin" re- 
moves him essentially from the subjective standpoint in his 
theory of redemption. As we have seen, original sin is for him 
simply sin that originates in a will. All sin is original sin. 
But as regards redemption, the point here is that while sin 
ttous originates in the will's own act, by that act the will be- 
cocies corrupt and helpless. "For this is the essential attri- 
bute of a will and contained in the very idea, that whatever 
determines the ^will acquires this power from a previous deter- 
mination of the will itself.....And if by an act to which it
had determined itself it has ^ftuppppinQa itself to the deter-
L,
raination of nature (in the language of St.Paul, to the will of 
the flesh% ) it receives a nature into itself and so far be- 
comes a nature; and this is a corruption of the will and a 
corrupt nature. It is also a fall of man, ina.smuch as his will 
is the condition of his personality." (Aids.p.230) He con- 
stantly speak.s of this subject state of the will as a "disease", 
and of Christianity as the "remedy". "Ask me not how such a
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disease can be conceived possible. I come to cure the disease, 
not to explain it"(234). "a&at it is in the power of the will 
either to repent or to have faith (in the Gospel sense of the 
word) is itself a consequence of the redemption of mankind, a 
free gift of the Redeemer"(261).
This is far removed from the simple principle of subjective 
moral influence. The central idea of Coleridge that the 
atoning act in it3 relation to the human will is "transcendent", 
mysterious - "factum est" - and that its nearest analogy nay be 
a "new birth", a regeneration through a quickening Spirit; or 
some kind of "imward co-agency" ("an Agent who can at once act 
on the will as an exciting cause quasi ab extra, and in the will 
as the condition of its potential, and the ground of its actual 
being" 276) - this is fundamentally distinct from the prin- 
ciple of the subjective theory.
Maurice's idea of the corruption and bondage of the will and 
its need for deliverance is entirely in line with Coleridge, 
but his treatment of the matter is of course much fuller and 
goes much farther than with Coleridge.
Maurice's chief contribution to Atonement doctrine is found 
in his idea of Sacrifice; "That doctrine I hold, as our fore- 
fathers held it, to be the doctrine of the Bible, the doctrine 
of the Gospel;" and according to Maurice the true meaning of 
sacrifice is; "The sacrifice which manifests the mind of God, 
which proceeds from God, which accomplishes the purposes of
p
God in the redemption and reconciliation of His creatures, 
which enables these creatures to become like their Father in 
Heaven by offering up themselves."(Doct.of Sacrifice.Introd.)
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This is the essential teaching of Maurice on the Atonement, 
reiterated throu$iout his works, and we have here the leading
point I have referred to as distinguishing him from the purely
(t 
subjective principle - that is the thought that is God's
f\
sacrifice alone which enables us to offer ourselves as a sac- 
rifice to Him, that sets us free, delivers the will, and 
gives us power to repent. This thought, which he rfipeats 
over and over again, is characteristic of Maurice's whole 
teaching. The sacrifice of God in Christ is "that mighty 
conquering power - that power against which no other in earth 
or Heaven could measure itself" (id.p.219). This sacrifice is 
offered "that they might be able to offer themselves as 
children to do their Father's work and .will"(66). "It is the 
Word Who has purchased for them the privilege and the power 
of sacrificing themselves M (3.09). Maurice is as clear as Cole- 
ridge in showing sin to be the "disease" of the will, and 
he speaks of th e Atonement as "an actual remedy for an actual 
disease"(I75,ete.)
What I am concerned to bring out is the essential distinc- 
tion of Mauriee's teaching from the subjective position, and 
therefore I wish to emphasise in his case - as in that of 
Coleridge - only this one leading point of the will and its 
deliverance. In Maurice as in Coleridge the whole bearing of 
the act of Atonement is on the redemption, the deliverance 
of the diseased and captive will of man. I only stress this 
point meantime. My view is that it removes him entirely from 
the subjective standpoint. Maurice speaks of a sin "so in- 
tricately and inseparably interwoven with the very fibres of
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their being, that men cannot get rid of it without destroy- 
ing themselves"(Essays.25).
I am anxious to avoid the appearance of placing Maurice 
(fhere he would no doubt be somewhat startled to find himselfI) 
definitely within the ancient Patristic theory of a Ransom 
to Satan; but the truth is that passage after passage through- 
out his voluminous works could easily be cited which offer in 
all essentials a modern rendering of that theory, showing 
unmistakably that Maurice personally held and earnestly pro- 
fessed the full New Testament conception of an Evil Spirit 
with its power of bondage over the human will on which the 
Ransom theory is largely founded.
See for example: Th«ol.Essays, "On Sin","On the Evil .
Spirit".
Doct.of Sacrifice, Ser.VIII."Christ's Sacrifice a
Redemption". Ser.XII."Christ made Sin for us".
Ser.XV."Christ's Death a Victory over the Devil".etc.
He says; "I have further contended with great - some of the
 
orthodox Journals seem to think with excessive - vehemence, 
that the denial of an Evil Spirit, of a Devil, confuses the 
facts of the universe, our own inmost experience, and the 
divine witness concerning God's victory over evil". 
(Doct.of Sacrifice.Introd.xxx.)
I have no wish to make out a case from any special sayings 
or passages, however numerous, in a writer like Maurice. 
I maintain his fundamental distinction from the subjective 
theory on the ground of his,whole teaching as to Christ's act 
being in its nature essentially redemptive, an act of deli- 
verance; but before passing from this matter, I may refer to
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one very striking instance he gives of Christ's death actually 
breaking the power of the Devil. Dealing with the verse, "that 
through death He night destroy him that had the power of death, 
that is the devil", Maurice shows how the devil's most com- 
plete victory over men is in his power to persuade them that 
death separates from God, it is the final separation, the 
final chasm, of which all other separations are but dim pro- 
phecies. Now Christ by His death and resurrection tears in 
pieces that calumny against God. No words could have 
The transcendent act does it. Christ dies and rises again 
and thus breaks the bondage of that deception. His death, 
which seemed to separate Him from God, is made the pledge of 
His eternal union with Him, and actually break^ the devil's 
power by scattering the delusion he has cast over men's minds. 
(Doct.of Sacrifice.236-7)
4. GENERAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY.
I am not content, then, with the Subjective theory in any 
form in which, so far as I know, it has appeared. The act of 
Atonement cannot be understood on the plane of "Subjective 
Moral Influence"; and that is true whether regard be had to 
the Divine initiation of the act on the one hand, or, on the 
other, to the effects of the act on man. It is not simply a 
moral influence persuading man to abandon evil, but is rather 
an actual objective dealing with the evil in man. There is a 
difference between these two things both to God and to man. 
(i) To God it means that He did not simply choose this 
method of appealing to man, but was, so to speak, shut up to 
it, enforced into it, as the only possible method of acc-or.ip-
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lishing His purpose. And (ii) to man, it means that he is not 
simply appealed to or persuaded - he is delivered, a totally 
different matter.
Now, if the "Moral Influence" theory were to be so extended 
as to include these ideas - namely, that there is a power of 
evil which compels God to act in this way if man is to be re- 
deemed, and that man on his part finds that he is not merely 
appealed to and powerfully persuaded to repent, but that he 
is set free, delivered, enabled to repent, that something 
happens to the evil within him in consequence of Christ's 
atoning act - then I am entirely prepared to accept that 
theory. But in that case I maintain - first, the theory 
cannot pro-perly be described as one of subjective moral in- 
fluence; and second, it is certainly not the "Moral Influ- 
ence" theory as it has historically appeared. It is not the 
theory of Abelard nor of Rashdall. Moral suasion of man's 
will by the supreme revelation of God's love is the essence 
of the transaction as this theory has actually appeared in 
the history of the doctrine. When you go beyond that you un- 
doubtedly introduce the essential principle of the Ransom 
theory.
The subjective theory does not go deep enough. It does not 
take sufficient account of the reality and power of evil, and 
therefore it can never offer an adequate reason why this dire 
and terribly expedient of the Cross was necessary. If the 
theory of moral influence - revelation for the purpose of 
persuasion - is the true explanation of the Atonement, then 
the Cross, in the last resort, was not necessary. It was an
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accident. It was an arbitrary choice on God's part to reveal 
Himself in this way. You cannot avoid the thought that God 
niffht have chosen some other method. Lacking some dire and 
absolute necessity, it would be true to say that the Cross 
would rather repel than attract what is best in man. It is 
simply because it is necessary, and because God does not shrink 
from this terrible necessity, that the Cross has its unique 
power to appeal to men and to win them. If the only necessity 
lay in the effort to appeal, the appeal would fail. It is be- 
cause the Cross is absolutely unavoidable on other grounds 
that it has its app eal. And these grounds appear in the evil 
that God is attacking by means of the Cross. The Cross is the 
"power of God" and the "wisdom of God" in dealing with evil.
That, I think, is the answer to Abelard. The moral theory is 
quite inadequate to the facts of the case. It can offer no 
real explanation of these facts without tacitly assuming 




My endeavour in the Thesis has been to show that the 
Patristic, Pre-Anselmic view of the Atonement - the idea of a 
Ransom to the Devil - is the true one. The myth need not 
trouble us: the truth is there. Great truths have been given 
under mythical forms ere now, and the great truth given in the 
Ransom theory is that the Christian Atonement means - God in 
Christ grappling with evil, and overcoming evil, for man's 
redemption. That thought best explains the facts, and this is 
the only theory that makes the thought unambiguously clear. 
The fact to be explained is the Cross of Christ; why was 
it necessary? how did it effect its object? - and (as we have 
seen) neither the Anselmic tradition of Satisfaction to God, 
nor the Abelardian tradition of Appeal to man, can really 
supply a satisfactory answer. The Ransom theory gives the 
simple explanation, that this was the only possible method 
of accomplishing the object, of overcoming evil, it was the 
price God had to pay for man's deliverance. "God was in Christ 
reconciling the world unto Himself 1.1 I believe thia is funda- 
mentally the New Testament interpretation of the facts; I am 
certain it is the mind of both Coleridge and Maurice on the 
matter; and I find this view given - purely and unequivocally 
- in the Ransom theory alone among all Atonement theories. 
The difficulty lies in man, not in God, and the whole bearing
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of the atoning act is manward, not Godward;- manward not merely 
in the way of appeal or noral influence, but in tne way of 
redemption, deliverance, emancipation.
I. A RECENT UPHOLDER OF THE PATRISTIC THEORY.
There are various indications that thought on the Atonement 
will move more and more in this direction. For example, in a 
masterly little treatise on the Subjective feiew, "The Pro- 
blem of the Cross", by W.E.Wilson - which he calls a "variety" 
or "extension" of the Moral Influence theory - the writer gives 
it as his profound conviction - after a careful study of the 
New Testament - that no New Testament writer taught a "penal 
substitution" or "satisfaction" view of the Atonement. "While 
the older theories", he says, "saw the cause of Christ's death 
in a Divine requirement of justice, and its effect primarily 
on God and only secondarily on man, this (Wilson's view) sees 
as its direct and only cause the sin of man, and as its effect 
the removal of that sin by inducing men to repent."(p.41) 
This is a distinct advance on the Satisfaction theory, but he 
does not get beyond the Subjective theory. Wilson is right in 
saying that the sin of man is the only cause, but wrong in 
limiting the effect of Christ's death to the "inducing" of 
men to repent. It enables men to repent. His view is not 
really adequate to the New Testament idea of the meaning of 
the Cross. He saya again; "A false idea in the old theories 
is that God' is not at liberty to forgive freely - an idea which 
is a mere invention of the theologians, and is not found 
either in the Old or New Testament"(21) I think the real 
defect of his position is seen here. The "old theologians" -
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the "old theories" - at least the oldest theory, the Patri- 
stic, did not hold that God is not at liberty to forgive freely, 
but that God has not power to do so, or rather that His free 
forgiveness cannot take effect because nan, undelivered, has 
not power to accept it.
This is a fine and stimulating study of the Atonement, and 
very significant. While he does not actually reach the true 
theory, he comes within sight of it and feels after it. The 
interpretation of the death of Christ must be entirely "man- 
ward", but for this writer that only means, apparently, that 
it "turns", "wins", "persuades" men - never that it frees then.
Much more notable is a recent volume of Lectures on the 
history of the Atonement by Professor Aulen of Lund (English 
Trans.by A.G.Hebert,M.A.I93I->. The Lectures were delivered 
before the University of Upsala and in Germany, and were pub- 
lished in 1930 under the title, "Die drei Haupttypen der 
christlichen Versohnungsgedenkens." The English version is 
entitled, "Ghristus Victor". I read the book with great in- 
terest as it turns out to be a direct defence of the Patri- 
stic idea, which the writer calls the "Classic" theory of the 
Atonement. The essential idea of this Classic view is that 
the Atonement is a victory of God Himself in Christ over 
hostile powers. Aulen endeavours to show that this has really 
been the main line of Atonement theory in the Church all along, 
his chief contribution, perhaps, being his emphatic clain that 
Luther himself belongs to this Classic type. I take, a few 
sentences to show his line of thougit:- 
> - "The main idea is clear. The work of Christ is first
and foremost a victory over the powers which hold nan- 
kind in bondage: sin, death and the devil"(p.3G).
"With Irenaeus (he dates the Classic theory from Ire- 
naeus) it i s God Himself Who in Christ accomplishes the 
work of redemption, and overcomes sin, death, and the 
devil"(37).
"The Classic view of the Atonement has a dualistic 
background, namely, the reality of the forces of evil. 
which are hostile to the Divine will....The work of Atone- 
ment is depicted in dramatic forn as a conflict with the 
powers of evil and a triumph over them"(5I).
Referring to the Ransom theory - "We must penetrate 
to that which lies below the mythological dress, and 
look for the religious ideas which lie concealed beneath 1.1 
(64)
"Behind the 'deception of the devil' lies the true idea 
that the evil jpower really overreaches itself when^it 
comes in conflict with the good"(7I).
This is the first modern writer I have come across who takes 
the Patristic idea og a Ransom to the dewil seriously and 
gives a reasoned exposition of the religious ideas under- 
lying it.
Aulen denies, like W.E.Wilson, that the Satisfaction theory 
is to be found in the New Testament. I hold this too, and I 
think it is true if one keeps in mind the essential distinc- 
tion (which Coleridge draws attention to) between the Act of 
Atonement itself and its effects as experienced by the ?&& 
redeemed. Penal, juridical, forensic conceptions are certainly 
all found in St.Paul, because such ideas are true to redeemed 
experience.
I think jUulen underrates the epoch-making change brought 
about by Anselm. He says that this Classic type of theory has 
really been the prevailing type throughout, but this can 
hardly be«n maintained. There can be no doubt that the Ansel- 
oic or "Latin" view became the dominant one in the Scholastic 
and Reformation periods and right up to the present tine.
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And perhaps we may regard him as carried away by a hardly 
blameworthy enthusiasm over the discovery of a valuable buried 
treasure when we see him claim Luther as an adherent of the 
Ransom theory,"There should be no doubt at all that in Luther 
we meet again the Classic idea of the Atonement. It is the 
Patristic view that has returnedf"(I24).
This may not be -quite convincing, but the whole argument 
is of extraordinary interest. Aulen would make out a case for 
Luther belonging to the Patristic view. With, I believe, more 
reason but on similar grounds, I have attempted to make out 
the same case for Coleridge and Maurice:- (a) They have not 
been recognised as such - naturally, as the entire theory had 
dropped out of sight, (b) Many expressions found in their 
writings seem to claim them for the Satisfaction or the Sub- 
jective theory, (c) The whole bearing of their teaching is 
essentially in line with the Patristic principle,
2. NATURE OF EVIL.
(i) DIVINE CAUSALITY IN RELATION TO EVIL.
The ultimate origin of evil is admittedly one of the unsolved 
problems, but the Ransom theory obviously rests upon the sup- 
position of the actual reality and power of evil; and if this 
is to be upheld, if the idea is to be upheld that evil is a 
real thing, with power against God, power to call forth the 
death of Christ as the price of man's redemption, it must be 
probed at least to what depths may be possible, and the mind . 
satisfied that it is resting on a solid bottom where no suc- 
cessful effort to explain evil away has been ignored.
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Now, such an effort - namely, to explain evil away - appears 
in the theory of an ultimate divine causality behind the evil, 
an idea which has an ancient origin, and has been adopted in 
modern times, for example, by Schleieraacher. If the divine 
causality is true, then God's struggle is after all only a 
shan fight.
In the interests of the Divine Omnipotence and to safeguard 
against the errors of Manichaeism, Schleiermacher definitely 
brings sin itself within God's causality. (See,e.g.,Arts.80-1 
"Der Christ.Glaube" Engl,Trans.) And I may say at once that 
it seems to me Schleiermacher here essentially departs from 
his chosen ground of Christian Experience. The weakness of his 
whole system - resting as it does on the Christian conscious- 
ness of "absolute dependence on God" - is (as PJEleiderer has 
pointed out) that it really makes our relation to God physi- 
cal rather than moral. Indeed, in Schleiermacher the purely 
ethical - the moral relationship of persona and wills - tends 
to drop out of sight, and we have what practically amounts to 
a mechanical system, a monism of a Hegelian or even Spino- 
zistic character.
"As in our self-consciousness sin and grace are opposed 
to each other, God cannot be thought of as the Author of 
sin in the same sense as that in which He is the Author 
of redemption. But as we never have a consciousness of 
grace without a consciousness of sin, we must also assert 
that the existence of sin alongside of grace is ordained 
for us by God"(op.cit.p.326i)
"If we add the fact that the sin which persists outside 
redemption never ceases to generate more sin, and that 
redemption only begins to operate after sin has attainad 
a certain degree, we need have no misgiving in saying 
that God is also the Author of sin - of sin, however, 
only as related to redemption"(328).
"Manichaeism is a surrender of the theoretical reli- 
gious interest in thelreality of the Divine omnipotence 
in favour of the practical interest attaching to the
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idea that evil is real in the rao.st unqualified sense, 
NO a,s all the more to bring out the necessity that the 
perfect good .should counteract it redornptivcly"(floO).
"Sin is ordained of God as that which makes redemption 
necessary. Unless indeed we are positively to assume 
that Divine action caan be limited by that which does 
not depend on the Divine causality"(335).
Why not? Schleiermacher seems unable to understand ethics 
as entering into the relations between &od and man. His "Di- 
vine Omnipotence" eliminates, apparently, the ethical 
altogether, and signifies a mechanical monism.
He seems, again, to mix up sin with Unite existence as a 
whole. If God is the Author of the one He must be so of the 
other. But there is surely confusion here. The relation of 
the whole finite world to God is a profound enough philoso- 
phical problem with difficulties of its own, but it is quite 
distinct from the problem of the relation of sin or evil to 
God. Finite existence is not evil (unless perhaps by a return 
to the crudest Greek notions of matter). The Christian con- 
sciousness certainly posits finite being, and it also posits 
sin, but it absolutely refuses to attribute sin in any degree
to the Divine causation, while it does not do so with regard
vsin/ 
to finite being as a whole. To attributTeVbr evil to God's will
(in any semse whatever) is entirely contrary to the dictates 
of that which is Schleiermacher 1 s own chosen criterion - the 
Christian consciousness.
Nor can the Divine causality be allowed to slip in under 
shelter of the fact that that God has created free will and 
is therefore the original Author of the evil introduced by 
that will. "If this whole form of existence - the life of the 
natural man - subsists in virtue of Divine appointment, sin,
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as proceeding from human freedom, has also a place in that 
appointment"(334).
If God creates free will He creates sin. This is really a 
contradiction. How God creates free wiftl, or how it is related 
to God, is a problem by itself - but if its sin is not i£s 
own, wholly and originally, then the will is not free. That 
cannot be escaped. To attribute the e»il of free will to God 
(in any semse that can be conceived) is to deny that freedom.
It were easy here to lose oneself in -
"solitary thinkings such as dodge 
conception to the very bourne of heaven 
then leave the naked brain" -
but to keep on sane solid ground, there is nothing more em- 
phatically pronounced by the Christian consciousness than 
that my sin is absolutely and entirely my own. To assign 
its ultimate cause in any way to God is to break through the 
bounds of that ethical universe within which all discussion 
of Atonement doctrine must abide.
Schleiermacher's teaching as to the Divine causality might 
attempt to vindicate itself from the'point of view of the 
transmutation of evil into a higher good, the idea that evil 
has a high purpose. The greatest good is evil transmuted, 
so that evil is ultimately good and in the last resort flows 
from God. This thought has often been put forward as an ex- 
planation of the origin of evil, but the result is that 
while monism is saved - ethics is abolished. It seems to me 
that the whole conception of evil being the means to the 
highest good is artificial, and is inadmissable because 
essentially unethical. 'The evil, with all the suffering it
103
gives rise to including the Cross, is simply a scheme God has 
devised in order to create greater good!
This whole thought of the Divine causality behind the evil 
arises, of course, out of a shrinking from dualism and the 
desire to preserve a monistic universe - or, theologically, 
the omnipotence, the all-in-all character of Clod. The philo- 
sophical mind demands a monism. It always has done and always 
wil]|do so - the imaginary conception of an Absolute is the 
goal of all pure philosophical inquiry. There is no doubt it 
must be so. It may be an ignis fatuus, but the thought of it 
is the only philosophic resting place. The endless search is 
satisfying and restful only when it seems to discern an Ab- 
solute on ahead.
But while in a metaphysical universe there may thus be no 
rest for the mind short of an ultimate monism., either of 
Subject (Hegel), or even of Substance (Spinoza); yet in an 
ethical universe, such as the Christian scheme of things has 
to do with, monism is unreal and dualism is simply a fact. 
Evil is real, an extraneous thing antagonistic to God. God 
must deliver man from it. God's struggle with evil is an 
actual struggle in which God suffers./jVe fypenoCtn //.")
(ii) GOD'S ANTAGONIST.
Evil then is a hostile power, a power against which both God 
and man have to fight. In the New Testament Christ's victory 
is over demonic powers, "principalities and powers" of evil, 
"the prince of this world", etc. In the Patristic theology
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these hostile powers are personalised and individualised into
the single figure of "Satan" or "The Devil". Christ's atoning 
act on the Crosr* is the ransom or price paid by God to this 
evil One for nan's redemption.
Now, the subtle way in which evil gains ascendency over the 
human will and gets that will into a position of thraldom 
certainly suggests thoughts which lead the mind on till it 
seems almost impossible to stop short of the full New Testa- 
ment conception of a Spirit of Evil. It is not my purpose 
to argue the question of the existence or non-existence of a 
personal Devil - an age-long, unsolved problem. As I have 
before remarked, the question is not vital to the actual 
principle of the Ransom theory; but the whole situation of 
evil in relation .to the human will, the way in which it ap- 
proaches and acts on the will, does seem to point with 
extraordinary persuasiveness to the existence of such a being.
Maurice himself has beautifully analysed the kind of ex- 
perience referred to:-
"The terrible visions of the past and of the future 
which every man has been conscious of - which seem to 
many as if they made up the sum of their existence - 
whence do they come? At first we think from without. 
We lay them to any annoying circumstance, to any dis- 
agreeable fellow creature. The same discoveries, which 
we cannot be deceived in, bring thej* nearer home. They 
must have more to do with us than with anything about 
us. They seem to move from us and yet toward us. There 
springs up in us, we cannot teli i'rom^whence, a desire 
to be freed from this vile state of mind, this self- 
torment. But the moment the effort at reformation 
begins, there begins a suggestion of discouragement and 
despair. The evil that has been done is brought against 
us; the evil that is with us still is brought against 
us. Both are arguments why we cannot obtain freedom, 
why we should not crave for it. Is this accusation from 
ourselves? Is it from conscience? But conscience cannot 
be an enem# of reformation, cannot bid us continue in 
evil. It must be one who is perverting all the witnesses 
of conscience, who iu using them to keep us from ever 
what conscience says we ought to become. It must
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be an accuser, a slanderer - not one clothed in flesh 
and blood - but a spirit"(Doct.of Sacrifice.233-4),
"This tempter speaks to me. to myself, to my will. 
Over that he has established his tyranny. There his 
chains must be broken"(Essays.45)
We certainly have to take account of something of this kind, 
some evil power, actually working in human experience, work- 
ing on the human will. The great sinners and the great saints 
of the race, the great wrestlers with evil and victors over 
evil - Luther, Bunyan, and a host of others, all illustrate 
it for us, and common men know it.
In cold scientific thought what is to be made of it? What 
is this Absolute Evil, this Devil, that acts on and in the 
human will, antagonises God, and calls forth the death of 
Christ in order to man's deliverance from its dominion?
If we are to assign some absolute origin to evil, or attempt 
at least some genetic account of it, I should imagine that 
origin to be found simply in the thought of negation. This is 
perhaps the nearest category one can think of. God is positive, 
in being and action. He is all good, all love, all that is 
good, all that is love, and as we conceive of this positive 
good and love moving on in creative activity, then what is 
left, what is not God - the negative implied by the positive - 
can be imagined as appearing in human history as the evil. 
God is not simply and diffusively the all. He is positive 
being in action. What remains is the not-God. In the bound- 
less spaces of imagination, I can conceive of that as answer- 
ing to the conception of "the origin of evil".
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Such a view nay perhaps find confirmation in, for example, 
the scientific philosophy of A.N.Whitehead. In his books, 
"Science and the Modern World" and Religion in the Making", 
Whitehead offers a notable contribution to the question as to 
what God is. God is the "principle of concretion" in the 
universe - that order of things whereby the whole universe 
of being is concreted, gathered to a point, as it were, in 
every single particular, that principle whereby each is in 
all, and all in each. That order pervading the whole universe 
that makes it concrete, is God.
Now Whitehead has given us a most luminous idea as to what 
evil is. God is the principle of concretion, but there is 
in the universe a principle of discretion - and this is the
evil, God's antagonist. Evil is the principle of discretion
this
or anti-concretion. It is J:hat hinders or obstructs the par- 
ticipation of all in each. This is the very opposite of God t 
the antagonist of God. It is the destroyer of concreteness 
as God is the promoter and sustainer of concreteness. God 
and this evil are mutually exclusive. Evil is not included 
in God, but is a certain disorder that appears in the uni- 
verse.
We are far here from the thought of the Divine causalityi 
Whitehead does not say how this principle of discretion or 
disorder first of all appears in the universe, or why it is 
there at all - "the difficulty," as someone has said, "is not 
that Satan fell out of heaven, but that he ever came into it" 
- but evil is there, this discreting, disordering, destroy- 
ing thing, and its real existence and power affords the true
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ground for the understanding of God's great atoning act in the 
Cross of Christ. (>f>/>eft^r>t 1.)
3. NATURE OF CHRIST'S VICTORY.
One question remains - How does the death ofl Christ over- 
come evil? What is the nature of that blow that is struck at 
the head of the evil by the Cross of Christ? That the Cross 
does strike a blow at it - a victorious blow - is the universal 
testimony of the ages of Christian experience. But how? How does 
the death of Christ effect its purpose? If, as we have seen, 
God has an antagonist to fight and overcome in delivering man, 
and if the weapon He uses is the death of Christ, what is the 
real nature of that weapon and wherein lies its power?
Now this is the great leading question as to how the death 
of Christ deals with evil, and it yields a very beautiful 
amswer. It involves the extremely interesting fact that God's 
method of conquering evil is precisely what we have come to 
understand as the Christian metiiod, the "Christian principle" 
"turning the other cheek", non-resistance, becoming "more 
than conquerors" not by resisting evil but by yielding to the 
utmost that it can do. So that God Himself, in the great 
original act of Redemption, which is the essential> vital 
moment in the tfiole structure of the spiritual universe, is 
carrying out the simple command of Jesus, "I say unto you 
that ye resist not evil". "The Lamb as it had been slain" is 
seen at the very centre of the Eternal Throne.
Suffering to the utmost at the hands of evil for the sake 
of others, in the effort to help them and deliver them from it,
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is not unknown ariong ourselves. Moberly, speaking of vicari- 
ous penitence, beautifully instances what is perhaps one of 
the profoundest cases of the kind in our literature, the case 
of Peggotty and Little Em'ly in Dickens' novel. "Peggotty's 
love for his daughter is not diminished by her fall. The men- 
tal attitude in which the old fisherman and his daughter 
ultimately join, is penitential, and we see on his part vi- 
carious penitence". He enters into the evil that is afflic- 
ting her. He bears it. He suffers and repents with his 
daughter. He suffers the utmost her sin can do for her sake.
The Ransom theory pictures the atoning sufferings of Christ 
as the supreme exemplification of the Christian idea of non- 
resistance - the enemy to whom it is offered being the Devil, 
the hostile power of evil. Christ yields to this entirely and 
so conquers it.
Yielding to it- that is the Christian way of overcoming 
evil. The Cross means that God in Christ actually submits and 
lets evil do its utmost - and by this evil is conquered. This 
is the truth Jesus Himself exemplified in His action, and 
hands on in His teaching to us. But can we go further? Can 
we analyse, can we explain the actual effect which yielding 
to its power has upon the evil? What does suffering do to evil 
whereby it conquers it? What actually happens when the good 
voluntarily yields and suffers to the end at the hands of 
evil? What is that extraordinary, unique, irresistible power 
of Christian meekness, harder than adamant, more durable than 
brass, always winning in the end? Why should yielding to its
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power, letting it trample over you, letting it crucify you, 
why should not that rather strengthen the evil, confirm it, 
and extend its dominion? \Yhat strange alchemy is there in 
submission that changes evil, weakens it, reduces it from a 
power to a weakness, and casts it out beaten, defeated?.
(i) First of all it may be answered, there is some mys- 
terious effect here of which we can only say - factum est. 
It is the great Christian secret. We know that it happens. 
The spirit of the Cros:, does conquer evil, is the only thing 
that will conquer and destroy it, but how that takes place, 
who can tell? "That in some mysterious way the bodily death 
of Christ prevailed over the powers of evil, Origen certainly 
held," says Rashdall. "Acts of self-sacrifice - and particu- 
larly the supreme sacrifice of a unique personality - 
diffused a spiritual influence which directly acted on the 
evil spirits," but - "how exactly Christ's death, or other 
self-sacrificing deaths were supposed to defeat the danger, 
is not explained"(Idea of Atone.262).
(ii) Or is this effect (the effect exercised upon evil by 
the good submitting to the utmost suffering it can inflict) 
is it ultimately of the nature of a persuading, a melting, 
a softening of the hard and stubborn will of evil by the 
spectacle of the suffering? - In that case, there is after all 
some soul of good in the evil. It is not Absolute Evil. The 
Devil has it in him to "tak a thocht anfl mend". He can bo moved. 
And also in that case, the purely moral argument is at last
the true one.
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(iii) Or again, is this effect of the nature of an 
exhaustion of the evil, by making it run itself out in a 
supreme effort, in which - its purpose accomplished - or 
rather, perhaps, shown to be impossible of accomplishment - 
it dies?
These are interesting questions, important too in the con- 
tinued progress of Christianity, and in our inspiration to 
make our own fight with evil - but this is a region certainly 
where a dogmatic temper is not only "undesirable" and "un- 
scriptural" but impossible.
My own mind inclines towards this final idea of exhaustion, 
defeating the purpose of evil by allowing it to pursue its 
purpose to the end, only to find that it fails. The good can 
suffer but it cannot be changed in its nature. The Devil beats 
on a wall of flint and breaks himself. There is thus, I would 
say, even some truth in the ancient idea of God deceiving 
Satan, in Satan's having the worst of the bargain in the 
transaction between him and God. Ths soul of Christ proves 
after all impossible of capture. "Through Christ's Atone- 
ment the power of Satan - the Prince of this world - is 
broken and his impotence in contrast with the Holy One, on 
whom he exhausted himself, demonstrated"(Dorner.IV.120).
The soul of Christ, which is the central core of the good, 
defies capture. It even defies attack, because the opposing 
force of evil, when in its conquering advance it comes right 
up against that soul, falls away broken, its power shattered. 
But the point is that the suffering of death, the last utter 
sacrifice that any soul can make, has been necessary in order
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to 3how this. The body must go, death must be undergone, and 
death in such a dreadful fora that facing it implies total 
and complete self-abnegation - this is Christ's yielding to 
evil - so that the impregnable soul may be reached and re- 
vealed. There is an inner point of light - a citadel of life - 
a centre of force - that cannot be penetrated, the Devil 
never touches the soul of Christ - "the Prince of this world 
cometh and hath nothing in me" - but this inner point, this 
"orbed drop" of light and love, must be reached and shown to 
be impenetrable; and the reaching of that impenetrable point, 
the laying of it bare, that is the Atoning Death, the debt 
of suffering and sacrifice, which the good has to pay to the 
evil in order to destroy it.
"A body hast thou prepared me" -
yes, to show, by its utmost pain, by its perfect sacrifice, 
that I have a soull
In any case, this Redemptive Act is repeated. It is enacted 
over again in men age after age by the indwelling Spirit of 
God in Christ, Christ crucified and risen. God giving up His 
Son to conquer evil by dying at its hands may be only a 
special momentary historical manifestation of a continuous 
act. God is always and everywhere doing this, God is always 
struggling, suffering, conquering - but the principle is the
same.
The Devil is not slain once for all. He rises and acts again 
in each individual will. But, in the Cross of Christ, the 
decisive blow has been struck at his power, the way has been
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shown how to conquer him in each case, the Christian Principle
 
has been shown to be the fundamental thing in the spiritual 
universe, and - the decisive blow having been struck by Christ, 
Christ's work being a "finished work" - it is always possible, 
even in the humblest human life, to be more than a conqueror 




The Atonement a living issue.
It is unnecessary to offer any justification or apology for a 
discussion of the Atonement to day. The doctrine is coming 
more and more into its true position as the vital element in the 
Christian Religion and the chief fact in the moral and spirit- 
ual experience of men. The doctrine and fact of Atonement 
actually holds the field, both in scholarly thought and in popu- 
lar feeling. How inevitably it forces itself into the central 
position may be well illustrated by an example from current 
literature. The following occurs in a paper on "Myth and Reality" 
by C.M.Chilcott, in Canon Streeter's "Adventure";
On one page we find this;-
"'He was wounded for our transgressions, Hejvas bruised for 
our iniquities    - and by His stripes we are healed 1 . 
This view of Atonement is based on a primitive and very 
deep rooted sense of justice in human nature - the view 
which Aeschylus finds ('drasanti pathcin 1 - 'the doer must 
suffer 1 ) - and contains a profound, religious appeal which 
no more subtle theory can lightly supersede. Such a view, 
however, is not acceptable to many at the present day. It 
has long been felt that it presents a view of God as Judge 
and Avenger which is incompatible with our view of Him as 
Love. To the younger generation it is not only immoral but 
meaningless, because the younger generation does not be- 
lieve in "sin". It believes in folly and futility, mean- 
ness and blindness; and equally that, if any redemption of 
these things is possiblej it miut be by our own pain. 
Perhaps a belief in sin is a prerogative of the old and 
wise and optimistic; at any rate no religious doctrine 
based on a belief expressed in the traditional formulae 
awakens a response at the present day." (p.237)
A little farther on we find the following;-
"Most people would admit some measure of guilt for evils 
for which in their own lives they could not be held re- 
sponsible, and they certainly share in thr consequences 
of these evils. We cannot isolate our own from the lives 
of others or speak of them as separate........Our spiri- 
tual life includes and is the spiritual life of countless 
others. This being so, there is one guilt upon all the
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human race; and this Christ, by becoming a member of the 
human race, shares. How is that guilt to be redeemed? 
Surely there is only the way of suffering - not because 
an inscrutable Providence, less kind than mortals, decrees 
a blind payment of pain for pain ? but because God is Love. 
There must be pain in the recognition of evil and pain in 
the effort to overcome. Therefore love must suffer and lay 
down its life. This is the supreme revelation of God given 
us in Christ. We should never have guessed at the meaning 
of this creating and reforming love had we not beheld the 
redemptive suffering of the Cross, where God's heart broke 
for tne world: we see good, because it is good, crucified 
by evil, and out of death life springing and hope foe ever. 
And this we know is more than a single act of history; 
it is a process illuminated once and for all by that act - 
the steadfast and continuous purpose of God." (239)
The essential fact of Atonement is deeply interwoven with 
the essence of human life, and cannot be driven out by youhg 
or old.
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. APPENDIX 13. 
Aim of this Thesis.
Where lies the real need for the suffering and death of Jesus 
Christ?
The Argument-of the present Thesis might be stated thus;- 
Consider that great primary truth of Christianity as a whole, 
the Incarnation. By that sovereign fact of the spiritual world 
entering into time a new realm is brought into being, a Divine 
humanity, a world in which our human nature is seen in its per- 
fect state; a world moreover which we see carried beyond reach 
of decay or corruption in the Resurrection of Christ, The thought 
which this presents to the mind is that of a perfect humanity 
existing under ideal conditions, a City of God, the kind of 
humanity God intends, deathless, pure, perfect; its law, love; 
realising all our purest idals and endeavours with respect to 
our race.
But as yet this world consists of but one supreme Personality, 
one ideally perfect Man in fellowship with God. How is that 
world to b( extended to include others? How is the whole race 
at large, - how is any emngle individual of the race - to 
attain this last blossom and flower-of existence? How are we to 
become members of this high and perfect fellowship? 
Different systems of thought, philosophers, scientists, poets, 
dreamers, theologians, have answered this question in many 
ways; Christianity answers it by the doctrine of the Atonement. 
That is the Philosopher's Stone, the elixir vitae, the strait 
gate and the narrow way. It is the aecret of the ages. Accor- 
ding to Christianity, the Atonement is the one Kate of entrance 
into the final and perfect human.city.-
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Now I would take the broadest possible view of the Atonement. 
I would aee in it every single method, every single power and 
word and influence that comes out from that unseen and perfect 
realm to transform our humanity into its likeness and to raise 
us to its citizenship. Not only the deep transactions of Geth- 
semane and Calvary, but the whole appearing of the supreme 
crown of existence in the God-Man; the Divine love that over- 
flowed in His Advent - the gracious human {${$-- life of Jesus 
in its every act and word - the utter devotion that carried Hid 
like a flint to the end - the final stroke of death - the si- 
lence of the grave - the triumph of the Resurrection - that 
whole miracle that rends the veil of time and matter and shows 
our humanity made perfect in one strong shining Figure on the 
stage of history; all that, every influence that flows from it, 
I would regard as belonging to the Atonement - the Fact of Christ 
in all its bearings on man's life.
We feel, however, that the whole matter does narrow itself 
down to one question - the question of the Death. What place 
has suffering, what place has death, in this great scheme?
It is clear that the Atonement is a manifestation of Divine 
love. The children were partakers of tlesh and blood and He 
Himself likewise took part of the same. He became flecsh because 
we were flesh, and by becoming flesh He beautified our nature 
and consecrated all its abode. That is the truth of the Incar- 
nation. In the Incarnation we already have the union of God and 
man - the perfect oneness of the human and Divine - the point 
where they meet in a perfect fellowship and reconciliation,
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which it is tUue purpose of the Atonement to accomplish. This 
is the aspect of the question which modern thinking tends to 
lay stress upon. There in the God-Man you have the final and 
perfect goal of humanity - the final stage we are all in the 
end to reach.
But the constant teaching of the Bible is that the suffering 
and death had to intervene - that before the race could be 
brought into harmony with this perfect type, Christ had to make 
the tremendous, dark descent, to enter into and take upon Him- 
self all the worst consequences, the sorrow and shame, that 
sin has ever brought on men, and even that last utter darkness 
and banishment of the soul which the death of the sinner means. 
And the Bible teaching is that by His doing this great results 
were achieved and consequences flowed for the sinner that could 
not have come otherwise* There was so to speak, a foundation 
laid by that act, and by that alone, on which rests the possi- 
bility of sin being broken, the banishment and CElusion of the 
sinful soul being taken away, and our huaan nature being raised 
up into that higher life seen in Christ Himself.
The definite question, then, has to be faced - where lies the 
necessity, the dire need, of the suffering and death of Christ 
in order to this result being attained, in order to God's for- 
giveness of sin, and an Atonement being made beyween God and
man?
The question is really this: Is that necessity to be found 
ultimately in God Himself, the Author of the Atonement; or 
is it to be found in the evil, the sin, that calls for the
118
Atonement?
There is an "objective element" in the Atonement. That is to 
say, over and above the moral effect of Christ''s death on the 
mind and heart of man - its power to convince and persuade man 
- there is something that it does, an opus operatum, it exer- 
cises an objective effect. Now is this object God Himself, His 
will to forgive, or in some way His justification in forgiving? 
Or - is this objective effect in the Atonement wrought entirely 
upon Jhhe evil and not on God at all?
Now when we remember that God is the Author of the Atones 
ment - that is is entirely the outcome and the freo gift of 
His love and grace - it may seem a strange statement to make, 
but it appears to me the simple truth, that all post Anselmic 
theories of the doctrine, notwithstanding their great variety 
of type, all theories which admit an objective element at all, 
tend to regard the Atonement made, by Christ as taking effect, 
in one way or other, on God, and as being therefore necessita- 
ted by something in God. They appear to minimise or fail to 
appreciate the real place of evil, its significance and power.
The point I wish to make is in stressing the evil - the evil 
will in man, the evil principle, the evil one - or whatever it 
turn out to be.
It is always interesting to look on the road which the 
philosophical or theological pilgrim has travelled and to de- 
tect the point at which he would appear to have taken a wrong 
turning. We have such a point (as I would hold) in Descartes, 
when he gave an unduly subjective twist to epistemological
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inquiry; and I am suggesting that Anselm, with his vigorous 
and scornful refutation of the Patristic idea of a "Ransom to 
the Devil", gave a wrong impetus to the Medieval thinkers and 
to the whole vast body of Reformation Theology - the effects of 
which may still be discerned in the most recent writers on the 
Atonement to day.
In his great thought of the Outraged Honour of God, and the 
need for an Infinite and Equivalent Satisfaction for an infinite 
Debt - based on the conceptions of Chivalry and the Germanic 
penal law - what Anselm did was -f TO SHIFT THE WHOLE NECESSITY 
FOR THE DEATH OF CHRIST FROM THE SIDE OF THE DEVIL TO THE SIDE 
OF GOD. I desire to suggest that IT MUST BE SHIFTED BACK AGAIN 
if we are to understand the Atonement.
Signs are not wanting that Atonement theory is moving in this 
direction - see pages 96 - 99 of the Thesis.
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APPENDIX C.
The "Ransom to the Devil". 
I maintain that the truth lying in that picturesque old phrase,
"a Ransom to the Devil", comes nearer than anything else to 
supplying a satisfactory rationale of the Atonement. God has 
an actual struggle in redeeming man - not a sham fight for the 
purposes of display or (in any sense whatever) for His own satis- 
faction. God saves by the skin of His teeth and by an agonising 
conflict.
In eveiy type of theory which ignores and leaves out of sight 
the grim and terrible truth adumbrated in this ancient idea of 
a real ransom paid to, and a real deliverance from, an actual 
inimical power, there will be found something artificial, some- 
thing failing to satisfy in depth and completeness.
It is artificial and ultimately shallow to regard God as send- 
ing forth His Son to die; in order to justify Himself; to 
satisfy His law; to vindicate His holiness; to preserve His 
moral government of the world; to give an exhibition, a revela- 
tion - even the supreme revelation - of His love and willingness 
to forgive; and (a fortiopj.) to punish, to punish man or sin 
or Christ. But I sec; nothing artificial or unreal in the thought 
that God had to do this in order to deliver man; God did not 
do it in order to be (in any sense whatever) right with Himself, 
but actually to redeem man. Much has been made of persuading 
man to repent by Christ^s death; not enough has been said of 
actually enabling man to repent and return by delivering him, 




I find that Dr. Horton, following the idea of Scott Lidgett's 
"Spiritual Principle in the Atonement", has given in the 
"Theological Symposium" (p.136-7) a fine and concise summary 
of theories of the Atonement - that is, of the real contribu- 
tion made by each theory to the doctrine; and it may be use- 
ful (in order to have before the mind the course which thought 
has followed on this matter, and to avoid undue repition of 
details which appear in most discussions of the subject) to 
quote here what he says ;-
"The contributions of the g^eat thinkers all have their 
assignes place. The first great thinker on the subject ? 
Anselm, established once for all the notion that God Him- 
self was concerned, in order to perfect His work in 
creation, to deal with sin. He showed also how man of 
himself could not make a satisfaction or get rid of it 
without weakening the sense of it. This was the main 
thought contributed before the Reformation. Calvinism 
added the notion that our Lord's life was a necessary 
preparation for the atoning sacrifice, that we are in 
abiding relationship with Him, and His Incarnation brought 
Him into the experience of the consequences of sin. 
To this, Grotius added the thought that by the sacrifece , 
of Christ the moral government of the universe was vindi- 
cated, ̂ j^^^^yi^7^ft4¥ft*^^^^»fe i and the Divine 
judgement on sin expressed."
  (When one thinks of it,
this idea of Grotius, which is often repeated by preachers 
and by popular writers on the Atonement to day, is - to 
say it without offence - really one of the most absurd 
thoughts, the most hateful theoughts, ever introduced 
into the history of the doctrine. In what possible sense 
can the moral government of the universe be vindicated 
by the slaying of the innocent, and how is God's mind on 
sin expressed by the punishment of the Sinless? These 
questions, though put forward a thousand times throu^iout 
the ages, arc still entirely relevant and are absolutely 
condemnatory of that theory)   
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"In modern tines Dr.Dale has the credit of bringing out 
the conception of righteousness as sonething quite distinct 
from the arbitrary will even of God. and the further credit 
of showing that God nust nark the ill desert of sin by 
suffering, so that the sufferings of Christ are a necessary 
element in the Atonement. Dr.MdLeod Campbell laid a string 
stress on the spiritual nature of the Atonement, even on 
the need of entering into the nind of God concerning sin. 
('Anen 1 to God's verdict on it). Maurice added the notion 
that the Lord fulfils the true life of humanity and be- 
comes the sinles.: root of a new humanity. In Bishop 
Westcott there is a contributory touch, that it was part 
of the Lord's work to be made perfect through suffering, 
which evolved His highest capabilities. Bushnell brought 
out the conrection between love and sacrffice, and 
showed how Cgrist entered into the curse. Finally, Ritschl 
has insisted on the vital bond of love between God and nan, 
and on the truth that the essence of the Atonement is in 
ethical relations".
The spiritual nature of the Atonement, emphasised by Scott 
Lidgett, Hofcton, etc., helps to illustrate for the present day 
nind Maurice's great idea of Christ as our true life offering 
the perfect sacrifice for us and in us. No one can bear 
physical pain or nake a physical sacrifice for another, but 
spiritually, Christ can interpenetrate our spirit and so His 
offering and sacrifice becone ours.
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APPENDIX E. 
Kant - the "Self-Legislative Will"
Modern Theology owes a very great deal to Kant's tremendous 
fact of the SELF-LEGISLATIVE WILL. Indeed it is a real point de 
repere for Modern Theology, although this is not always recog- 
nised or acknowledged.
Kant's famous Categorical Imperative flows, as Ueberweg shows, 
from the Autonomy of the Will ;-
"Our moral dignity depends on our moral self-determination. 
Man in his character as a rational being or a thing-in- 
itself, gives the law to himself as a sensuous being or 
a phenomenon. In this (says Kant, who here treats the 
difference between thing-in-itself and phenomenon as a 
difference of worth) is contained the origin of duty." 
(Ueberweg. Hist.of Phil,II.I80-I)
It will be useful to recall Kant's own words on this matter 
(Groundwork. Engl.Trans.42,38-9) ;-
"Man's will is to be regarded as not subjected to the law 
simply, but so subjected as to be self-legislative, and 
upon this account, subjected to the law of which himself 
is the.author.
The will is cogitated as a faculty to determine itself 
to act according to the representation of given laws; 
and such a power can be met with in reasonable agents 
only. Now what serves the will for the ground of its 
self-determination is called the 'end'. Let there be granted 
somewhat who3e existence has in itself an absolute worth, 
and which, as in itself an end, is in itself the ground of 
its own given laws. Then herein and here alone would lie 
the ground of the possibility of a Categorical Imperative, 
i.e., of a practical law. Now we may cease to wonder hou
all former attempts to investigate the ultimate principle 
of morals should have proved unsuccessful. The inquirers 
saw that man was bound to law by the idea of duty; but 
it did not occur to them that he was bound simply by his 
own law universal, the prerogative of his nature fitting 
him for a universal legislator, and so subjecting him to 
the law emanating from his own will. This autonomy of 
the will is the supreme principle of morality."
I have quoted these familiar and fundamental words of Kant
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because both Coleridge and Maurice, of whom I an treating, 
derive from this in their final ideas on the Atonement - 
Maurice through Coleridge. This epoch-making conception of the 
will proved germinal in those fundamental thoughts which lie 
at the basis of the theory in both writers - such as Evil and 




As the difference between the Categories of Understanding and 
the Ideas of Reason is one of the main pillars of the entire 
Kantian system, Kant's own view of the matter in the Critique 
of Pure Reason may be recalled ;-
"We defined the Understanding as the 'faculty of rules'; 
Reason may be defined as the 'faculty of principles'. 
The Understanding may be a faculty for the production of 
unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the Reason is a 
faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the Un- 
derstanding) under principles. Reason therefore never ap- 
plies directly to experience or to any sensuous object; 
its object is on the contrary the Understanding; to the 
manifold condition of which it gives a unity a priori by 
rroans of conceptions, a unity which may be called a ra- 
tional unity and which is of a nature very different from 
the unity produced by the Understanding.
The results of all the dialectical attempts of pure 
Reason not only confirm the truth of what we have already 
proved in our Analytic, namely, that all inferences which 
would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallaci- 
ous and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us 
this important lesson, that human reason has a natural 
indlination to overstep these limits, and that trans- 
cendental ideas are as much the natural property of reason 
as categories are of the understanding. There exists this 
difference, however, that while the categories never mis- 
lead us. outward objects always being in perfect harmony 
therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistable illusions, 
the severest and most subtle criticism being required to 
save us from the fallacies which they induce. 11 
(Critique of Pure Reason. Engl.Trans,13ohn.pp.2I3.2I4.394)
It is obvious that Coleridge's view is based generally on 
Kant here, the main difference being that Coleridge in his 
treatment of the matter entirely abandons Kant's scepticism. 
The ideas of Reason for Coleridge are not illusory, they are 
facts, they give actual truth, In this he differs materially 
from Kant.
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"There is nothing that Kant repeats more frequently or more 
unambiguously than the statement that these (the Ideas of Reason) 
are mere ideas, yielding no cognition proper, but entangling 
the mind in metaphysical paralogisms and antinomies. They have 
regulative but not constitutive truth. We are not entitled to 
state them as dogmas". (Caldecott and Mackintosh, Theism. I 81) 
Kant of course in his Practical Reason brings back as faith or 
belief and moral certainty what he had previously ruled out as 
actual knowledge; but for Coleridge, what Reason gives us is 
knowledge, direct vision. There is not a trace of the dualism 
so deeply embedded in Kant's thought, Coleridge's whole em- 
phasis rests on the despising of the Understanding as a faculty 
for giving us spiritual truth, while Kant despises the Reason 
as such.
In this respect Coleridge has been regarded as being nearer 
to Jacobi than to Kant. Ueberweg says;-
"Coleridge in the Aids to Reflection insisted on the dis- 
tinction between Reason and Understanding more in the sense 
of Jacobi than Kant. Jacobi, the philosopher of faith, 
sought to establish the authority of rational and direct 
faith in opposition to philosophic, system-mailing thought. 
He censures Kant's argumentation in favour of the validity 
of the postulates in the Critique of Pure Reason as being 
without force, since holding a thing true for merely prac- 
tical reasons (believing merely because one needs to be- 
lieve) is self destructive, and held that we have as well 
an immediate conviction of the supra-sensible, to which 
Kant's postulates of the Practical Reason relate, as of 
the existence of sensible objects. This conviction he de- 
nominates faith; in later works he terms the faculty by 
which we immediately apprehend and are aware of the supra- 
sensible, reason. 'There lives in us ' he says 'a spirit 
which comes immediately from God, and conststutes man's
most intimate essence. fe enz tnc bold assertion that we believe in GOQt  iev ^ althouph we 
cannot see Him with the bodily eyes!" (Hist, of Phil. 200)
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This is exactly the sense thaf'Reason" bears for Coleridge - 
direct vision, immediate, real contact, in man's relation to the 
spiritual or supernatural. The Kantian want of theoretic cer- 
tainty and despair of actual knowledge with regard to these 
supersensuous realities, is entirely surmounted in Jacobi and 
in Coleridge.
"With Jacobi, opposed to the explanatory understanding, 
we must acknowledge a non-explanatory, positively re- 
velatory, unconditionally deciding reason, or belief of 
reason. As there is a perception of sense, so there must 
be a perception of reason, against which latter, demon- 
stration will as little avail as against the former." 
(Schwegler . History of Philosophy.Engl.Trans.p.252)
Jacobi himself says ;-
"The reason is the direct contact with reality, which it 
affirms and even is. It apprehends the 'me' and the 'thee 1 , 
it apprehends above all the great Thee, God: apprehends, 
and we may say, appropriates. And it apprehends them at one 
bound - in one ^alto mortale - because it is really in 
implicit possession of them." (Jacobi's Works. III. 53. 
Quoted by Wallace, Logic of Hegel. I. 33).
All this is exactly Coleridge. Kant however, as is well known, 
is by no means consistent in his scepticism, and indeed could 
really be made to admit, in some place or other of his work, 
all that Coleridge would contend for as to the truth given by 
reason* Coleridge himself is acute enough to discern this. There
are some very interesting remarks on the matter to be found
tkoprq f>kt4 
in his La c t u r o a on Sl
After speaking of Kant as almost a Platonist (to whom ideas
are constitutive) rather, than an Aristotelian (to whom they 
are merely regulative), he proceeds; ,,Kant had becn in
imminent danger of persecution during the reign of the 
late king of Prussia, and it is probable that he had 
little inclination in his old age to act over again the 
fortunes and the haii>-breadth escapes of Wolf ..... .His
caution was groundless. In spite therefore of his own de- 
clarations, I couldijevcr believe that it was possible for 
him to have meant no more by his Koumenon, or thing-in- 
itself , than his mere words express; or that in his own
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conception he confined the whole plastic power to the 
forms of the intellect, leaving for the external cause, 
for the materiale of our sensations, a matter without form, 
which is diubtless inconceivable. I. entertain doubts like- 
wise, whether in his own mind he laid all the stress which 
he appears to do on the moral postulates." (Biog.Lit.77.)
Coleridge here expresses a doubt as to the reality of Kant's 
scepticism. Does he mean that he really believes Kant's ideas 
of reason to be not merely regulative but constitutive?
Indeed however, the whole subject both in Coleridge and in 
Kant is more or less confused. Neither writer, it must be ob- 
served, is entirely consistent in hi ideas of the distinction 
between reason and understanding, For example, Kant says;-
11 If pure reason can be practical and is actually so, as 
the consciousness of the moral law proves, then it is 
still only one and the same reason which, whether in a 
theoretical or a practical point of view, judges accord- 
ing to a priori principles,&c.(Grit.of Pract.Reas.II.2)
On this Caldecott and Mackintosh make the following comment; 
"This identification of the theoretical and practical reason 
if pressed, would go far to undermine the dualism between 
thought and being which runs through 30 much of Kant's 




Further Point of contact - Rationalising, (p.35) 
Kote on Epistemology - Descartes' error.
There is one further point which is essential in the teaching
the two writers and which I would refer to at some length 
in this Appendix.
In the aim and purpose of all their work in Christian Theology 
both Coleridge and Maurice are bent on "rationalising", They 
desire - in words I nay borrow from F.R.Tennant - "to estab- 
lish the reasonableness of Christian conviction and the intel- 
lectual status of Theology."
   
This is important. It involves that both thinkers believe 
profoundly that in our thought we are in touch with ultimate 
reality. Both are unaffected by that radical dualism which has 
dogged the steps of Philosophy ever since Descartes - and which 
swallows up Kant. Both also are free from the psychological 
method of starting from individual experience in the search 
for truth - a method for which, in modern philosophy, Descartes 
is also responsible, and which recent theology owes largely to 
Schleiermacher; a method, it may be added, which niakes it 
extremely doubtful if reality is ever actually reached at all. 
Coleridge's "reason" and Maurice's "participation in the Divine" 
mean that man's hi£frest thought is in unquestioned contact 
with the ultimately real.
It may be of interest\to refer to the subtle point of pure 
philosophy here involved; it .is by no means beside our present
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question, for in this whole matter of the Christian Redemption 
the modern mind must be certain that it is truth, ultimate and 
absolute truth, that we are dealing with (so far of course as 
that is accessible in any case), and the question of the relation 
of our human knowledge to reality is one that vitally concerns, 
for the thinking mind, any matter in hand,
In that distinguished book, "Philosophical Theology" by 
F.R.Tennat of Camgridge, we have a typical present day example 
of that subjective, psychological tendency that characterises 
the prevailing view of the relation of Subject and Object in 
knowledge. It is actually a false epistemology, an artificial 
separation struck between the self and the objects of its 
knowledge which really dates back to the original illegitimate 
and unnecessary dualism of Descartes.
Tennant says;-
"The ordo cognoscendi is the sole route that possibly may 
lead to a known orcTo essendi; psychology is the fundamen- 
tal science, the first propaideutic to philosophy." 
(Op.Cit.I.p.II)
And this psychological obsession is well illustrated thus;
"The notion of a substance as an abiding reality is doubt- 
less derived from knowledge of the self. It is knowledge 
of self and of other selves that encouraged the venture 
involved in believing things to continue a life history 
when not being perceived. Thus, to conceive of "things" 
is to personify, to assimilate to self, to interpret 
scattered data in terms of self, and so to understand. 
Thinghood, permanence, substantiality, efficiency and 
interaction (which we attribute to the non-self) are all 
partial analogues derived from self as paradigm."(I,177)
"Our knowledge of. the external world is, from its very 
foundations, a matter of more or^less precarious and 
alogical analogy, rather than of self-evidence; of hope
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and venture that have been rewarded. Its certainty or 
necessity is practical not logical; its exact intellec- 
tual status is that of 'probable belief ' .(I. 183)
The position here stated is at once recognised. It plunges us 
into the midst of a well known philosophical quagmire - the re- 
lation between the mind and its object. This is a perennial 
question, a question which has to be settled at the threshold 
of every system of metaphysics or of theology, and there have 
been and still are various schools of thought. One who would 
deal with any fundamental' question whatever - as I am dealing 
with the doctrine of Atonement   must gain some standpoint on 
the matter satisfying to his own mind; and therefore, in spite 
of all that has come and gone in the turbulent history of 
mental science, I venture enlrc&ly to question the whole 
position here exemplified in Tennant's work. I cannot pretend 
of course to come forward with a refutation of this subjec- 
tive standpoint which will satisfy all - inasmuclias the Scot- 
tish Realists, Hegel, and other distinguished persons have 
tried to do so and have failed! - but what I can do is to ex- 
press the conviction I have always held that the whole dif- 
ficulty is an artificial one and arose from the initial error 
of Descartes. Descartes with his "dubitatio" and his "coglto 
ergo sum',' built a wall around the self, which philosophy - 
misled by Descartes - has never really been able to break 
through. He put asunder what God Had joined. He made a
chasm between the self and its objects which has never since 
been bridged, and which ought never to have been there.
, *
The whole attitude is wrong* We do not really start with self
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at all in our knowledge of things, nor do we start with know- 
ledge itself as a psychological process; we start with "outward" 
objects, "outward" reality as the primary thing. To begin with, 
we know nothing of knowledge - what we ..know is objects. It is 
conscious reflection (like Descartes 1 ) that begins to concen- 
trate on the knowing process, and then objects disappear. (It is 
a good thing after all, no doubt, that Descartes did nake this 
error, for it led philosophy into a path which, while it has 
lain amid infinite agonies, at last brought us to the magni- 
ficent country of Kant and Hegeli)
But I hold that Descartes would have been much more justified 
in doubting the self as an independent entity, than in doubting 
its objects. The primary certainty after all is not the self 
but the things we know. These are the indubitable things, and 
when the self begins to find itself and to know itself, it is 
in these outer objects it knows itself. Of course, once reflec- 
tion has begun, and when the thinker has begun to follow Des- 
cartes and to understand his famous "doubt", the mind is led 
into a track which it is extremely difficult if not impossible 
to get out of, and the painful and protracted journey of mo- 
dern philosophy begins.
Self is the snare, intellectually as well as morally. 
Descartes was sure and certain only of himself - in reality 
the onetthing he actually knew nothing about untilfte began to 
reflect! - and so the "shades of the prison house begin to 
close."
To return to Tennant's work, then, I suggest that psychology
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is not the fundamental science, nor is the ordo cognoscendi 
prior to the ordo essendi. The outward, the given, is the 
primary real, and should never have been made "outward" at all.
In Theology is not this very much what the Barthian school 
has been emphasising? Schleiermacher started Theology on a 
wrong route, beginning from the psychological point of view, 
from man's Christian experience and feeling. But that is not the 
first thing. It is the object, the given, that is first - God- 
Not experience, but that which is given in experience, is the 
true starting point. Start with reality and never leave it - 
not with reflection upon the process of experiencing, or with 
knowledge. The psychological, ifxperemtial starting point cre- 
ates a dualism which no man can reconcile.
Coleridge (with Jacobi rather than Kant), and Maurice (with 
Hofinann,&c.) assume as a starting point that point of reality 
and truth which they never lose and never question. They start 
with that which is logically and really prior to any psycholo- 
gical process as consciously known; with God, with the actual,
i
direct vision of reality. In primitive, naive experience, God 
is a reality ^psychological reflection comes later), and God. 
given in experience should be the real starting point for 
Theology.
Notwithstanding the ages of profound and painful philoso- 
phising, I believe one is justified in thinking that something 
is far wrong when it is considered a positive feat t a wonder- 
ful and subtle victory of intellectual gymnastics possible only
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to the few - to reach reality and to know the real! - when the 
plain fact is that all men are living and working, rejoicing and 
suffering and knowing in the midst of the real all along from 
the cradle to the gravel With deference to the philosophers, 
there is something wrong and out of joint. The difficulty must 
be artificial. But ife is - to the present day - a triumphant 
feat, the clever act of a champion philosopher, to get at reality!
In "The Psychological Approach to Reality" Francis says; "The
A
problems concerning knowledge are seen to be psychological 
problems"(p.4) . A wrong assumption at once. They arenothing of 
the sort. The problems concerning knowledge (i.e. epistemologi- 
cal problems) are logical or philosophical rather than psycho- 
logical. He describes knowledge as "a subjective or psycho- 
logical event with an objective reference." This is knowledge 
as seen later and studied by the psychologist. In knowledge 
itself to begin with, the "objective reference" is the essence 
of the fact. Aveling confuses Psychology and Epistemology from 
the start. If you begin with psychology in your thoughts of re- 
ality, you will never get beyond it.
"The auest j ro recurs; is there a truth relation, as we con-
ceive this, between something mental on the one hand, and 
something objective or extra-mental on the other? What is 
the criterion in virtue of which, supposing a truth rela- 
tion to be pojsible, we may know that it actually obtains 
in any given case?"(Aveling.I7) .
From the point of view of the professed psychologist such a 
question is one of quite extraordinary interest; but looked at 
from another point of view, it well illustrates what I am con- 
tending against - the psychological obsession in epigtcmology.
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The question Aveling puts assumes a separation which does not 
really exist between subject and object in the fact of knowledge, 
It is this assumption that gave modern philosophy (with Des- 
cartes) its false start. It is the assumption underlying the 
whole of Kant's critical work. It creates an artificial dualism. 
Kant's "Ideas of Reason" would never have been called by him 
"illusory" but for the thought contained in this question of 
Aveling. Aveling says;-
"It is from the immediate awareness of the substance or 
substantiality of the self that our notion of substance is 
derived and analogically applied to other experiences; if 
we look on a lump of gold, or a tree or horse as substances 
it is not because we have any direct intuition of reality 
lying behind their phenomena; but because we interpret 
the phenomena in the l&ght of our immediate insight into 
our own subsistent self"(207).
I question this. It is a common assumption, but it is simply 
the psychological obsession. On page 313 (Aveling) we read; 
"We have found an extra-mental world long before we have begun 
to reflect upon it, or upon the way in which we have come to 
believe in it. We are in fact, naturally realists before we can 
methodically become solipsists."
That is the truth. And it is reflection, then, that creates 
the difficulty about the relation of the mind to the object. 
Coleridge and Maurice are both among those who bring us back to 
the fresh air and freedom of a pre-Cartesian possession and en- 
joynent of the actual reality*
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APPENDIX H. (Thesis,99-103) 
Divine Causality 
Divine "Impassibility"
In a very interesting discussion entitled "The Necessity of 
Redemption", by P.Hartill, the Divine Causality apperas under 
the thought of the transmutation of evil into a higher good.
"If the existence of evil is not to reduce the total 
goodness of the universe, this can be achieved in ine way 
only - by a creative act of God which transmutes the evil 
by drawing from it a greater good, a good which comes into 
existence only through the evil and its transmutation.(35) 
An adequate atoning act........must be an act which trans- 
mutes the very meaning of that fact which it catonot undo. 
Just so has the crime of the Cros^ been transformed into 
a unique manifestation of Divine love, so that Christian 
devotion has expressed itself in the famous words, "0 
felix culpa quae talem et tantum meruit habere Redenp- 
toreml" It must be such an act that the world is better 
than it would have been had all else remained the same 
and yet sin had not been committed." (88)
This is a well known position. Evil is the means to a greater 
good, therefore ultimately it is not evil at all - a familiar 
form of theodicy, the "justifying of the ways of God to man" 
Hartill arrives at this on account of his somewhat mechanical 
postulate that if God is to be perfect goodness, the total sun 
of good in the world must not be diminished. But if evil is evil 
at all in any sense, if there is any evil existing even for a 
nonent although it nay have the best possible purpose, the 
sun total of goodness is diminished thereby. Such mechanical 
ideas are alien to a truly ethical universe.
In order to naintain unimpaired the Divine transcedence, the 
omnipotence and "all-in-allnes" of God, Hartill also brings
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forward the conception of the Divine "Impassibility", which has 
recently been receiving much attention.
"St.Thomas Aquinas teaches that the passive potentiality 
which is the principle of being acted upon by something 
else (principium patiendi ab alio) cannot exist in God. 
We find that Anselm not only staTed the problem but gave 
the right answer when he said that God is impassible in 
Himself but full of compassion in respect to us. We may 
conclude that the doctrine of Divine Impassibility......
is valuable in thought because it guards against false ideas 
of a finite God and conserves the important truth of the 
transcendence of the Creator. It also preserves the assu- 
rance, which modern theories would take away, that amid 
all the changes of this fleeting world we may repose in 
God's eternal changelessness"(II2).
But it is to be remarked that God's transcendence, perfection, 
changelcssness, etc., are to be construed as qualities belong- 
ing to an ethical Person, a Father, and that they characterise 
God as such. They do not exist in God as they would, for example 
in a physical whole or a metaphysical absolute. In regard to this 
whole subject, one cannot but observe that the ethical often 
tends to be lost sight of.
Mr.Bertrand R.Brasnett has given us an exceedingly able study
of this question in a book called "The Suffering of the Impas-
.*.
sible God", in the preface to which he says that this is an "ex- 
tremely difficult problem", in which "a dogmatic temper is at 
once undesirable and unscientific". 
The following is his view of Impassibility;-
"We must ground the Divine Impassibility on the Divine 
Purpose. Ever passible in His sympathy, God is eternally 
impassible in His will"(p.6).
That is a reasonable statement. And with regard to God being 
the ultimate Author of evil, Brasnett speaks cautiously thus;-
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"Evil is God's responsibility to this extent at least, 
that without Him it could not be. It draws life from Hin at 
second hand, for He holds in being those who give life to 
evil(p.I)."
"It has to be remembered that such power ro constrain 
Deity as may be possessed by the sins of men was given to 
them by Godjj28)." "God in His infinite wisdom and per- 
fect goodnews thought fit to create in a certain way......
By creating a potentially sinful world God was seeking to 
obtain certain results presumably unobtainable in any less 
hazardous fashion"(73-4).
Thia is commendable as being cautious, tentative, undogmatic; 
but there are two assumptions underlying this position which 
I have already dealt with as being essentially unethical, and 
which, therefore, cannot be allowed; First, that God in creating 
free will must be regarded as somehow ultimately responsible 
for the sin it originates; and Second, that evil may be in 
reality after all a good because the means to a good that couM 
not have been without it. Such assumptions involve again the 
idea of the Divine Causality.
On the other hand, Brasnett has strong words on the reality 
and power of evil;-
"For Christian ethics sin is never negligible, it is of 
profound importance and vast significance. It may be hor- 
rible, loathsome, deadly, but whatever it is,it is never 
a thing indifferent. It may cost man his hope of eternal 
life; it has cost God the life of an Eternal Son. For us 
sin mars and injures even the bliss of Deity, it breaks 
in upon the holy joy of God, and lessens it: it stay;j the 
purpose of the Almighty, and chacks the will of the Eter- 
nal(72). M
There at once is all I contend for. Only I say - all that is 
ultimately real, not a mere appearance to us; and a fortiori, 
not a cunning artifice designed and put fonvard by God Himself 
for higher purposes! It seems to no that the Divine Impassibi-
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lity (if the truth of that doctrine were established), would 
involve the merely apparent character of hunan freedom and the 
purely phenomenal character of evil. Neither will nor evil is real 
if God cannot really suffer.
But Brasnett, while like a true student he is searching for 
light and is willing to be fair all round to every side of the 
question, is certainly sound at heart on this matter. He says;-
"Even such an absolute Creator is in a sense dependent on 
His creation, both before and after He has callrd it into 
being.....A God Who cither intends to create, or Who has 
created, is not an absolutely unfettered God; He is to 
some extent dependent on His thoughts or deeds; if He were 
not, whatever else He might be, He would not be rational. 
(73).
"We find the Divine blessedness in the consciousness of a 
will that knows - not that it will prevail - but that at 
whatever cost of agony or tears ? it will continue to will 
the right. The power of God's will is seen not so much in 
its power to realise itself externally ? as in its power to 
be utterly unmoved by, and completely impassible to , 
moral evil"(148).
Now what can that mean but that God has an antagonist - an 
antagonist with real power over against God, power to make God 
suffer - an antagonist in whom lies the real necessity for the 
Atonement, the necessity for the death of Christ if man is to 
be delivered?
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APPENDIX I. (Thesis,103-107) 
On The Devil.
A vast literature has gathered around this figure. As a good 
example I nay recall some observations of Sir Walter Scott on the 
character of Louis XIth of France:-
11 That sovereign was of a character so purely selfish - so 
guiltless of entertaining any purpose unconnected with his 
ambition, covetousness, and desire of selfish enjoyment, 
that he almost seems an incarnation of the devil himself, 
permitted to do his utmost to corrupt our idea of honour 
at its very source. Nor is it to be forgotten that Louis 
possessed to a great extent that caustic wit which can 
turn into ridicule all that a man does for any other per- 
son 'a advantage but his own, ans was, therefore, poculi  
. arly qualified to play the part of a cold hearted and 
sneering fiend.
In this point of view, Goethe's conception of the chara^-
ter and reasoning of Mephistopheles, the tempting spirit in 
the singular play of Fauat, appears to me more happy than 
that which has been formed by Byron, and even than the 
Satan of Milton. These last great authors have given to the 
Evil Principle something which elevates and dignifies his 
wickedness; a sustained and unconquerable resistance 
against Omnipotence itself - a lofty scorn of suffering 
compared with submission, and all those points of attraction 
in the author of evil, which have induced Burns and others 
to consider him as the hero of the Paradise Lost. The 
great German poet has, on the contrary, rendered his se- 
ducing spirit a being who, otherwise totally unimpassioned, 
seems only to have existed for the purpose of increasing 
by his persuasions and temptations, the mass of moral evil, 
and wh6 calls forth by Ms seductions those slumbering 
passions which otherwise might have allowed the human 
being who was the object of the evil spirit's operations 
to pass the tenour of his life in tranquility. For this 
-purpose Mephistopheles is, like Louis XI, endowed with an 
acute and depreciating spirit of caustic wit, which is 
employed incessantly in undervaluing and vilifying all 
actions the consequences of which do not lead certainly 
and directly to self-gratification" (Introduction to 
Quentin Durward).
Bunyan may be taken as a supreme example of the struggle of the 
individual man with the devil - which is so common in Religious 
Biography. In the Hibbert Journal, Vol.XXVII. there is a very
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acute analysis by Dr.J .B.Baillie of Bunyan's spiritual struggle.
"Bunyan was from the first thrown back on hiuself; self 
analysis and self criticism became his preoccupation and his 
only resort in finding a way out of his perplexities......
The accumulation of sins committed in the past rose up in 
judgement to condemn him beyond dispute, and these could 
not be forgotten or repudiated. He was answerable for them. 
He plumbs the very depths of self will, which is the essence 
of sin, and touches bottom when he deliberately rejects 
in a mood of wilfulness what he clearly knows to be the 
only means of securing the righteousness he seeks. This, 
which he calls the sin against the Holy Ghost, gave him as 
might be expected the greatest agony of soul...... It is
small surprise that at times his brain seemed to reel, and 
that he lost his balance. With a less solid and ^ane per- 
sonality the strain would have proved too much. It is 
probable that his mental security was maintained just be- 
cause he regarded all this evil as due not to himself as 
such but to the outside agency of the devil. ITis nature 
was sinful and evil because it had been corrupted by the 
- devil. If the evil had had its origin really in himself 
his nature would have been shattered by the struggle. As 
long as he could put all the blame on the devil he could 
ascribe the cause to something outside himself. The 
struggle for freedom became a struggle with a real cause 
apart from himself; the struggle was a real struggle, not 
a process of aclf destruction. The belief in the devil 
therefore kept him sane, while it left the devil occupied 
in devising endless means of torturing him. He seems to 
have doubted everything except the reality of the devil. 
According to Bunyan in the Holy War the devil was an arch- 
angel who was expelled from Heaven for rebellion, and 
finds occupation by way of revenge in thwarting the Di- 
vine purpose for the universe, and more particularly in 
captivating the soul of man."
Dr.Baillie adds; "It is not difficult to understand how 
the devil came out of Heaven - the difficulty is to under- 
stand how he .ever came into itl (pp. 391-6-8)"
As the writer further says - "Neither Milton nor Bunyan throws 
any light on the subjectl"
Who has thrown light on that subject? The entrance of evil 
into the universe, wh<& can tell us?
The thing of supreme importance in this account of Bunyan 's 
struggle is this;- that sin is my own - yet the devil's* I an
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answerable for it, yet I retain my sanity under the weight of 
that responsibility because, in fighting it, I am fighting an 
actual adversary outside myself. It is I, and yet not I. There 
is a deep mystery but also a deep truth there. "Nevertheless I 
live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me". "The good I would 
I do not, the evil that I would not, that I do".
Sin is "original". Coleridge is absolutely right. It originates 
in me, in my will. But there appears another will in my will, 
working with it, attacking it. Is that other will jointly re- 
sponsible, or do I take up its guilt entirely into my own will? 
Perhaps the best that can be said is what appears in Bunyan's 
case; I am responsible, but in such a way - by reason of the 
other will which I feel to be acting in and on my will - that 
I preserve my sanity, and in fighting to destroy the evil, I 
am not entirely fighting for my own destruction. 
(Maurice's own fine analysis of the experience here in question 
is quoted in this Thesis, pp. 104-5) .
The same thought of an evil person or principle acting on 
my will and somehow controlling me, appears in Moberly's idea 
of "Incomplete Penitence". His doctrine of the Atonement is that 
of a "Vicarious Penitence" on the part of Christ for us; and 
discussing this, he says;- "Because sin is part of me, part of 
what I am, I cannot wholly detest it even if I would. Penitence 
is always incomplete". (Quoted by W.H.Moberly, "Foundations". 
p,295)
That is to say, it is _I who sin, keep sinning, love sin and 
cling to it, or am helpless under it. Part of me never repents,
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so to speak. That is how the devil acts in me. That is the ul- 
timate evil". It is this that Christ has to fight in His death.
